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                                            ABSTRACT 
 
The present research will argue that the IMTFE, considered as a strategic legalism tool, 
can be explained only when placed within broader context of the Allied powers’ postwar 
policies both at international and regional level. Japan ascendance to the role of Western ally 
and its strategic value did not result in the prompt release of Class A war criminals, quite 
the contrary, it reached a deadlock in which legalism no longer played a strategic role. This 
issue exposed the inconsistencies in US expectations regarding Japan’s rearmament and 
started to inhibit progress on the important security agenda in US-Japan diplomatic 
relations. The dynamics of US-Japan negotiations regarding the Class A war criminals 
within the broader war criminals agenda, as it will be shown, placed in the hands of 
Japanese government a powerful tool to instigate its own visions of security vis-à-vis the US. 
Consequentially, the IMTFE and Class A war criminals which once represented the symbol 
of Japanese defeat started to become an asset for Japan in its efforts to achieve postwar 
reintegration. Hence, the justice meted out at IMTFE changed its quality in that from a 
strategic tool placed in the hands of the victorious allies it became a strategic tool placed in 
the hands of Japan, a defeated party in war.  
 
KEY WORDS: the IMTFE, justice, international order, war criminals, legalism, clemency 
and parole  
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INTRODUCTION  
 
On November 22, 2017, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) convicted General Ratko Mladic, the former Bosnian Serb commander to life 
imprisonment on counts of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. It was the 
last missing piece that would allow Tribunal to wind down its activities and “close [a] dark 
chapter in Europe” twenty-four years after the war. Yet, beyond the moral, ethical, and 
social conundrums still animating politicians and populace in the Balkans, arises a more 
important question of, ‘what manner of things has been perpetuated?’.  In other words, did 
the policies behind international criminal tribunals and their ever-improving laws and 
jurisprudence, centered on the non-use of force and protection of humanity, contribute to 
the preservation of an international order based on peace and stability through consistent 
application of these very postulates? Can dark chapters of history be closed by a judicial 
verdict? Not only have heads of states, government officials, and the highest ranking 
military officers been tried for one or several international crimes, but international criminal 
justice as an entity in and of itself been many times on trial on counts of questionable 
legality, impartiality, fairness, consistency, and effectiveness, to name a few.  
A similar problem surrounds the historic case of criminal justice that had been meted out 
to Japanese civilian and military leaders at the end of World War Two by the Allied powers 
through the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (hereafter IMTFE) widely known 
as the Tokyo Tribunal. Together with the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (IMT) 
it represents the first institutional manifestation of the idea that war can amount to not only 
an illegal, but also a criminal act allowing for individual responsibility of its main 
perpetrators. The immediate postwar premise that the war crimes tribunals would 
constitute an integral element of the peace-making process after 1945 had been tested in 
these two tribunals.  It has been applied somewhat intermittently since the establishment of 
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the ad hoc tribunals by the United Nations Security Council to respond to civil wars in the 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, only to gain a stronger foothold with the establishment of 
the International Criminal Court (ICC) as a permanent institutional mechanism of 
international criminal justice. Still, “the supreme international crime”1 tried exclusively at 
the above-mentioned international military tribunals—crime against peace or aggressive 
war—has remained poorly defined, therefore this ambiguity has enabled states to “opt out” 
from its use. 
The IMTFE or the Tokyo Tribunal was established on May 3, 1946, and symbolically set 
up in rooms of the Imperial War Ministry to prosecute twenty-eight Japanese military and 
civilian leaders for waging aggressive war in Asia-Pacific region. From the perspective of the 
defendants, who held the prominent positions in the Imperial Japan, they performed official 
duties in serving their country’s interests and the Emperor, but failed to win the war for 
which they were being prosecuted. In the eyes of the victors and victims, these men were 
criminals who ought to be severely punished for planning, waging, and instigating 
aggressive war, and the atrocities inflicted upon the civilians and prisoners of war. On 
September 2, 1945, Japan signed the Instrument of Surrender by which it accepted the 
unconditional surrender and military occupation by the Supreme Commander Douglas 
MacArthur for the Allied powers (US, Britain, Australia, Soviet Union, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Canada, France, China, Philippines and India) each represented within the 
international prosecution section and panel of judges. Terms of the Potsdam Declaration of 
July 26, 1945 contained a provision on the stern justice to be meted out to all war criminals 
which posed the legal basis for the war crimes program in Japan. In a hurry to start criminal 
trials in Japan, as they had already been underway in Germany, the IMTFE Charter, 
modelled upon the IMT Charter concluded by the Big Four at London, was unilaterally 
proclaimed by the Supreme Commander on January 19, 1946. The other Allies got the 
                                                          
1 Nuremberg Judgement, October 1, 1946, 25.  
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chance to adopt policy decisions and amend the Charter within the scope of the Far Eastern 
Commission (FEC) seated in Washington. The defendants were provided with two defense 
counsels each, one Japanese defense counsel of their own choice, and an American who was 
there to help the defense in providing knowledge and clarifications on the Anglo-Saxon 
legal practice with which the Japanese were not familiar. In 1945, these were 
groundbreaking changes for international law and an exercise of traditional statecraft which 
considered war to be a political act of state, not a criminal one. The initial occupation plans 
were designed to perform disarmament, demilitarization, and democratization which would 
allow Japan to reintegrate a newly created postwar international order, open and 
multilateral in nature.2  The planners of these initial occupation policies envisaged that 
Nationalist China would emerge as the US ally in the region, not Japan.3 These initial 
miscalculations on China becoming the US ally were to be rectified only from 1949 with the 
Communist China winning the civil war and the outbreak of Korean War which made the 
US presence in the region through its military basis in Japan indispensable. In the 1950s 
Japan became the US pivot against the Communist-bulwark which placed the matters of the 
Japanese rearmament, presence of US basis in its territory at the top of diplomatic agenda, 
especially following the strategy of military containment introduced by President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower. After signing the Peace Treaty in 1951, Japan actively pursued reintegration 
into international institutions such as the World Bank, IMF, GATT, and ultimately the UN, 
which would help rebuild its economy and enhance its international prestige.    
Present-day international criminal justice has become mainly preoccupied with the 
application of humanitarian regimes—regulating state and non-state actors’ behavior in 
times of both war and peace—and excelled at further development and refinement of crimes 
against humanity, war crimes, and genocide, thus addressing mass atrocity. Although the 
                                                          
2 Iriye Akira, Japan and the Wider World: From Mid-Nineteenth Century to the Present (New York: Longman, 
1997), 100.   
3 Ibid., 101.  
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present predominant legal, political, and societal discourse displays unquestionable support 
and impulse in applying human rights and humanitarian regimes whenever the political 
willingness and strategic interests are present, the era of World War Two was a time of total 
war with less concern toward the humanitarian aspects of war. The momentum of 
brutalization of entire societies and cruelty of its participants gained such a momentum that 
the laws of war, although in vigor at that time, were disregarded or were inept to respond to 
the complexity of events. Invariably, in words of Brian Orend, every war is a “nasty 
business which, ultimately, calls forth more vice than virtue,”4 and this  applies to the case in 
point— the Pacific War. Despite the normative distinction between aggressive and defensive 
wars, ethically, such differentiations do not stand – if the ultimate test of morality is killing, 
then every war is immoral.5 At the outset, it is necessary to clarify that the present research 
does not question the veracity of Japanese atrocities, weight their morality, nor exculpates or 
justifies the behavior of wartime leaders in Imperial Japan. Rather, by adopting a posture of 
“moral minimalism,” it remains focused on understanding the mentalité, political decisions, 
international dynamics of the postwar period in which the prosecution of crime of 
aggressive war or crimes against peace took place.  
Contrary to the trial records of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg that 
were almost immediately published by its Secretariat in separate volumes from 1947 to 1949, 
the IMTFE records were lying in obscurity until the 1980s. The classic works about the 
Tokyo Tribunal lies between the extreme views that qualify its justice as “victors’ justice” or 
“justice of civilization.” The volume Victors’ Justice by Richard Minear published in 1971 
offers a fierce critique of the Tribunal’s legal postulates that were bluntly violated by 
American engagement in the Vietnam War. Minear rejects the legality of norms and 
procedural rules that were created ex post facto by the victorious Allies in order to get rid of 
                                                          
4 Brian Orend, The Morality of War (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2006), 247. 
5 Larry May, Aggression and Crimes Against Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 339.  
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Axis leaders and assign the ultimate responsibility for the Pacific war to the Japanese top 
brass. The selection of the members of the Tribunal was not merit based, but rather 
politically motivated to create a group of individuals who would be willing to carry out the 
postwar goals set by their respective governments and the Supreme Commander Douglas 
MacArthur — thus being prejudicial to the impartiality of justice and due process of law. He 
strongly argues that victors’ justice was blind to the similar atrocities committed and 
brutality used by the Allied powers to achieve victory. The rationale behind the Tribunal 
required seventeen years of Japanese history to be rewritten in order to fit the dominant 
narrative of Japan’s conspiracy to wage aggressive war, which resulted in history being 
profoundly flawed and simplified. In the author’s words, the historical complexities leading 
towards the Pacific War could not have been grasped by the legalistic framework.  
On the opposite spectrum of Minear’s reasoning stands the work of Japanese historian, 
Awaya Kentarō, whose book Tōkyō saiban e no michi criticizes the Allied powers for their 
half-hearted effort in prosecuting Japanese war crimes as well as the Allies’ crimes against 
the Japanese such as atomic bombing and firebombing which fell into oblivion. As he 
contends, the probative evidence for these crimes—bacteriological tests and vivisections, 
sex-slavery, opium and drug war—was available throughout the Trial while the former 
Japanese colonies were omitted from the bench. From the 1980s, with declassification of 
archives in the US, Japan, New Zealand, Australia, a new potential was born for the research 
field to thrive and produce expanded, yet more balanced narrative about the Tokyo Tribunal. 
Departing from the extreme views, series of books by Japanese historian Higurashi 
Yoshinobu, based on archival materials from the Allied powers’ countries and Japan, offer a 
new perspective on the Trial as a place of diplomacy, an institutional framework where the 
postwar international order was negotiated and created to reflect new balance of power. 
This approach allowed for a broader perspective, both thematically and temporally, while 
his analysis transcends the legal framework and embraces a broader perspective of the 
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Tribunal. As a part of the same effort the work of Yuma Totani, Japanese historian based in 
the US, stands out as an important contribution for its extensive new evidence that it 
brought to light which had transformative effect upon the conventional knowledge 
regarding specific themes of the Trial such as—the disharmonies of the work of the 
prosecutorial unit, non-evidence based criteria for the selection of the defendants, the 
existence of abundant evidence about Japanese atrocities in its former Empire at the time of 
the Trial, and legal incompetence of the members of the Court.  
As the archives in the former Japanese colonies and certain Allied powers’ countries 
were made available only from the 1990s, it is logical that the researchers’ focus was 
exclusively placed upon the Tokyo Tribunal. As a consequence, other important trials of 
lower rank Japanese military officials for violations of laws surrounding armed conflicts or 
jus in bello, performed in national courts of the Allied powers for crimes committed against 
their prisoners of war (POWs) and populace in the former colonies, were rather 
marginalized. The proliferation of publications on these trials that extend beyond the 1950s 
offer a better understanding of the former Japanese Empire and acknowledge the existence 
of a more inclusive and contrasted view of the Allied powers’ war criminal justice effort that 
does only revolve around the Tokyo Tribunal which had enjoyed the position of a war 
criminal trial star. The Class BC trials are the theme that the present research explores only 
obliquely. The 2017 multi-authored volume Japanese War Criminals: The Politics of Justice After 
the Second World War offers findings on the Japanese Class BC war criminals, tracing their 
fate from their prosecution to their release, which are complementary to the method and 
findings of the present work.  
In the immediate post-war period, political and intellectual milieu in Japan, as well as its 
public opinion predominantly held onto Tōkyo saiban shikan or “the Tokyo Tribunal view of 
history,” is considered to have a “masochistic“ view when it comes to war responsibility. 
Another view that gained momentum from the 1970s was shaped by the dissenting opinion 
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of Indian Justice Radhabinod Pal whose argument was singled out and made to fit 
revisionist historical narratives. His dissenting opinion discusses the war of aggression as ex 
post facto law, stresses the defective procedure, partiality of justice at Tokyo thus implying 
that all defendants should have been acquitted. Pal’s dissent has further been arbitrarily 
distorted to serve the rightist discourse in Japan, which has been on the rise since the 1990s. 
This view justifies Japan’s Great Asia War and refutes the legal validity, and subsequent 
verdict by the Tokyo Tribunal. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s visits to Yasukuni Shrine–where 
the Class A war criminals were enshrined in 1978– manipulates war apologies to further his 
agenda. Along with this, his involvement in the ultra-nationalist kindergarten scandal in 
2017 represents the most recent aspects of the current climate of historical revisionism.6 In 
that sense, the Tokyo Tribunal has been a timely and important topic for being a part of 
Japan’s present political, security, and social discussions, including its diplomatic relations 
with Southeast Asian neighbors.   
The present work contributes to the existing body of research by shedding light on the 
Tokyo Tribunal in several aspects. First, it observes the Tribunal as politico-legal event, thus 
addressing its nature through discussing the postulates on which international criminal 
justice rests as a precursor for proper understanding of the Tribunal. The concept of 
international criminal justice has been evaluated in strict terms, against justice administrated 
in domestic courts or ideally as entity free from interference of politics. However, 
international criminal justice not only touches at the core of the sacred domain of state 
sovereignty that is to punish its citizens, but cannot be born without political support of its 
sponsor states. They use their political values and formulate broader policies that are 
supposed to be channeled through the creation of international tribunals, their mandates, 
                                                          
6  Christopher Hughes, Japan’s Foreign and Security Policy Under the ‘Abe Doctrine’ (New York: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2015), 72.  
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and norms thus pointing out the idea that justice is not an end in itself.7 Whether states will 
prosecute atrocities committed by parties involved in war is not a result of consistent 
practice, but rather careful calculations of self and collective interest which introduces the 
idea of international law being “architecture of political compromise.”8 American political 
philosopher, Judith Shklar, in her discussions on legalism introduces a general idea that 
“law is politics […] but not every policy is legalistic.”9 Legalism as ideology10 argues for a 
strict dichotomy between law and non-law. It observes law as a space where citizens are free 
of arbitrary acts of government, thus providing for stability and certainty within the social 
order. Legalism, in her view, is “the policy of justice,” a “form of political action,” thus never 
isolated from the essential components of politics– power, prudence, and expediency.11 
Principle of legality–nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege or “no crime without law”–supports 
this idea. However, faced with public outrage at the Axis atrocities, the grand scale of 
human, economic, and military devastation caused by the Second World War, the victorious 
Allies felt compelled to create a new, ex post facto law that would allow for criminal 
punishment of leaders they considered responsible before the law, believing they would 
avoid the judgment of the past and provide for the brighter future by outlawing war. In 
these exceptional circumstances, the call to act came from the suitable opportunity and 
intention to avoid what is in Kantian words called “blood guilt” or blutschuld which is 
implied complicity from ignoring crimes. 12 The concept of legalism in endeavors of criminal 
justice was further refined by Johnathan Bass who described it as “liberal states’ belief in the 
rule of law” and moral urge that perpetrators of atrocities ought to be punished. This view 
                                                          
7 Jackson N. Maogoto, War Crimes and Realpolitik: International Justice from World War I to the 21st Century, 
(London: Rienner Publishers, 2004), 10. 
8 Jackson N. Maogoto, War Crimes and Realpolitik: International Justice from World War I to the 21st Century, 10.  
9 Judith N. Shklar, Legalism: Law, Morals and Political Trials (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), 144. 
10 Legalism as ideology is referred to in the sense that it defends the law from the world of politics, without 
its proponents acknowledging that in claiming so they are also positioning themselves among political values. 
see more in Shklar, Legalism: Law, Morals and Political Trials, 8.  
11 Shklar, Legalism: Law, Morals and Political Trials, 126, 143.  
12 Jonathan N. Choi, “Early Release in International Criminal Law,” The Yale Law Journal 123 (2014): 1812.  
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of legalism does not recognize the lack of consistency in application, and even misuse, of 
legalism by the same liberal states due to geopolitical or material concerns that pertain to the 
domain of power. To remedy the latter purely liberal view of legalism, Peter Maguire offers 
a more appealing explanation of the policies underpinning international criminal tribunals 
that he denominates as strategic legalism – that is “use of law and legal arguments to further 
larger policy objectives, irrespective of facts or moral considerations.”13 Somewhat similar 
argument has been recently developed by Zachary Kaufman who denominates international 
criminal justice as an exercise of prudentialism14 which explains the international criminal 
tribunals as the product of “case-specific balancing of relevant politics, pragmatics, and 
normative beliefs.” 15  Kaufman’s argument appears to be more refined and the term 
prudentialism, defined in multitude of ways, has been understood as choice of action that 
best serves one’s interests without moral considerations, or it could be added, at least not as 
its main motive. These two approaches are relevant to the effect that they add a realist 
component, that is power and national interest, thus contrasting the liberal notion of 
legalism which entails the consistency and commitment to the rules of law. However, in case 
of strategic legalism and prudentialism normative beliefs are unstable and unpredictable when 
applied to the realm of international relations. However, the term prudentialism involves 
prudence or cautiousness in decision-making which, according to the present research, did 
not reflect the Allied powers’ choices at all times. For the reasons pertaining to semantics, 
the term strategic legalism, borrowed from Maguire, will be used as it allows for a better 
understanding of the coherence and utility of legalistic policies used by the Allied Powers in 
relation to their larger diplomatic and political goals for postwar Japan.  
                                                          
13 Peter Maguire, Law and War: An American Story (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 8.    
14 Zachary D. Kaufman, United States Law and Policy on Transitional Justice: Principles, Politics and Pragmatics 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 58-60.  
15 Zachary D. Kaufman, United States Law and Policy on Transitional Justice: Principles, Politics and Pragmatics, 
58-60.  
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Second, the analytical grid takes into consideration the factor of time when looking at 
different stages of the international military tribunals. Political goals, values, and intentions 
professed in the moment of their establishment, investigative phase, and later, trial phase, 
adjudication, and finally, execution of sentences phase which entails releases and pardons 
before the serving of the full sentence do not coincide. These “behind the curtain” realpolitik 
considerations to which tribunals are submitted, in a more or less subtle way,16 are not 
visible on the institutional record of the tribunals which makes “the true story of these 
institutions rather incomplete.”17 Due to this “compartmentalization”18  of the trials it is 
difficult to assess “the nature, intent, and impact of the political decisions which created, 
administered, and ended these trials”19 under a single label of victors’ justice or justice of 
civilization. In case of the Tokyo Tribunal, its establishment period reflected the power 
dynamics, principles, and goals of the immediate postwar international order which in turn 
dramatically transformed throughout the Trial as the regional dynamics of the Cold War 
took precedence over lofty goals proclaimed in 1945. Events ought to be analyzed within the 
context peculiar to them—circumstances, timing, culture—which act as transformative 
forces guiding actors’ intentions and decisions at a given moment.20 The power of context is 
inextricably related to making sense of concepts, institutions, actors, decision-making 
process and the present research aims to emphasize the evolving circumstances that were 
reflected in the very unfolding of the international justice in Tokyo.  
Third, the story behind the Tokyo Tribunal does not end with the delivery of the 
majority judgment. Certainly, it implied the institutional closure of the Tribunal’s activity, 
but what came after—the execution of imposed sentences is often disregarded piece of the 
                                                          
16  M. Cherif Bassiouni, “From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The Need to Establish a 
Permanent International Criminal Court”, Harvard Human Rights Law Review 10 (1997): 12.  
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Malcolm Gladwell, The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference (New York: Little, Brown 
and Company, 2002).  
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puzzle. The execution of sentences phase also involves parole, clemency, or pardon before 
the complete execution of the sentence by the prisoner. In the practice of modern 
international criminal tribunals, it has rather become a rule, than exception that convicted 
war criminals would be released by default after having served two thirds of their 
sentence.21 In the case of the IMTFE, it was not the composite part of the program, although 
its Charter did grant to the Supreme Commander, Douglas MacArthur “the power to 
approve, reduce or otherwise alter any sentence” imposed by the Tribunal, the formal 
system of clemency and parole was not formally established until 1950. The rationale behind 
the clemency and parole system was meant to be a corrective to initial injustices in 
sentencing, but more importantly to adapt to the increased strategic value of Japan which 
transitioned from a foe to a friend. This post-Trial or post-institutional aspect of the IMTFE 
has been rather neglected and left out in assessing the overall quality of the Allied powers’ 
justice that falls behind the dominant analysis which conflated trial process and adjudication 
into their assessment of the Tribunal. Yet, the inclusion of the post-institutional phase of the 
IMTFE bears potential to shed a new light onto the nature and meaning of justice 
administered at Tokyo that has a property of being evolving, in motion rather than static in 
character. The extent literature overlooked this theme when examining the IMTFE project, 
with the exception of Higurashi Yoshinobu whose book Tōkyō saiban offers a chronological 
analysis of the Tribunal and does include a section on the release of the Class A war 
criminals. The present research draws its conclusions on the quality of justice rendered by 
the IMTFE by prioritizing the establishment and the execution of sentences stages of the 
Tribunal as being the most revealing of the Allied Powers’ evolving intentions and 
dilemmas that were mirrored upon, what can be called the end product—criminal justice at 
the IMTFE. This approach adds a new layer of meaning to the extent political, legal, and 
historical narratives surrounding the Tribunal presented by its main stake holders—the 
                                                          
21 Jonathan N. Choi, “Early Release in International Criminal Law,” 1791.  
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Allied Powers, post-war Japan, and victims—each using different phases of the Tribunal at 
their convenience in gauging the war criminal trials program in Japan.   
The workings behind the establishment of the IMTFE are important to the effect that it 
shows that the Allies, under the US preeminence, placed criminal justice within a much 
broader context than purely organizing institutionalized revenge. After seven years of 
isolation, different from Japan’s nineteenth century like isolationism, “locked in an almost 
sensual embrace with its American conquerors,”22 the post-institutional phase of the IMTFE 
brings into the equation the independent Japanese government that became a stakeholder in 
the war crimes program. In other words, by restoring independence, Japan became an active 
participant in the last phase of the IMTFE project which, in addition to changed geopolitical 
regional outlook, altered its nature and purpose in comparison to the initial phase of its 
establishment. Paradoxically, the IMTFE project as an occupation policy extended well 
beyond 1952 when Japan was pursuing a rather active policy trying to bring about its own 
goals and reintegrate into the transforming regional and international frameworks.  
For what purposes did the Allied powers establish the International Military Tribunal 
for the Far East? In what way did the Japan’s newly acquired role of a Western ally change 
the nature and pace of the post-institutional phase of the IMTFE? To what extent did the 
demands for Class A war criminals’ release gain prominence in US-Japan diplomatic 
relations? Did the early release of prisoners have transformative role upon the overall 
quality of justice discharged at IMTFE? 
The present research will argue that the IMTFE, considered as a strategic legalism tool, 
can be explained only when placed within broader context of the Allied powers’ postwar 
policies both at international and regional level. Japan ascendance to the role of Western ally 
and its strategic value did not result in the prompt release of Class A war criminals, quite 
                                                          
22 John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 
1999), 21.  
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the contrary, it reached a deadlock in which legalism no longer played a strategic role. This 
issue exposed inconsistencies in the US expectations regarding Japan’s rearmament and 
started to inhibit progress on important security agenda in the US-Japan diplomatic 
relations. The dynamics of the US-Japan negotiations regarding the Class A war criminals, 
as it will be shown, placed in hands of the Japanese government a powerful tool to instigate 
its own visions of security vis-à-vis the US. Consequentially, the IMTFE and Class A war 
criminals which once represented the symbol of Japanese defeat started to become an asset 
for Japan in its effort to achieve the postwar reintegration. Hence, the justice meted out at 
IMTFE changed from a strategic tool placed in the hands of the victorious allies to a strategic 
tool placed in the hands of a defeated party in war.  
The argumentation is based on findings from the archival documents predominantly 
from the United States National Archives related to the work of the US government agencies 
which had to strike a delicate balance between the war criminal policies and other strategic 
goals; International Conferences in the interwar and war period which set in motion the 
establishment of the Tribunal; the Far Eastern Commission which played an important role 
in amending the occupation policies and enhancing the international experience at the 
Tribunal; the International Prosecution Section which played instrumental role in 
elaborating historical narrative of Japan’s aggressive war and refining the newly created law; 
Clemency and Parole Board which was the main body in charge of the release of Japanese 
war criminals; the Allied representatives meetings in Washington which revealed the Allies’ 
deliberations behind decision-making process in relation to the release of the IMTFE 
convicts. Findings in relation to the Japanese side of the story draw in part on the archival 
documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Justice which, each in their 
own right, played an instrumental role in the process of releasing war criminals and 
authoritative secondary sources which addressed parts of the clemency and parole process.   
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Before proceeding to the organizational aspects of the present thesis, it is important to 
clarify few points. The term justice is used to designate international criminal justice which 
consists in international criminal law application by the Tribunal from its establishment to 
the release of the convicted war criminals. Although the Class A war criminals or major war 
criminals were convicted by the IMTFE, after the occupation, the campaign for the release of 
the BC war criminals somewhat merged with the efforts for the release of Class A war 
criminals. In many instances the release process of war criminals encompassed both A and 
BC classes which made it methodologically difficult to clearly differentiate between the two, 
but in the later decision-making process this distinction would become apparent as the Class 
A criminals would involve all of the interested Allied powers taking a common decision. In 
this sense, their paths occasionally converge and diverge.  
The present thesis is a work of diplomatic history that aims to place the Tokyo Tribunal 
within the broader framework of US-Japan diplomatic relations which dramatically evolved 
over the period covered by the analysis. The occasional insights into the lower level placed 
actors aims to offer a better understanding of how policy choices adopted at the top level, 
mainly preoccupied by politics, principles, emotions, and exigency,23 had to compromise 
with facts, law, and objectivity24 once they reached execution stage within the IMTFE. Also, 
the trajectory of the IMTFE from being placed on a high-level politics, passing through mid-
to-lower level agencies (Ambassadorial, Clemency Parole Board) with its eventual 
resurgence of the top diplomatic level in 1955 was reflected in the narrative and political 
relevance of personas involved. The events are analyzed to reflect the dominant political 
ideas of the time in which they took place, whereas connections made with the present date 
similar events are made with intent of showing the evolution of principle or consequences of 
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past choices that had been made. In order to respect the nature of phenomenon studied 
which also pertains to the legal domain, minor parts of the present work address and 
discuss technical legal points and principles. This duality surrounding the Tokyo Tribunal is 
reflected in the agency of second generation of lawyers-statesmen personified by Henry 
Stimson, Robert H. Jackson, John Foster Dulles, who were concerned with legal justifications, 
without moral or legal grounds, and lower-level jurist-politicians, who were part of the 
IMTFE representing justices and lawyers with sense of pragmatism, ready to bend their 
legal ideologies and convictions in order to implement policies they were assigned.  
The first chapter looks at the establishment phase of the IMTFE as closely related to the 
1919 Versailles Conference and interwar period when the ideas about war as a crime first 
appeared. Furthermore, it looks at the IMT at Nuremberg and IMTFE as projects aimed to 
complement the illegality of war enshrined in the UN Charter and serve as a deterrent for 
the future aggression, thus preserving the status quo. On a regional level, the IMTFE was 
designed to represent an international framework that would allow for the Allies, 
predominantly the US, to impose harsh occupation policies, provide a historical narrative of 
the Pacific War, and educate the Japanese. The second chapter deals with the IMTFE 
judgement, its dissident and separate opinions which represented a platform for competing 
narratives on Japanese history and legal guilt as well as missed chances to rectify the harsh 
judgment imposed upon the Class A war criminals. It demonstrates how the changing 
geopolitical situation showed the need to abandon harsh occupation policies and decide the 
fate of the IMTFE war criminals leading to the conclusion of the peace treaty which would 
reflect this shift. The third chapter delves into the institutional dynamics of the clemency 
and parole process within both the US and Japan, which were both internally divided on the 
approach to be taken with respect to the Class A war criminals and repercussions it would 
have for the IMTFE legacy; pointing out at the persistent divisions between the Allies 
regarding the IMTFE clemency and parole system; in that aspect it reveals that the IMTFE 
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remained deeply connected to the IMT in Germany in both establishment and release phase; 
it shows the instrumental role of Japanese public opinion which made war criminal problem 
rise to prominence from emotional and social one to political and diplomatic level. The 
fourth chapter demonstrates how the Hatoyama and Kishi cabinets skillfully used the war 
criminals question to secure concessions from the US regarding the rearmament, and secure 
the parole and final release of the Class A war criminals, some of whom would be politically 
engaged and reintegrated into the society free of war criminal stigma, and eventually 
honored as spirits with their enshrinement to Yasukuni. Changes in other Allies’ policies 
towards Japan also contributed to their release, including the influence of the Communist 
China and the USSR, which although excluded from the release process, still found a way to 
exert influence upon the main entrepreneurs behind IMTFE project. An important aspect 
this chapter reveals is how the internal divisions within the US government and complete 
unresponsiveness of the clemency and parole board, which was driven by the imperative to 
preserve the judicial character of the war crimes program, stripped the legalistic policies 
which became detrimental to the US larger security objectives of their strategic character.  
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CHAPTER 1: A Foundational Story: Behind the Scene of the International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East 
 
1. In the Shadow of the Paris Peace Conference: Foundational Primer for the Post-World 
War Two War Criminal Program             
 
The war to end of all wars did not live up to its expectations, however it did set into motion 
important changes to the international order, shifts in power dynamics - not only confined 
to European theater - but extending to the Asia-Pacific region, and international dialogue 
among the great powers regarding the premises upon which the new order should be 
based.25 The 1919 Paris Peace Conference represented an important venue for victorious 
nations (America, Britain, France, Italy, and Japan) to divide war gains, to organize a new 
international order that would preserve the status quo and punish the defeated. The peace 
settlement involved, to a certain degree, a reluctant introduction of international law as its 
preserving agent. The consequences of the important decisions and choices made in 1919 
would have immediate impact upon the developments of the interwar period, and most 
importantly, percolate all the way into the post-World War Two peace settlement. The war 
marked the end of the Ottoman Empire, “the sick man of Europe,” and the Austro-
Hungarian Empire giving birth to new independent nations, which started positioning 
themselves around the victorious European powers, their new patronizing states. Although, 
the main theater of the Great War was Europe-centered, it had important repercussions for 
East Asia, a bastion of European imperialism, and Japan who had already started emerging 
as a regional hegemon in the 1890s-1920s.  
Following its victories in the First Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars in 1895 and 
1905 respectively, Japan gained not only important spheres of influence in Manchuria and 
Korea, but rose as an important force that “asserted greater political, economic, and cultural 
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influence within Asia.”26  In the eyes of the US and certain European states, Japan, “a great 
and ambitious nation,”27 posed a threat and was seen a potential challenger to the Western-
led regional order that had been built on the ashes of the Chinese regional domination.28 The 
Great War propelled Japan into a position of economic and military power among White 
nations at Versailles which it proudly assumed as the only Asian power to participate in the 
formation of new international order.29 In the aftermath of the Great War, Japanese foreign 
policy, under Foreign Minister Uchida Yasuya, stayed faithful to the Meiji era imperatives of 
Japan, cooperating within the multilateral framework with the Western Powers, principle of 
non-intervention in China, and the protection of Japanese interests in Manchuria. 30 
Nevertheless, it is important to mention that Japanese foreign policy had derailed from these 
principles and its traditional course on two occasions, under Foreign Minister Kato Takaaki 
and Prime Minister Terauchi Masatake cabinet, as they used military force to elicit territorial 
concessions. In particular, Takaaki’s Twenty-One Demands presented to China in January 
1915, by which Japan tried to gain similar rights to those that European powers already had, 
threatened to violate China’s territorial and administrative integrity; while Terauchi’s 
Siberian intervention in August 1918, in contravention to the agreed rules, was interpreted 
by the US as Japan’s effort to secure exclusive control of northern Manchuria and Siberia. 
These represented the first examples of Japan’s expansionist aspirations.31  
At Paris Peace Conference, the Japanese delegation became aware of its limited chances 
for territorial and economic expansion in the region due to the European powers’ spheres of 
influence. They came to the negotiating table with initially uncompromising demand on one 
point: the recognition of Japanese special rights in Shandong province. As the demand for 
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the annexation was met with disapproval from other great powers and Wilson —who 
wanted to break away from the old diplomacy that involved unequal treatment of third 
countries and secret alliances — the Japanese delegation changed its strategy by presenting 
its cause in a way to appeal to Wilson’s idealism. In the end, Wilson accepted the Japanese 
demand for governing the ex-German possessions, contrary to the proposed joint 
governance with other powers, with promise to give extensive rights and better treatment to 
the Chinese which was to be subsequently negotiated. In addition, the Japanese blamed the 
Western Powers for the current situation in China by which they scored extra points that 
would make President Wilson succumb to their proposal. 32  Despite his plea against 
colonialism and the opposition of all members of his delegation, he saw value in what he 
thought would reshape the existent great power structure in East Asia, ensure the successful 
conclusion of the Peace Treaty, and secure the League of Nations project. 33  The 
consequences of this concession that others qualified as a “terrible mistake” 34 would be 
visible only later in the interwar period.35 More importantly, this shift resulted in Japan 
drifting apart from its old and traditional ally, Britain, and gravitating towards more 
cooperation with the US which was championing the new principles. America was the only 
nation that did not possess an explicit sphere of influence in the region—it did not offer 
open support for the great powers system in the region—yet it benefited from rights and 
privileges as a favored nation. 36  What presented as an opportunity for the US-Japan 
rapprochement was their shared interest in penetrating the order dominated by European 
powers.37 While at the end of the nineteenth century the US was slowly joining the Big 
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Powers, in 1919 the rise of the US to preeminence was evident against European continent 
that suffered unparalleled human, material, and military losses.38  
In essence, the new peace settlement was supposed to keep “Germans down, the 
Americans in, and Russians out.”39 For Germany, stripped of its colonies and burdened with 
heavy reparations, this was a punitive peace which will breed the revisionism in the 
interwar period — and later constitute one of the most valuable lessons to the Allied Powers 
in the aftermath of the World War Two. The question of whether the Germans and their 
allies should be and in what way punished for starting the Great War was entrusted to the 
Commission on the Responsibilities of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of 
Penalties within the scope of the preliminary Peace Conference. The entente powers were 
clearly divided, Great Britain and France supported his prosecution, while the US - cool-
headed and out of reach of the direct war experience - refuted his prosecution as it 
considered statesmen business should be out of reach of judicial authorities for an offense 
that was clearly of a moral, but not a legal character. As well, President Wilson was more 
consumed with the League of Nations project than organizing trials, which would be equal 
to a pure act of revenge. The Report issued by the Commission was important in two aspects: 
it attributed the responsibility for waging war to Germany and rendered the immunity of 
heads of states obsolete for violations of laws of war and humanity.40 In 1919, Wilhelm II 
was not recommended for prosecution as the Report observed lack of legal basis and 
considered the matter suitable for study by statesmen and historians.41 The Articles 227, 228, 
and 229 of the Paris Peace Treaty vaguely stated his responsibility for “a supreme offense 
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against international morality and sanctity of treaties,”42 the provision that was not defined 
and thus deprived of all substance, and ordered his apprehension for the trial which never 
took place as he escaped to Holland. 43  Lord Chamberlain questioned the efficiency of 
potential trials given the time length needed to convene the tribunal, investigate the crimes, 
and prosecute numerous German war criminals. After the passions of war would subside, 
he thought, the Allied war criminal program would face reduced interest in justice being 
served and lose support of public opinion.44 
Of particular interest to the present study are reservations lodged by the American and 
Japanese delegations at Paris.45 The US legal stance evidenced the duality of the American 
foreign policy towards the application of international norms, which underwent a dramatic 
shift, as will be shown later, in the last days of the Second World War. Ironically, the 
Japanese stance towards the international criminal law was marked by continuity as the 
similar arguments have been advanced against the Tokyo Tribunal by the Japanese from 
1946. The American reservations exposed the novelty of the idea of an international tribunal 
and appropriateness of the national commission46 to prosecute the offenders of laws of war 
and humanity to punish those who committed criminal acts. This led to the point of 
negative criminal responsibility which implied that that person of authority who failed to 
prevent or repress the violations of others—he should have had knowledge of or ability to 
prevent—liability criteria which would be hard to prove.47 The Americans also advanced the 
lack of the legal precedent and state practice for the prosecution for initiating war which 
would lead to ex post facto law, the immunity of heads of states, who can only be liable before 
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their national courts not before a foreign jurisdiction, which is essential component of state 
sovereignty.48 The Japanese delegation shrewdly formulated its reservations around the 
issue of “victors’ justice.” They opposed the negative criminality and criminal liability of 
senior leaders that was problematic for their institution of the Emperor, and even asked for 
the elimination of words “heads of the state” from the report.  
The 1921 Covenant of League of Nations defined as its main task to deter war or prevent 
or stop any armed conflicts or threat of armed conflicts (Article 11) by using economic 
sanctions as means of pressure rather than instruments which were of coercive character 
(Article 16).49 The League was devoid of any concrete and effective measure to prevent or 
deter war, especially when the United States and the Soviet Union were not its member 
states. In the 1920s the legal momentum to prevent war or define aggression under the 
banner of jus contra bellum developed in response to the League Covenant which lacked 
robustness – Treaty of Mutual Assistance of 1923 held that war of aggression was an 
international crime that ought to be stopped by mutual assistance while Geneva Protocol of 
1924 focused on its prevention through judicial and arbitrational methods.50 Contrary to this 
movement to delegitimize aggressive war, it did not enjoy wide support and was not 
established in international law.51 The 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact which would be discussed 
in the following section distinguished itself in that it aimed to prohibit unilateral use of war 
while it allowed for war as a collective action against the aggressor. 52  The subsequent 
invasions in the 1930s were the first signs of the failure of postwar peace settlement and 
other instruments to prevent or stop war which was reflected by 1931 Japanese invasion of 
Manchuria on the occasion of which Henry L. Stimson, secretary of state, in reference to the 
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Pact denounced Japan “as lawbreaker” 53  and advocated the “non-recognition” of the 
situation created in contravention to Nine-Power Treaty and the Kellogg-Briand Pact.54 In 
protest to the conclusions of Lytton report, issued by the commission approved by League’s 
Council to investigate Japanese intervention in Manchuria, that proposed solution 
detrimental to what Japan considered its vital interests—that is demilitarization of the 
region and placing its autonomous government  under Chinese sovereignty55—Japan left the 
League in 1933.  
According to Hersch Lauterpacht, prominent British international lawyer and 
afterwards, justice at the International Court of Justice, although the Pact did not have any 
“teeth,” its importance lied in diffusing the idea that war, which was previously used as an 
instrument to alter the status quo and international law, became illegal with the exception of 
wars fought in self-defense or as a collective sanction against the aggressor.56 The instances 
of military expansion in the 1930s—Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931, Italy invaded 
Ethiopia in 1936, and Germany invaded Poland in 1939—leading up to the outbreak of the 
Second World War would indeed evidence that the legal innovation was still in the realm of 
the ideas, that were still not ripe to gain the support and observance from nation states 
which once again chose to settle their differences by military force.  
 
2. Building Blocks of New Postwar International Order: War as Illegal and Criminal Act 
 
The ideas and dilemmas released by the Great War regained their value as World War Two 
was nearing its end in favor of the Allied powers and the need to lay the grounds of a new 
peace settlement appeared on the horizon. The kernel of the allies’ argument, stemming 
from 1919 international order failures, was that both Germany and Japan would not be 
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pastoralized, but occupied following the unconditional surrender; demilitarized, 
democratized, its elites reeducated, and only then, reintegrated into the new international 
order. Regarding the punishment, Winston Churchill, who was a strong advocate of 
legalistic solutions for the main villains of Great War in 1915, disillusioned with the power 
of law to settle political and historical issues, preferred summary executions of few of the 
Axis leaders who bore the most responsibility for the war.57 During the war, President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt had already made oblique warnings about the punishment of the Axis 
“guilty barbaric leaders,” in his speech at the Casablanca Conference in February 1943, or 
more directly referred to the efforts of the Allied powers to put an end and punish the 
Japanese aggressive war at the Cairo Conference in November 1943. The reasons behind 
these low-key statements regarding the punishment of Axis leaders were the absence of 
concrete policies for war crimes program and the fear of retaliation against the prisoners of 
war captured by the Axis.58 In planning the course of action for the final days of war at 
Quebec in fall 1944, Churchill and Roosevelt consulted on the question of prosecuting the 
major war criminals. The British plan, drafted by Chancellor Lord Simon, played a decisive 
role in swaying President Roosevelt towards a political solution as memorandum and 
concluded that “it could not rest with judges, however eminent or learned, to decide finally 
a matter like this, which is of the widest and most vital public policy.”59 The summary 
executions were tempting as the leaders were aware of the fastidious process that the 
investigation, apprehension, and the trial could entail. Ironically, in October 1944, Joseph 
Stalin who was delighted at the opportunity to reap the benefits of the Soviet entry in the 
war against Japan, opposed summary executions and suggested that the world would be 
more impressed if the Axis leaders would be sentenced to life-imprisonment following a 
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legal procedure 60 — this was the Soviet version of legalism that was purely based on 
political criteria which established the guilt of the defendants, who were simply executed or 
imprisoned without any procedural rights.61   
The end of 1944 marked a fierce battle with the US government between the Secretary of 
Treasury, Henry Morgenthau Jr. whose Jewish roots heavily weighted in his proposal for 
pastoralization of Germany and Secretary of War Henry Stimson, seasoned lawyer and 
“defender of laws and constitution,”62 who argued for legal methods in shape of the war 
crimes program. Although Morgenthau had the president’s ear at the time of the Quebec 
conference, the leaking of passages from his vengeful report to the press sealed its destiny as 
it was met with public indignation. In January 1945, President Roosevelt had a change of 
heart regarding the war crimes trials and decided to offer his support to Stimson as he 
acknowledged its added value laid in generating “historical record”63 of the atrocities. The 
War Department, under the Stimson’s leadership, John McCloy and Judge Advocate 
General Myron Cramer, who later joined the IMTFE as the US Justice, started making 
sketches of what would later become the war crimes trials program for both Germany and 
Japan. The purpose of the trials was not vengeance, but prevention. The legal character of 
the program was to be ascertained by the guaranty of minimal procedural rights for the 
defendants, but the process was to be spared of legal technicalities, often found in domestic 
criminal system, as its architects correctly observed. Promptness was indispensable in order 
to avoid “making martyrs of the individuals punished.”64 Despite this awareness, the IMTFE 
will be greatly impeded by protracted trials which not only prejudiced the defendants for its 
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rules of evidence that impeded defense,65 but also succeeded in making victims out of 
criminals for its lengthy procedure and harsh sentencing. The image of the convicted 
criminals as victims would become even more palpable during the post-trial stage of the 
execution of sentences where the legal minutiae surrounding clemency and parole process 
attracted the public anger and burdened US-Japan postwar relations.   
The United Nations Charter, the final product of the postwar settlement adopted on June 
26, 1945, in its Article 2 paragraph 4 prohibited “threat or use of force against sovereignty, 
political independence, and territorial integrity of any state.” This “juridification”66 of war in 
the sense that the law intervened to regulate the use of force came as a fruition of pre-World 
War Two progressive ideas of placing “crude political power” within the framework of “law 
and morality.” 67  The intent was to preserve the postwar status quo by outlawing its 
violation to the dissatisfaction of many “have-not states.”68 The war criminal tribunal came 
to complement this juridification of war by criminalizing the initiation or waging of 
aggressive wars as concluded at the London Conference on August 26, 194569 which drafted 
the Charter of International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (hereafter IMT).70 Although the 
IMT and IMTFE were institutionally distinct entities created for two fairly different war 
theaters, the importance of validating the Axis leaders’ criminal responsibility for aggressive 
wars as well as newly created norms was their common goal. War crimes programs in both 
Germany and Japan would evolve in a quite different way, but this shared political goal of 
preserving the validity of the Allied powers’ legal endeavors would permeate into the late 
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1950s until the last prisoners were released on clemency and parole. The IMT Charter, which 
was created on a nominally contractual basis between the Big Four at London — the US 
delegation was instructed to be uncompromising on definition of crimes and procedure71—
served as a model to the US when it crafted the IMTFE Charter. It is important to have a 
glimpse into the process of its creation that divulged the US legal position which was 
heavily rectified from the one opposing any criminal trials for the heads of state by 
international tribunals it had advanced in 1919. At London, the Soviet and French 
delegations that at first disagreed on placing the charge of aggressive war at the heart of the 
Tribunal’s jurisdiction, finished by consenting to it under the promise that it would only be 
applicable to instances of the Axis aggression.72  
Robert H. Jackson, American Justice at the Supreme Court and Chief Prosecutor at IMT, 
was another important and influential figure who propelled the development of the US legal 
position which recognized the criminality of aggressive war based on the 1928 Kellogg-
Briand Pact. He served as principle of individual criminal responsibility for aggressive war 
disregarding the traditionally respected immunity of heads of states and defense of superior 
orders. In a report to President Truman, who succeeded late President Roosevelt, Jackson 
stressed that the change in circumstances ushered in a new era in the growth and use of 
international law, which, in Wilsonian spirit, ought to be “a real expression of our moral 
judgment."73 The novelty was that the law was meant to be used as a tool of politics, in that 
it allowed for the needed expedience. American legal stance was qualified as “relatively 
simple and non-technical”74 and immune to “sterile legalisms.”75 It was highly influenced by 
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the work and advice from Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, who was at that time, professor of 
international law at the University of Cambridge. Jackson was also personally convinced 
that war of aggression constituted a punishable crime under international law.76   
The decision to pursue war criminal trials based on these newly announced principles 
were, in the eyes of Stimson, a victory for American legalism and his personal triumph over 
policy of isolationism that reigned in the US during the interwar period. The charge of 
aggression, which was severely disputed by European powers, was also a necessary package 
designed to support the actions of the Roosevelt administration77. These powers were an 
abandonment of neutrality 78  and lend-lease as well as justification for “perpetuating 
American internationalism,” 79  that guaranteed US economic and military assistance. 80 
Contrary to wars fought prior to the Treaty of Versailles, which punished nation for losing 
the war, the German Empire and subsequently Germany and Japan would be punished for 
having started one.  
 
3. The IMTFE as a Venue for Legislating Process  
 
The legal basis for the establishment of the IMTFE was contained in the Article 10 of 
Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945 according to which, “[the Allied powers] do not intent 
that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as nation, but stern justice shall be 
meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our 
prisoners.”81 The text of the Declaration did not include any reference to the position of the 
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Emperor, for which the Japanese asked assurances and was reflective of transition in views 
on Japanese occupation policies from those who were Japan hands and proponents of 
moderate policies, such as George Blakeslee, Hugh Borton, and Joseph Grew, acting 
secretary of state, as opposed to his successor Dean G. Acheson who advocated harsher 
occupation policies towards Japan.82 Before the Tribunal was established, there existed the 
conflict between the State-Navy-War Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) 83  and State 
Department as to the degree of the US role in the IMTFE establishment - “the US lead”84 
thesis and “the Allied Powers’ cooperation”85 thesis respectively. In October 1945, in order 
to avoid the stigma of being exclusively an American tribunal, it was agreed that the 
Tribunal’s international character should be respected, but that the US position would 
prevail in case of disagreement between the Allied Powers, a decision closer to the US lead 
thesis.86 It is important to note that the directive of Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) discussed the 
possibility of organizing exclusively American tribunal to try Hideki Tōjō’s cabinet for the 
Pearl Harbor Attack, in case of complications involving the participation of other Allied 
Powers (delays or refusals), which was in the end dropped in favor of its international 
character that would give the tribunal more legitimacy.87 The judges were appointed by the 
Supreme Commander upon the recommendation from military and civilian representatives 
of the Allied powers, while the international prosecution section (IPS) was under the 
authority of the SCAP, and each country was to provide for its representatives. In order to 
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guarantee the international character of the Tribunal, the Far Eastern Commission (FEC)88 
was instituted in Washington on December 26, 1945 where all the nations represented at the 
IMTFE were given the opportunity to challenge the US views in formulating and 
recommending the policies that effect the Japanese occupation. 89  FEC directives were 
reformulated in concrete policies by the US government and then transferred to the 
Supreme Commander, while in case of urgent matters regarding policies that were not the 
subject of FEC directives, the US government was allowed to issue interim directives to the 
SCAP.90 This institutional mechanism and the authority vested in SCAP to mete out the 
stern justice gave the US preeminence regarding the establishment process in comparison to 
other allies, thus allowing it to proceed more quickly as it was rushing against the clock to 
establish the Tribunal, the IPS, and open the trials. A mid-January target date proved rather 
unrealistic.91 Almost six months into the IMT proceedings, on January 19, 1946 the IMTFE 
Charter was born, following MacArthur’s special proclamation which was grounded in the 
Instrument of Surrender, the Potsdam Declaration, and the Moscow Conference. 92  The 
Commonwealth nations, especially Australia, were eager to assert their view of the postwar 
Japan, which clung onto more punitive policies that were rooted in fears of Japanese 
invasion and a revived militarism. In a stark contrast stood the position of Britain, which 
was preoccupied with its postwar recovery that heavily depended upon the US. This 
relationship was reflected in its rather modest position regarding the occupation of Japan.93  
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The international experience surrounding the IMTFE, other than the official diplomatic 
channels, was more tangible within the IPS, established in December 1945, where teams 
from the Allied countries, whose representatives, primed by different legal cultures, 
expertise, and temperaments, would be compelled to work together in order to satisfy the 
overall goal of preparing the case against the Japanese leaders. The first to arrive to Tokyo 
on December 10, 1945 was the American team headed by Joseph B. Keenan, the chief 
prosecutor in Tokyo, whose reputation and expertise stood in stark contrast with his 
counterpart in Nuremberg, prominent Justice Jackson. Keenan’s appointment was not 
completely based on his expertise. He was considered a second rate choice but had strong 
political connections with the late President Roosevelt and FBI’s Edgar Hoover which 
secured him the position.94 President Truman considered him to be a man who could get 
things done, hence the task of prompt and efficient prosecution of Japanese leaders 
responsible for aggression.95 Keenan was successful in garnering the financial support of the 
Senate for the executive New Deal projects, of which the Tokyo Tribunal was an example.96 
Upon the arrival, the team was faced with the realities on the ground, such as the lack of 
direct evidentiary documents, the overwhelming mass of documents that needed to be 
translated, read, and analyzed along with the interrogations that needed to be organized 
resulted in disorganization and inefficiency. In early February, the Allied powers’ 
prosecutors joined the IPS, British prosecutor A. S. Comyns Carr, Australian prosecutor 
Alan J. Mansfield, Brigadier Quilliam from New Zealand, Henry G. Nolan from Canada, 
and Hsiang Che-Chun from China, but neither the indictment or the list of defendants were 
ready. The draft indictment contained charges related to Pearl Harbor attack, in which Tōjō 
figured as the only defendant, and the Japanese government was added among the Allies as 
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the interested party in prosecuting wartime Japanese leaders for aggression. The 
Commonwealth prosecutors were appalled at the extremely poor state of affairs and were 
under the impression that the American version indictment was far too “contrary to the 
Tribunal’s goal of cultivating the public sense of responsibility for national policy” by 
placing the ultimate guilt for war upon the wartime Japanese government thus confirming 
the omnipresent view among the Japanese that their leaders deceived them.97 Under the lead 
of Comyns-Carr the Commonwealth prosecutors would capitalize98 upon the Keenan’s poor 
leadership skills to challenge the US preeminence and organize prosecutorial work that 
would allow for the indictment and list of defendants to be completed as soon as possible.99 
Contrary to the instructions from Washington, it seemed that the members of the American 
prosecutorial team forgot about the crucial time factor and expeditious trials which was 
reflected in their remarks addressed to the British prosecutor for “too much of a tendency to 
keep an eye on the clock and the other on Nuremberg.” 100  The reasons behind the 
importance of time factor was succinctly expressed by almost prophetic words of Comyns-
Carr “[that] from the very day on which the Nuremberg trial is over, world interest, as 
distinct from the purely Japanese interest, in the whole subject of International Trials, will 
fall to the vanishing point.” 101  The work of the IPS was additionally delayed and 
complicated by the late arrival of French, Soviet, Chinese, and Philippine prosecutorial 
teams, although Keenan thought that the Russian arrival would alleviate “the growing 
world atmosphere of friction.”102 While the Soviet prosecutor Sergei A. Golunsky requested 
the addition of new names to the defendants lists, other teams asked for amendments of the 
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particulars. 103 The final version of the indictment was presented to the Tribunal only on 
April 26, 1946. However, after this moment, the trials would considerably slow down, the 
presentation of cases in phases, interrogations, and collection of evidence would take toll on 
the expected expeditious character of the proceedings as prosecutor Quilliam noted in early 
June “all the sense of urgency was gone.”104 
In 1945, President Roosevelt acknowledged the usefulness of the war criminal trials as a 
method for generating “historical record.”105 As the reports on the Japanese atrocities upon 
the POWs saw the light of the day, the American public opinion turned to violent hatred 
and outrage towards the Japanese. Along with this, in 1945 the US government was placed 
under scrutiny for its share of responsibility in failure to prevent the Pearl Harbor attack. 
The Congress established the Pearl Harbor Committee to investigate facts and circumstances 
leading to the attack. The rumors surrounding late President Roosevelt’s responsibility for 
provoking the attack due to his unwavering intention of drawing the US into the war which 
were refuted in the final report issued in June 1946. At the time when the grounds of the 
IMTFE project were laid down, the establishment of Japan’s guilt by the Tribunal for 
conspiring and waging aggression against the US appeared useful for placing the stigma of 
war responsibility elsewhere.   
From all the treaties that were created in the interwar period aiming at limiting or 
preventing war, the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact was the most widely supported one as signed 
by the most of the established nations in the world, including Japan. As such, it served the 
Allied Powers as a raw material in creating the new category of crime, war of aggression, 
which was to be applied to wars pursued by Germany and Japan. The contracting states 
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condemned “recourse to war for the solution of international controversies” 106  and 
renounced “war as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another,”107 
according to its Article I. States agreed that “the settlement or resolution of all disputes and 
conflicts of whatever nature or whatever origin” should always be settled by peaceful means 
as stipulated in Article II. Following the logic of the provisions, unilateral war as means of 
national policy was limited, “whether on “just or unjust grounds.”108 Nevertheless, the Pact 
was silent on collective actions related to war, civil wars, and war with states non-
signatories.109 Further interpreted in the light of its Preamble, the purpose was to preserve 
the status quo which could be altered only by peaceful means; in the contrary the signatory-
state would be “denied the benefits”110 provided by the Treaty, meaning that other signatory 
states were given a free hand in waging war against it.111 The pact did not define aggression 
or outlaw war, or provide any judicial or arbitration mechanisms for its prevention. The 
reservations logged by states abounded and reflected position that the Pact does not limit 
the exercise of the sovereign states’ inherent right to self-defense which was to be arbitrarily 
decided in face of necessity or circumstances which was confirmed by Secretary Kellogg in 
his speech before the American Society of International Law.112 It is interesting to note that 
the Japanese government heavily stretched its understanding of the right of self-defense, 
implying that the protection of its “lifeline” in China would fall within the category, 
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although lying outside of Japan’s territory.113 Great Britain went further in claiming that self-
defense not only could be exercised in cases of an all-out aggression confined to its border 
stretching all the way to its Empire, but also certain regions of special interest. It alluded to 
Egypt, that although it gained independence in 1922, the Britain claimed that it maintained 
“’special relations with it over the Suez Canal.” 114  It implied that any interference or 
questioning of this special relation could trigger the war in self-defense.115  
The Pact, however, did not establish the individual criminal responsibility of individuals. 
Until 1945, international law was an instrument for governing interstate relations, 
overlooking individuals who were rather invisible to it. Heads of states enjoyed functional 
immunity from criminal prosecution, by virtue of state equality and dignity, for the duration 
of their mandates in performing an act of state which is related to their official duty. In 1945, 
the principle of individual criminal responsibility for heads of state was established, and 
later on, confirmed by the judgments handed down at Nuremberg and Tokyo, thus eroding 
the old rules related to the aforementioned functional immunity. If the aggressive war was 
prohibited, as established by the Pact, then analogously those who plan, initiate, and wage it 
are to be found responsible for it. This was in complete opposition to the US position in 1919 
as mentioned earlier.  
 
 
 
 
4. Hegemonic History of Pacific War: Japan as Aggressor 
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“Prosecutors and defense attorneys are not compelled by any statutory mandate to write history […] 
However, all parties to a trial have an interest in advancing the most persuasive legal argument possible, 
and some have come to see historical evidence as assisting them in that goal.”116 
 
With all these legal precedents and an ongoing trial at Nuremberg, the IPS at Tokyo had an 
important task to prepare the case against Japanese leaders based on the central charge of 
crime against peace or waging aggressive war. In doing so, the IMTFE was fulfilling another 
important goal: to confirm the law at Nuremberg117. Dean Acheson explicitly instructed this 
as he said “it is most important that the procedure and principles of the Tokyo Tribunal, as 
well as definitions of crimes, should harmonize with those adopted for the prosecutions in 
Germany.”118 In other words, the prosecution was supposed to prepare the case that will 
show how the Japanese war was aggressive in all its instances — starting from January 1, 
1928 all the way to September 2, 1945 and directed against the Allied powers. This linearity 
that would have been lost had the US organize an exclusively American tribunal to try the 
Tōjō cabinet for the Pearl Harbor attack. According to the Indictment, the war started by 
Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 was an outright violation of the 1922 Nine-Power 
Treaty in which Japan organized a puppet state, stationed military troops, and built war 
potential, which the Soviet team qualified as preparation for an attack against the Soviet 
Union. Thus, the two-week border clash at Lake Khassan in 1938 and three-month long clash 
at Khalkin-Gol River, on the border between Mongolia and Manchuria, were qualified as 
“undeclared aggressive wars”119 by the Soviets whereas in fact these were mere incidents 
that ended in peace settlement. Subsequently the Neutrality Pact was signed between Japan 
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and the Soviet Union in 1941. 120  On September 22, 1940, Japan and France signed an 
agreement after the Japanese invasion of the northern part of Vichy’s Indochina in order to 
cut the flow of arms and fuel it was providing to China. Few days later, the indictment went 
on to state, Japan signed the Tripartite Pact with Nazi Germany and Italy in pursuance of 
the plan to dominate Asia-Pacific, its sphere of influence.121 According to the indictment, the 
stronghold in French Indochina was used as a base for Japan to carry out surprise attacks 
against British Commonwealth nations of Singapore, Malaya, Hong Kong, Shanghai, and 
then Philippines, Thailand.122  
From the outset, the IPS was put in a difficult situation due to the lack of direct evidence 
against the Japanese leaders; not only the evidence was dispersed all over the former 
Japanese Empire, but the government documents in Japan were destroyed during the war, 
in the firebombing of Tokyo, or destroyed by the government in the last days of war, when 
the defeat was imminent. On the contrary, the conditions in Germany were friendlier to the 
prosecution of IMT members who had the record of Nazi plans and atrocities available, in 
addition to these policies coming from a unified center of command. British prosecutor 
Comyns Carr’s words are illustrative on this point “the whole Japanese situation is infinitely 
more complicated than the German for the purpose of prosecution, as all the politicians, 
soldiers and sailors were all squabbling and double-crossing one another all the time.”123 
The prosecutors in Tokyo became convinced of Japan’s guilt124 and with deep understanding 
of the grander policies behind the IMTFE, which many of them considered capable of 
changing the history, they committed to the creation of new law. The legal solution that 
came as a glue to the issue of fast-changing cabinets and dispersed theaters of battle was the 
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doctrine of conspiracy, borrowed from the Anglo-Saxon municipal law. Legally, the 
conspiracy concept was elastic, as it required only participation of individuals aspiring 
towards a similar goal.125 This all-encompassing property made it suitable for Japanese 
aggression, which was consisted of distinct theaters of battle that all fused under the 
overarching goal of waging aggressive war.  
This method promised to render the task of preparing the case easier as the act of 
aggression perpetrated by different regimes fit into the common plan to wage aggressive 
war whereas the lack of direct evidence for individual responsibility was circumvented by 
leaders’ simple participation in it, not the actual commission of crimes. In other words, “a 
defendant may be guilty of conspiracy even though he did not authorize or actually 
participate in the perpetration of the ultimate unlawful act or acts or in the preceding illegal 
means, as long as they failed to expressly withdraw from the evil combination.” 126 
Conspiracy served as a method for proving guilt of Japanese leaders for all three crimes – 
aggressive war, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. For instance, Article 5 of the 
IMTFE Charter defined aggression as “planning, preparing, and waging a war of aggression 
in violation of international law and treaties” or the “participation in common plan or 
conspiracy for accomplishment of any of the foregoing.”  
Aware of the risk of placing the prosecutorial success exclusively on a single charge of 
conspiracy, the prosecution decided to secure the chances of defendants being prosecuted in 
case the overall or single conspiracy was insufficiently established due to the complexity of 
the Japanese situation, and introduced an additional four counts of conspiracy to be 
prosecuted as a statutory crime. Each phase of the war in the period between 1931-1945 was 
to be represented by the individuals on key decision-making positions in a cabinet. There 
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were seventeen cabinets and sixteen prime ministers during this period, leaders acted in 
opposition, and many decisions were more reactive than a product of policy continuity. 
Illustratively, the first count of the Indictment read that the common plan or conspiracy in 
which Japanese leaders occupying different position in distinct phases took part was “to 
secure military, naval, political, and economic domination of the East Asia and of the Pacific 
and Indian Oceans and all of countries and islands therein and bordering thereon” and 
“wage declared or undeclared war or wars.”127 This count, according to prosecutor Solis 
Horwitz, was meant to establish responsibility of different ministries in the government, and 
then implicitly individuals who participated in it.128 The words “declared or undeclared” 
wars were inserted in definition of crime of aggression in the Charter in order to cover for 
the controversy over the Japan’s declaration of war prior to the Pearl Harbor Attack as well 
as for the incidents or clashes which in the absence of formalities did not change the 
aggressive nature of war. The second and third count covered China, while count 4 was 
encompassing all other Allied Powers. The last count of conspiracy went beyond the Asia-
Pacific theater to encompass the conspiracy to dominate the whole world with other Axis 
powers, according to the prosecution, as evidenced by the Tripartite Pact.129  
In the words of Japanese historian Akira Iriye, designation of the World War Two in 
Japanese literature as a “Fifteen-Year-War” or “the Asia-Pacific war” crated confusion about 
the nature and scope of the war that took place in that part of the world. Otherwise, the war 
could be framed as distinct periods and theaters of combat against China, the 
Commonwealth countries, the US, and the Soviet Union.130 The minutes of IPS also show 
that the prosecution had difficulty connecting the aggression in China in the 1930s to other 
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phases of war as they pondered over whether it ought to be distinguished from other phases. 
The prosecution was presented with documents consisting of studies, publications, treaties 
from different periods of Japanese history. Many of them emanated from Japanese prewar 
history out of which they tried to make sense and build the story of Japanese aggression. In 
face of difficulty to corroborate their narrative of conspired aggression with the direct 
evidence, these documents were supposed to help trace the origins the Japanese militarism 
well beyond World War Two. This way, the prosecution was writing a highly distorted 
version of history that was to fulfill a mission of proving the guilt of the defendants, which 
many prosecutors felt strongly about.131  
Nuremberg Charter crimes against humanity constituted a separate category of crime as 
it was created for German milieu where the Nazis committed crimes against their own 
population. Transposed by the way of the Charter to Tokyo, it proved inadequate for 
Japanese context and consequentially, it was merged together with conventional war crimes. 
Even though certain crimes presented by prosecutorial teams could have entered into 
category of crimes against humanity, the prosecution relegated them to serve as evidence to 
substantiate the main charge of crimes against peace.132 More precisely, the documented 
atrocities were used to show patterns of atrocities and their similarity, which would indicate 
that they were part of a larger policy adopted and ordered at the top level. The crimes 
against populations in occupied lands such as, deportation and enslavement; murder, 
torture, rape, destruction of private property, and forced labor were only enumerated as to 
support the supreme crime of crime against peace. 133  The Chinese prosecution team 
documented the Rape of Nanking which took place in December 1937, but they mostly 
relied on affidavits. The interrogation of the defendants pointed at the impossibility of 
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controlling little disciplined Japanese troops, which engaged in murder, rape, or looting, 
with support of field commanders. Negative criminality was introduced to compensate for 
the lack of the direct evidence about the Japanese leaders’ knowledge regarding the 
atrocities.134  The last two counts of the Indictment, fifty-three and fifty-five established 
individual criminal responsibility for direct participation in the common plan or conspiracy 
to “order, permit, or authorize”135 the entire command chain, from ministers, commanders 
to local units, to commit atrocities against populations in occupied areas and negative 
criminality which established responsibility by omission or disregard of duty to prevent the 
atrocities.  
 
5. Strategic “Forgetting”: The Allied Powers’ Crimes Obscured 
 
“The record on which we judge these defendants today is the record on which history will judge us tomorrow. 
To pass these defendants a poisoned chalice is to put it our lips as well…(a)nd let me make clear that while this 
law is first applied against German aggressors, the law includes, and if it is to serve a useful purpose it must 
condemn, aggression by any other nations, including those which sit here in judgement.”  136 
 
The justice at Tokyo did not fulfill the quality of being universal as many crimes committed 
against the local population in former Japanese colonies and by the Allied powers against 
Japan were omitted from the Trial. The lack of political will, pragmatic aspects of organizing 
such trials, and larger goals to be attained by the IMTFE resulted in their omission from the 
Trial’s version of history. It should be emphasized that the Trial had been staged by 
countries who still had colonies which meant that the needs of colonials did not rank high 
on their agenda. It would be odd to expect the victorious nations to prosecute their “crimes” 
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committed against the defeated nations, but it is important to address them as they reflect 
the selective character of the international criminal justice. The fact that they did not earn 
their place in the Indictment resulted in the Allied Powers not carrying moral stigma, 
burden of which Japan and Germany have borne to this day.  
The existence of sexual brothels and widespread practice of sexual enslavement was 
evidenced to be the composite part of Japan’s war strategy in Southeast Asia as extensively 
documented by the Australian national office. Victims of sexual enslavement were from the 
countries not represented at the IMTFE bench or that were still looked upon as colonial 
subjects (China, Korea, Japan, Philippines, and Thailand). In practice the ad hoc international 
criminal tribunals tend to prosecute crimes committed against the civilians of the states the 
main powers behind the tribunal patronize. In 1945, the Allied Powers’ governments gave 
clear instructions of what were the priorities for the war crimes program — to promptly and 
efficiently prove the charge of aggressive war against the Japanese leaders, all the rest was 
an extra. These atrocities were not prosecuted at IMTFE and later on, given the cold war 
realities they lost importance in the flurry of the Korean War during which new war crimes 
and crimes against humanity were committed, the issue was brushed off. Since the post-
Cold War era, so the issue has been revived and it served as a powerful political and 
emotional issue for the Korean government to exploit in its diplomatic relations with Japan.  
The knowledge about Unit 731 that carried out human experimentations for the 
purposes of the development of biological weapons was an open secret in the diplomatic, 
but also prosecutorial circles. The Unit was part of the Kwantung Army’s Epidemic 
Prevention Section which operated in Central China and along the borders of Mongolia and 
the USSR under the lead of Colonel Lieutenant Ishii Shiro, also known as “the Ishii 
organization.”137 The military involved with Unit 731 were all acquitted because the US 
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army was eager to acquire their scientific and technological findings on this new kind of 
weapon which was object of the GHQ General Staff investigation. Daniel Sutton and Colonel 
Thomas Morrow, Keenan’s assistant, travelled to Chinese cities of Shanghai, Chongqing, 
and Nanking to gather the indispensable evidence which proved to be a rather frustrating 
and unfruitful138 endeavor as the local authorities proved to be uncooperative and persons 
who were in a position to give court testimony were scarce.139 Both interrogators briefed 
Keenan on the findings on biological warfare in China in report and private exchanges. 
Morrow insisted on the importance of getting Ishii for an interrogation as it could 
demonstrate that Japan used prohibited means of warfare,140 soon afterwards Morrow was 
appointed back to Washington. When Sutton presented the case of poisonous serum testing 
of Unit 1644 (Nanking-Tama Unit), Justice Webb was dismissive and it was decided that no 
additional evidence would be introduced.141 The members of the Organization, including 
Ishii himself, were interrogated earlier in January 1945 by the GHQ General Staff, but they 
provided scarce information claiming that the experiments were conducted independently 
from the Imperial Japanese Army leaders or the Emperor. As they were promised immunity 
from prosecution in exchange for their finding, they at least all made sure to remain 
secretive about the level of authority which ordered and authorized the experimentations, 
but most of all to shield the Emperor from any connection with it.142 It can be said that the 
investigation for the prosecutorial purposes was nominal in nature, as the higher military 
goal of gathering military intelligence, which would be an important addition to the US 
biological warfare program started in 1942, was prioritized at the outset. This is one of many 
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examples where the morality and justice of the Allied Powers gave way to the temptations 
on the ground pertaining to exigency and politics.   
Paradoxically, two weeks after the London Conference on the occasion of which the 
Allied Powers created a new law defining crime against peace, war crimes, and crimes of 
humanity, the US which assumed high moral lead in war used the pre-eminent weapon of 
mass destruction against Japan while the Soviet Union entered the war against Imperial 
Japan, in the moment its defeat had already been imminent, with motivation to obtain in just 
a few days maximum gains with applying minimal military effort. The use of atomic 
weapons by the US was “excused” by the need to bring an end to a protracted war in the 
Asia-Pacific theater and the fact that the explicit prohibition to use nuclear weapons in 
international law did not exist. On the one hand, Japan was as unlawful belligerent in the 
sense of the Kellogg-Briand Pact which virtually made it an outlaw, a non-beneficiary of jus 
in bello rights in the war, which in turn freed victim states of the obligation to observe jus in 
bello rights in war against Japan.143 Thus unrestricted warfare was implicitly allowed for the 
purpose of taming the aggressor. On August 9, 1945, after the bomb was dropped on 
Nagasaki, the Japanese government sent one and only time a protest note to the US 
government evoking the unlawfulness of the indiscriminate weapons which caused 
unnecessary suffering144 to the civilians, thus violating one of the fundamental principles of 
laws of war. The atomic bombs were not directed against military targets, but caused mass 
atrocities on a scale incomparable to any other atrocities in the Pacific theater. The note 
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made reference to prohibited weapons such as poisonous gas,145 which Japan used in China, 
in comparison to which nuclear weapons were ultimately disproportional. The argument 
that the nuclear blasts would end the war were false, as the firebombing of Japanese cities 
continued well into the mid-August which caused severe material and human losses in 
Japan. In his opening speech at the IMTFE Prosecutor Keenan framed the atomic bombing in 
terms of just war theory “We admit that great force and violence, including the Hiroshima 
bomb, have been employed by the Allies, and we make no more apology for that that does a 
decent, innocent citizen [whose] family employ the use of force of prevent his life being 
taken by an outlaw.”146 Although Keenan took quite cold and optimistic outlook on the 
bombings, certain members of the IPS and judicial cohort were deeply disturbed by the 
judicial silence on it and the scale of devastation they witnessed once they arrived in Japan.  
The reverberations Russo-Japanese had upon their relations were reflected in the extent 
mutual wariness and the long-felt desire by the Soviets to revenge their loss.147 On April 13, 
1941, the two nations concluded the Neutrality Pact that was to expire in April 1946. Despite 
the assurances, the Soviets gave to the Japanese that they would not harbor the Allied 
military troops on its soil, the 1944 Moscow Conference showed the Soviet mala fides in 
negotiating the Soviet entry into the war against Japan and the recuperations of its interest 
in Manchuria, in exchange for providing Siberian basis for the US, which was formalized in 
Yalta in February 1945.148 The Soviets refused to mediate the end of the war between Japan 
and the Allied Powers and on August 9, 1945 Soviet troops invaded Manchuria. The UN 
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Charter draft Article 103 disposes that in case previously concluded treaties and obligations 
are contrary to the object and purpose of the Charter, the latter should prevail. The Soviet 
entry was justified as the collective military effort against the aggressor under the 
Covenant. 149  The Soviet invasion into Manchuria was accompanied by indiscriminate 
commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity against the local population - 
Chinese, Koreans, Russians, and Japanese. The Soviets captured one and a half a million 
Japanese civilians and prisoners of war who were taken to Siberia and Central Asia where 
they suffered from cruelties inflicted upon them – exposed to Marxist-Leninist 
indoctrination, forced into hard labor, or imprisoned. These civilians and prisoners of war 
would constitute an objection of serious contention between Japan and the Soviet Union 
until 1956 which will be observed in later chapters.  
 
 
6. The Emperor Hirohito as the Japanese Kaiser and Selection of the IMTFE Defendants 
 
“Without historical context, individual criminal acts do not appear to make sense.”150  
 
The Emperor was the only constant in the erratic cabinet changes during the war, with 
leaders who did not share the same policies and views. Despite the initial SWNCC directive 
of October 27, 1945 which read that “Hirohito was not immune from arrest, trial, and 
punishment as a war criminal.”151 On January 24, 1946 MacArthur warned that the Emperor 
was the instrument for effective governing of Japanese people, that his removal threatened 
popular upheaval which would call for not only more troops to keep the order, but also 
                                                          
149 Boris Trainin, Russian legal scholar, whose work infused the legal philosophy of Justice Jackson, author of 
Hitlerite responsibility under international law explained the Soviet view on the aggression by making distinction 
between just and unjust war. Wars of liberation fit the category of collective self-defense in terms of assistance to 
the state prejudiced by the aggressor  
150 Richard Ashby Wilson, Writing History in International Criminal Trials, 2011, 70. 
151  War Department to SWNCC, “Apprehension and Punishment of War Criminals in the Far East,” 
Memorandum, September 29, 1945 in Makoto Iokibe, ed., The Occupation of Japan, Part 2: US and Allied Policy, 
1945-1952, microfiche, 2-A-105.  
  48 
setting civil service members as they might lose support of Japanese officials. This, he 
contended, would be not only costly, but might halt the democratic reforms and give way to 
Communist ideas, which desperate masses would be receptive of. On June 18, 1946, Chief 
Prosecutor Keenan announced that the Emperor would not be tried and instructed his staff 
to fabricate a story and find evidence indicating his passive in the decision-making to which 
he was coerced by the pre-made Cabinet decisions. However, this was not consistent with 
the conspiracy charge which disposed that as long as the defendant did not withdraw from 
the position of power covering the seventeen-year period, he was considered guilty. The 
non-prosecution of the Emperor relieved the Japanese, but at the same time “it sent out 
ambiguous messages to the Japanese understanding of war responsibility, indicating 
paradoxically that it rested with both everybody and nobody.”152 
The IPS was pressured to select thirty defendants from fifty Class A suspects faced with 
lack of evidence in case of which they used all sorts of documents to establish some sort of 
evidence. The US intelligence reports, studies on Japanese history, militarism, politics, secret 
and industrial societies, diaries, hearsay evidence would be all admissible. Slow and 
inefficient work under Keenan prompted Comyns-Carr to organize Executive Committee 
which would select the defendants by a majority vote of associate prosecutors. The war 
criminal suspects’ files were in competition which further rendered the process painful, but 
the new criteria was based on how representative the individuals were of the key phases of 
aggression, their membership in the key agencies in Imperial government, and the degree of 
their cooperation with the IPS. Some defendants were discretionary included at the special 
request of the allies. For example, Yoshijiro Umezu, Kwantung army commander and 
Mamoru Shigetmitsu, US diplomat to USSR, were included at the USSR request and Kenji 
Doihara, although the evidence was lacking, was added with promise of the Chinese 
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prosecution team that it would provide it at later date.  without having enough evidence 
against them, but promising they would provide them, which had never happened.  
A great number of civilian and military leaders (listed as military officers of high and 
low rank, members of ultra-nationalistic organizations, members of Imperial Rule 
Assistance Association, and industrial conglomerates who gave their support to the war 
effort were considered to be detrimental to the process of democratization and were 
removed from the public office by SCAP directives in January 1946.  
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CHAPTER 2: Road Towards the San Francisco Peace Treaty: Fate of the War Crimes 
Program and Japanese War Criminals  
 
1. Dissipating Legal Narratives of the Class A War Criminal Guilt: The IMTFE 
Judgement 
 
 
The IMTFE project was designed to provide for legislation that would maintain peace in the 
newly created international order, make historical record, and administer retribution for 
Japanese misdeeds. The IMTFE judgement or its majority judgement represents the 
dominant legal, political, and philosophical thought of the judicial body that was mainly 
driven by Anglo-American forces which was uncompromisingly committed to pragmatism 
in the context of the postwar expediency. Yet, the dissenting opinions by the minority group 
not only challenged legal, political, and historical record provided by the judgement but also 
opened the door to a more ambiguous and fragmented views of Japanese aggression and 
war responsibility.  
After two years, on February 10, 1948 the IMTFE brought its hearings to a close. After 
that, in the period from November 9 to 12, 1948 the Tribunal read the majority judgement 
and sentences. Contrary to the initial post-surrender political context of urgency and high 
expectations put on the Tribunal to expediently deliver its judgement, “the prosecution, 
judges, and defendants enjoyed the luxury of time.”1 The IMTFE President, Justice Webb 
said that the judgement was not reached unanimously by the eleven-member tribunal, but 
that Justice Pal dissented from the majority opinion, while Justices Röling and Bernard 
dissented in part, and Justice Jaranilla and Webb lodged their separate opinions, although 
they concurred with the majority judgement.2 The dissents and separate opinions were not 
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read in the courtroom, but the President promised that they would be incorporated in the 
official trial record.  
The majority judgement represented the IMTFE’s dominant or intended version of 
history, almost entirely produced by the prosecution’s indictment. The international 
criminal tribunals tend to make certain choices in producing history, they tend to favor 
linear, over-determined narratives infused the view of Great Powers or sponsoring states–
they produce “hegemonic history;”3  as opposed to a more fragmented and ambiguous 
historical narrative that offers a deeper understanding of forces behind the events. Justice 
Pal’s dissenting opinion is instrumental in offering another, contested view of events, 
framed through the lenses of anti-imperialism. In that sense, the IMTFE trial record 
harbored not only the victors’ side of the story, but also the alternative versions of the Pacific 
War, and Japanese leaders’ responsibility for it. The IMTFE judgement, representing a sum 
of big and lesser chunks of the legal and historical narrative—a fragmented view—provided 
the Japanese government and people, especially those leaning to the right-wing and with 
revisionist tendencies, with legal opinion to capitalize upon in their rebuttals of the legality 
of the Trials, the aggressive war, and the war responsibility. Pal’s dissenting opinion 
remains a dissenting opinion indeed, standing aside from the majority verdict, yet it has 
gained authority in framing the legal and historical debate on war responsibility. In Japan, it 
is referred to as Pāru hanketsushō or Pal’s judgement4, instead of dissenting opinion. His 
dissenting opinion has been distorted to refute not only the responsibility of Japanese 
leaders for waging aggressive war, but the Japanese nation more generally. Justice Pal was 
respected judge at the Calcutta High Court, interestingly without delivering a single 
dissenting opinion in his practice, and well-versed in Hindi and Anglo-Saxon law. Prior to 
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his appointment to the Tokyo Tribunal, Pal did not have any background in international 
law; his international judicial career started in 1952 with his appointment to UN 
International Law Commission.5 Since he joined the tribunal, he did not hide his inclination 
towards dissent. When his dissenting opinion went public, it caused indignation to 
Jawaharlal Nehru, Indian prime minister, who did not want to side with it as it did not 
reflect the opinion of the government of which he informed the interested counties.6  
His dissenting opinion is relevant on few points. First, he criticized the crime of 
aggression and crimes against humanity as instances of ex-post facto7 law he considered 
would rather encourage aggression in the future than prevent it and secure peace. It can be 
argued that his point has been valid as law did not succeed in preventing wars in the post-
World War Two period—the concept of self-defense has been constantly stretched to justify 
instances of use of force—wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are cases in point. Second, his overly 
expansive view of self-defense comes as a contradiction to the previous point as he 
contended that states had arbitrary right to decide on the circumstances under which they 
could exercise their right to self-defense as long as such decision was animated by a genuine 
belief or bona fide.8 In his view, this entailed that valid justifications for triggering right to 
self-defense, even proactively, could be “inhospitable international environment,”9economic, 
political, ideological threats.10 Under his premises, Japanese invasion of Manchuria was not 
an instance of aggression, but self-defense due to the spread of communism, boycott of 
Japanese goods, harsh sanctions the US and Britain imposed upon Japan, their support for 
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Chiang Kai-shek which befall within ideological and economic motives;11 although he did 
not imply that Japan was under a threat of imminent attack. As noted earlier, this was the 
view of many states that lodged their reservations to the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Third, he 
partially refuted the Yamashita standard or command responsibility doctrine of military 
commanders on the grounds of negligence or omission for the actions of troops on the field, 
he rather considered that the liability stem from acts that superior “could reasonably have 
prevented.”12 The leaders, including the Japanese leaders, could not have been responsible 
for acts committed by lower military ranks and their superiors upon which the stern justice 
had already been meted out by the Allies’ under Class BC crimes. Hence, he refuted counts 
of war crimes on which the defendants were accused. Furthermore, Pal refuted the concept 
of conspiracy as non-existent category of crime in international law. Japan’s decision to 
attack the US, according to the evidence adduced, was a part of an overall conspiracy, but 
political decision following the diplomatic negations and the receipt of Hull note which as 
he says “cornered Japan.”13 The Pal’s convoluted dissent was profoundly anti-Western and 
anti-imperialist in his proposals as he assigned the guilt for “Japan’s aggression” in 
Manchuria to the colonial practices of the Western Powers, which it was trying to mimic, 
and whose policies propelled Japan to defend itself which was consistent with international 
practices at the time, alluding to the long-time practiced Western imperialism. In this respect, 
Pal’s view somewhat deviates from legalistic and flows into political discussion that goes 
along the reasoning of classical realism. 14  According to Pal, the Allied Powers were 
protective of their interests in narrowest of terms, they cemented the current state of 
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international affairs thus taking away the possibility of “have-nots” states to alter 
dissatisfying conditions for the sake of peace, referring to colonies.15  
Pal thought the Allies’ motives for creating the new charge were highly suspect– 
especially considering their own history of violence towards the non-Western nations. 
Instead of promoting universal values, these nations were perhaps deploying it to serve 
their own narrow interests, such as maintaining the status quo– “the very status quo,” he 
noted, “which might have been organized and hitherto maintained only by force by pure 
opportunist “Have and Holders.”16 He drew particular attention to the American chief 
prosecutor Robert Jackson’s statement at Nuremberg that “whatever grievances a nation 
may have, however objectionable it finds the status quo, aggressive war is an illegal means 
for settling those grievances of for altering those conditions.”17 To Pal this amounted to “the 
paralysis of international affairs, and by implication the criminalization of the struggle 
against colonialism,”18 which he considered unsustainable as colonies “cannot be made to 
submit to eternal domination only in the name of peace”19  
Pal’s 1,235 pages long dissent, against 1,444 pages long majority opinion, meshed his 
anti-colonial bias with some sound legal conclusions which reflected legal philosophy of 
positivism in opposition with natural law legalism that dominated the majority IMTFE 
members. His conclusions were not that Japanese leaders were morally or politically 
innocent, but innocent from the point of view of international law in force at the time of its 
establishment. Equally, Japanese atrocities, “devilish and fiendish,”20 were not refuted, but 
the evidence adduced was judged as non-probative. It can be concluded that Pal’s dissent, 
primarily directed against the European Powers which pioneered colonialism, somewhat 
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toned down Japan’s expansion, although it did imply that it shared the moral responsibility 
for colonialism, but not a criminal one.21  
On the other hand, French Justice Bernard and the Dutch Justice Röling who lodged 
their partial dissent to the majority judgement did not side with Pal on colonial remarks as 
they “accepted the assumptions of European superiority engendered by colonial rule.”22 
French Justice was a colonial magistrate and his appointment was motivated by the 
cautiousness of the French government to control the information regarding French 
atrocities in Indochina from appearing before the Tribunal— it was important to “rectify 
their image to appear more worthy of the era that came to its end.”23 While Justice Bernard 
was more sensitive to procedural and probative rules,24 in his dissent he agreed to the 
legality of crime against peace, but on entirely different legal grounds than the majority 
judgement group.25 Justice Röling’s dissented from the finding that the interwar pacts and 
resolutions, specifically Pact of Paris outlawed war in the sense that waging illegal war was 
criminal for which he considered that judges were not obliged to follow the Charter if its 
provisions were contrary to international law.26 As Justice Pal did, he criticized the ex post 
facto law adopted at London Conference. He did consider that wars ought to be prevented in 
the future by taking incremental legal steps “based on appropriate and reasoned 
foundations and progressively codified precedents.”27 Another important point, later found 
in the separate opinion of Justice Webb was the immunity of the Emperor whom he 
considered to be the main instigator of the Pacific War while the defendants at the dock 
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were his subordinates. 28  The three dissenters remained unswayed in their formalism, 
personal convictions, and ideologies and had to cohabite with the majority group which was 
more pragmatic in that its judges with preference for positivism completely acquiesced to 
the natural law-infused indictment prepared by the prosecution.29  
The majority judgement cohort of justices came to Tokyo imbued with deep sense of 
pragmatism, postwar urgency, and conviction that the IMTFE had an important role to play 
not only in exercising retribution against the Japanese, but also for the future, by confirming 
the new law. It could have been expected that in the last institutional stages of IMTFE, the 
floor would be given to the impartial justices, yet this was another group of legalists with 
the sense for pragmatism. British Justice Patrick dogmatically assented to the idea that “the 
only reason for setting up this portentous institution [the Tokyo Tribunal] was to declare 
that war was a crime and that individuals could be held responsible for it.”30 The bench’s 
“triumvirate”31 represented by British Justice Patrick, US Justice Cramer, and New Zealand 
Justice Northcroft were the pragmatists who tried to reconcile the discrepancies between 
legal philosophies and commitments to justice as they considered the IMTFE as a valuable 
project which merited transcending the differences for the sake of punishment in the context 
of postwar exigency. The Commonwealth faction railed against the justices who questioned 
or disagreed with the legality of the Charter who “should have declined to accept office 
under it.”32 Justice Northcrofth was anxious that the divisions of the bench would be the 
setback for the outlawry of war, but that “the sharp dissent from Nuremberg must be 
disastrous.”33 Justice Bernard from dissenting faction refuted such views in an unblushing 
manner. For him, the role of judge was to examine the law of the Charter with right to refuse 
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to apply it in case of disagreement with it. 34  The IMTFE President Justice Webb was 
notorious for its arrogance, inflexibility, and authoritarian behavior towards other justices as 
he believed that he ought to be the one to write the majority judgement while others were 
supposed to agree or disagree with him. Even in his interactions with Supreme Commander, 
Webb was very protective of the judicial body from outside incursions; he insisted that the 
judges should be left to act independently in their interpretation of the Charter or any other 
activity pertaining to their duties.35 Besides bad temper, Justice Webb’s previous post of the 
President of Australian War Crimes Commission in 1943 was problematic in respect to 
integrity and impartiality. The Commission, set up to investigate Japanese war crimes in 
New Guinea, Burma, and Thailand, produced numerous reports he had authored which 
certainly gave him solid pre-conceptions on Japanese leaders’ war guilt. In his short separate 
opinion, he stressed that as the Tribunal failed to prosecute the Emperor who was the main 
responsible for waging aggressive war, the sentences of other defendants could possibly be 
reduced.36 Other members of the Tribunal did not question this as, despite not being directly 
involved in similar activities, they came with strong personal convictions of the Japanese 
guilt and mission to advance international law.37 Philippine Justice Jaranilla was survivor of 
Bataan Death March and prisoner of war in Japanese hands. In his separate opinion, he 
lamented the leniency of the sentences which were disproportional to the gravity of the 
crimes committed thus marring the deterrent effect of the IMTFE project.38 Soviet Justice 
Zaryanov was a member of the USSR Supreme Court and had a poor conduct of English 
despite which he managed to become quite engaged in the work of the Bench, contrary to 
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the dominant views in the literature,39 by being committed to the IMTFE objectives and 
exercising a great degree of flexibility. Given the Cold War tensions, ironically, “he proved 
instrumental in cementing the majority in Tokyo.”40 The fact that the majority judgement 
sentenced seven IMTFE defendants to death by hanging has been often invoked as one of 
the manifestations of victors’ justice at Tokyo. And yet, not all of the judges were in favor of 
gallows out of fear it might be seen as vindictive. American Justice Cramer unwaveringly 
defended the idea that punishing criminals by death following the law was “a matter of 
justice, plain and simple.”41  
The judicial process was primarily led by Anglo-American jurists who were prepared to 
exercise a strong sense of pragmatism and commitment to the IMTFE project which was 
based on natural law legal tradition. These individuals performed a role of “jurist-politicians” 
as they were involved in matters not only pertaining to international law, but also 
international politics. The case of British who were ready to disregard the impartiality of the 
judicial body, in order to avoid ridicule for failing to prosecute Japanese militarism or meet 
the prestige of Nuremberg is exemplary on the point. The knowledge that other judges were 
questioning the law of the Charter was unsettling to Alvary Gascoigne, British political 
representative to Tokyo, who was ready to go as far as to appeal to MacArthur and Webb 
for help. In the end, Justice Patrick discouraged him to the effect that if would be 
inappropriate to expose differences between the judges publicly, and took initiative upon 
himself “to try to convert his colleagues to the vital necessity of their pronouncing judgment 
on the basis of the Nuremberg findings.”42 Although, they exercised a considerable degree 
of independence, justices went along the lines of ideas forged by the lawyer-statesmen. 
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2. The Internationality of the IMTFE Questioned: Mercy Denied to the Class A War 
Criminals 
 
The scope of the present research extends beyond the judgement but before it delves into the 
changing geopolitical aspects which transformed the fate and stance of the IMTFE convicts, 
it is important to look at two occasions on which their sentences could have been reduced.  
The majority judgement sentenced seven defendants (Kenji Doihara, Hirota Kōki,  
Seishirō Itagaki, Heitarō Kimura, Matsui Iwane, Akira Mutō, Hideki Tōjō) to death sentence 
by hanging, Shigenori Tōgō received 20-year sentence, only Mamoru Shigemitsu received 7-
year sentence, while the rest of the defendants were convicted to life in confinement. In their 
separate opinions, four justices expressed their opinion that the sentences should have been 
more lenient. Justice Pal found all defendants non-guilty, Justice Röling agreed to the death 
sentences of all defendants, except for Kōki Hirota who was opposed to the aggression and 
personally negotiated the cessation of atrocities with War Minister Hajime Sugiyama; 
instead of him, he recommended Shimada who had violated laws of war, while Shunroku 
Hata, Hirota, Kidō, Shigemitsu, Tōgō should all have been acquitted as their guilt had not 
been proven.43 President Webb considered death sentences to be a harsh punishment in 
view that “the main leader” in crime, the Emperor, had been granted immunity and 
suggested commutation from death sentences to life imprisonment. Webb observed that 
they were old and no longer impressive and that “it may prove revolting to hang or shoot 
such old men.”44 Justice Bernard found them all not guilty due to the defective procedure, 
not because he believed that crime of aggression was not criminally punishable.45  
The Tribunal did not have an appellate body, but the IMTFE Charter, unilaterally 
proclaimed by MacArthur did contain a provision, Article 17, according to which the 
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Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers had the authority “to review or otherwise alter 
sentence except to increase severity.” Later, however, FEC adopted policy directive, 
emanated from British and Australian delegation, which was meant to amend the IMTFE 
Charter, more precisely to limit the Supreme Commander’s discretion in altering judgement 
and sentences by imposing obligation to consult with members of Allied Council for Japan 
(ACJ)46 or representatives of other powers in Japan prior to adopting any such decision.47 
The idea behind was to keep MacArthur’s authority preponderance in check by 
“intergovernmental agreement on part of powers concerned.”48 The final version of the 
amended IMTFE Charter of April 26, 1946 did not translate FEC amendments regarding the 
judgement and sentences alteration, leaving its Article 17 intact. Aside from judges’ opinion 
regarding the review of the sentences, the IMTFE defense counsels appealed to MacArthur 
to exercise his authority of judicial review urging that “we must not ourselves be guilty of 
atrocities against the law and justice.”49 Beverley Coleman, defense counsel who resigned in 
mid-1946, personally pleaded that MacArthur should consider the possibility of consulting 
the United Nations International Court of Justice which could provide an advisory opinion 
on the criminality of aggressive war prior to committing any injustices regarding the 
sentencing of the defendants.50 Three days after the petitions were filed, the Allied Council 
for Japan hurriedly set the meeting between MacArthur and diplomats from the countries 
represented at IMTFE.  Diplomats’ positions reflected legal positions of their justices–France, 
proposing clemency, India proposing commutation of death sentences, while Australia left it 
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to the discretion of the Supreme Commander.51 In his pompous speech MacArthur decided 
to keep his deferential stance towards the judicial work and decided to uphold all the 
sentences. Although he did not believe in criminal punishments for war of aggression, he 
had probably decided to maintain the sentences given the postwar idealism and sentiment 
that authors of aggressive wars should be sacrificed for a better world.52  
Before the seven defendants were sent to gallows, they appealed before the US Supreme 
Court for a writ of habeas corpus. The idea was instigated by the defense counsel which 
claimed the IMTFE to be “a creation and enterprise of the Executive of the United State and 
the military authorities thereunder.”53 By defying the international character to the IMTFE 
and bypassing the SCAP, the action on behalf of the IMTFE defendants provoked responses 
from the nations represented at the Tribunal which came to justify and save its 
“international” appeal. When the case got before the Supreme Court, its justices were evenly 
divided between a group of four who believed that the Japanese war criminals should get 
their case heard, and another group of four who believed that the Court had no jurisdiction 
based on the Constitution to decide on the matter. Justice Robert Jackson, former Chief 
Prosecutor at Nuremberg, decided to cast a tie-breaking vote in favor of the Court deciding 
whether it could hear the case.54 On December 20, 1948, the Supreme Court decision refuted 
its jurisdiction to “review, affirm, set aside, or annul” the IMTFE judgement and sentences 
imposed upon Japanese citizens.55 Justice William O. Douglas who was in the group that 
refused the petitioners to file for a writ observed that this new type of military tribunals was 
out of judicial scrutiny, leaving them with an absolute power, while the prisoners did not 
benefit from the right of appeal for which they had to appeal to the mercy of the executive.56 
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Justice Douglas observed that the Tokyo Tribunal is not a judicial, but political question, 
describing the Tokyo Tribunal as instrument of military power of the executive.57  The 
Supreme Court episode touched upon the extent delicacy and ambiguity surrounding the 
question whether the Tokyo Tribunal was an American tribunal or international tribunal 
given its unilateral proclamation by MacArthur which the defense counsel saw as a loophole 
to be exploited in order to change the sort of the IMTFE defendants. However, the IMTFE 
was rooted in international instruments such as the Cairo Declaration of December 1, 1943, 
the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945, the Instrument of Surrender of September 2, 1945, 
and the Moscow Declaration of December 26, 1945.58 The Tribunal practically gained its 
“internationality” with the power granted to Far Eastern Commission to adopt policy 
resolutions, although of an arguable reach, were to be transmitted through State-War-Navy 
Coordinating Council (SNWCC) to SCAP, and with the arrival of other countries’ 
prosecutors, judges, defenses who will try to challenge the US leading role. The refusal by 
the Supreme Court to sit in judgement on the IMTFE case was a show of awareness that 
such an interference would play havoc with the Allied war criminal program in Far East. 
Notwithstanding its international character, “the chain of command from the US 
government to SCAP was unbroken,” held the Court. In this way, the Supreme Court 
affirmed that there was “no serious doubt […] that the tribunal is dominated by American 
influence.”59 MacArthur’s decision to suspend the execution of sentences waiting for the 
decision, after he had initially decided to uphold the sentences, further exacerbated the issue 
of American dominance in the IMTFE.  
The participation of the Allies’ countries, other that the US, to the IMTFE was adding to 
their prestige and power which the US unilateralism sometimes tended to jeopardize, but 
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for which they were ready to unite and assert throughout all stages of the IMTFE. The 
Commonwealth countries, in particular New Zealand, framed the defendants’ appeal to the 
US Supreme Court as a “threat” to all the countries represented at the IMTFE.60 The British 
were more confident in dealing with this unpleasant matter—although the Supreme Court 
affair might be observed as a result of the unilateral proclamation of the IMTFE Charter by 
the SCAP, the Supreme Commander was embodying the medium to carry out the decisions 
on behalf of the Allied Powers enshrined in international instruments establishing the 
Tribunal. Douglas MacArthur was not an American in Japan, but the “embodiment of the 
Allied cooperation,” 61  concluded the British. The Russians were angry at MacArthur’s 
decision to suspend the execution of sentence and wait for the Court’s decision on the 
admissibility of the case which amounted to violation of the US commitments pursuant to 
the Potsdam Declaration and the IMTFE Charter.62  
With MacArthur’s order given to the US Eight Army to execute the seven Class A war 
criminals, the window of opportunity to rectify and balance out the majority judgement’s 
sentences which represented the views of six judges out of eleven came to a closure. 
MacArthur reluctantly used his prerogative to make sure that the IMTFE project, already 
endangered not only by the time factor, but also by internal workings of its members who 
were not always ready to bend their legal, ideological, and political convictions. In 1949, the 
US diplomacy regarding the international criminal program slowly started to shift its focus 
to the urgencies dictated by the tumultuous geopolitical environment in the Far East. Japan 
started emerging as a valuable ally and consequentially the US diplomacy would, nominally, 
be committed to the goal of clearing the war criminals’ issue. And yet, once more dominated 
by institutional cleavages and dilemmas regarding the politico-legal character of the war 
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criminal program in the Far East, it would have to compromise with directly interested 
Allies some of which, in the meanwhile, became the enemies.   
 
3. The Class A War Criminal Suspects and Subsequent Tokyo Trials  
 
On January 8, 1948, the US started the Trial of Ministries Case in West Germany which is 
specific for its prosecution of diplomats, bureaucratic leaders, and fifth-columnists on counts 
of crimes against peace. It was the first time since the IMT rendered its judgement on 
October 1, 1946 that the national court took the task up to prosecute individuals for crimes 
against peace. More importantly, given the changing diplomatic and geopolitical outlook, it 
was the last chance to get prosecutions for “the supreme crime.” The judgment rendered in 
the Ministries case, which almost coincided with the IMTFE judgement, was handed down 
on October 7, 1948 convicting five individuals for crime against peace.63 Telford Taylor, 
former Chief Counsel at IMT, commended the reached consistency in judgement observing 
that “the judgement is more important than those which ended nearly four years ago […] it 
proves that we still mean in 1949 what we meant in 1945.”64  After that date, the question of 
the Class A war criminal suspects who had been held in confinement for almost three years 
without a trial became a pressing issue, although there had been some preliminary 
discussions in various venues.   
Already in 1947, Keenan urged his American team to prepare files on the fifty Class A 
war criminals still in confinement in which British prosecutors also took part, somewhat 
hesitantly, as they did not want to support the policies of protracted detention without a 
trial. In September 1947 about a half of that number was released. At this time, Britain also 
voiced its intention not to take part in any subsequent international criminal tribunals in the 
Far East and anticipated that the US would take similar position. FEC older policy decision 
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FEC 007/3 required that the individuals suspected of crime against peace were supposed to 
be prosecuted by an international tribunal which pointed at the need of amending the said 
policy decision. The revision entailed putting the amendment before the FEC which would 
give space to the USSR delegate to oppose it and uncompromisingly call for international 
trials which both British and Americans thought was to be avoided at any cost.65 Alternative 
explored was to place some of the Class A war criminals for trials under the BC class war 
criminals which was one of the programs under the jurisdiction of Alva Carpenter, Chief of 
GHQ Legal Section.66  
In March 1948, Chief Prosecutor Keenan appeared before the FEC recommending the 
release of the Class A war criminal suspects where he touched upon the purpose of the 
IMTFE, political and financial aspects against subsequent trials, and the general 
unwillingness of the IMTFE members to sit for another round of international trials. The war 
crimes trials program was funded by the Department of Army that was faced with 
considerable financial restrictions.67 The IMTFE project was time consuming, costly, and 
required immense effort due to difficulty of finding probative evidence, obtaining 
cooperation from the parties involved, and the need to study massive number of 
documents.68 In case the FEC governments wanted to organize subsequent international 
trials, they would have to organize them independently, appoint a new prosecutor and 
panel of judges which might result in lack of uniformity with the IMTFE. In short, Keenan 
strongly advocated the closure of the institutional basis for the prosecution of the Class A 
war criminal suspects, to the effect that the IMTFE prosecution had been exemplary.69 The 
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chief prosecutors’ stance ought to be placed in a broader context of shifting policies which 
moved from their emphasize on occupation and punishment to democratization and 
conclusion of a peace treaty. In 1948, Washington decided to bring halt to harsh occupation 
policies imposed by GHQ, including the protracted IMTFE trials which, in precarious 
economic and political conditions in Japan, threatened to turn public opinion against the 
Allies which could potentially represent a fertile ground for the Communist cause.70 George 
F. Kennan, Director of Policy Planning Staff, repudiated the IMTFE trials as “the hocus-
pocus of a judicial procedure,” completely inadequate form of punishment that should have 
taken “place as an act of war, not justice.”71 In other words, it would have been more 
efficient and effective to have shot the captured Japanese leaders than to organize political 
trials, well suited for historians and international politicians, not lawyers which rather 
endangered the US image and have nothing to do with domestic legalism. Kennan believed 
that the trials lost the attention of the public opinion which started to observe the defendants 
as victims enduring “humiliating ordeals.”72  
In October, 1948 the New Zealand delegation proposed FEC 314 which would constitute 
a basic document open for discussion to other members with the main goal of releasing the 
Class A war criminal suspects under investigation for crime against peace category and 
setting the target date of June 30, 1949 for the cessation of war criminal trials for all classes of 
war criminals.73 While the released Class A war suspects would be able to engage in public 
life, resume office, and have their property restored, their eventual trial for lesser crimes 
would not be precluded.74 The document was proposed in view that the two years were 
sufficient to fulfill general goals of the trial and punish a representative number of 
                                                          
70  “Explanatory Notes by Mr. George F. Keenan,” March 25, 1948 in FRUS, 1948. The Far East and 
Australasia, 1948, 717-719. 
71 Ibid.  
72 Ibid.  
73 FEC, Minutes, Committee No. 5, War Criminals, Minutes, 10th Meeting, October 11, 1948 in RG 43, General 
Records, March 1946-1949, Box 1.  
74 Ibid.  
 
 
 
 
 
67 
individuals in both classes,75 after which “justice would take its natural course.”76 This raised 
few objections among the FEC members as they considered that the target dates outside of 
Japan would scrutinize the pace of investigations and prosecutions of national courts which 
would be stigmatized for eventual delays. For example, Australian government, in 
particular worried about its capacity to meet the target date. The representatives of the 
Netherlands and Philippines worried that rushing to terminate the trials would give 
impression to their public opinion, still inflamed over Japanese aggression, that the war 
criminals would escape the punishment.77 The Chinese proposed that FEC 314 should take 
form of recommendation as it would imply that the member states have a moral obligation 
to terminate their trials by the target date whereas in case of policy decision, a dissent or 
abstinence from it, would imply no obligation at all.78  
In December 1948, the SCAP released seventeen Class A war criminal suspects upon the 
recommendation received from the IPS in accordance with FEC 007/3. Among the released 
were Kishi Nobusuke, Minister of Commerce and Kisaburo Ando, Minister of Home Affairs, 
both serving in the Tōjō cabinet. In 1950, the Soviets urged the US Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson to organize new international trials which would try the Emperor Hirohito and 
high military ranks for the most serious crimes against humanity. Khabarovsk trials that 
were held on December, 25-30, 1949 by the USSR to try twelve Japanese military and 
physicians on counts of preparing and using bacteriological weapons in pursuing their 
aggressive war against the Soviet Union, in particular Nomohan Incident in 1939, and China. 
These trials were meant to correct the IMTFE trials,79 in which the Soviets exercised limited 
influence, for not developing strong case for crime against peace against the USSR, non-
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prosecution of the Emperor, and biological warfare. The Soviet justice served as a 
supportive platform for its Cold War diplomacy by using propaganda and geopolitics.80 
 
4. SCAP Parole System and War Criminal Policies  
 
Before the occupation ended, the SCAP Legal Section established the SCAP Clemency 
System by means of Circular No. 5 based on the US Federal system on March 7, 1950. 
Prisoners were able to earn “good time” credit for observing prison rules and regulations 
and pre-trial detention credit, thus allowing them to reduce their sentences and become 
eligible for parole, after serving one third of the sentence or fifteen years in case of life 
sentence and sentence exceeding forty-five years. This mechanism will serve as a model for 
clemency and parole system established in post-occupation Japan. Not only the Circular did 
not mention any institutional link with the FEC or ACJ, but also did not make a distinction 
between the classes of war criminals which implied that the IMTFE defendants could be 
paroled under the newly established system without consultation with the representatives 
of other countries. Again, the SCAP was exercising the sole authority for the execution of the 
IMTFE sentences on behalf of the Allied Powers81 to the effect that China and Soviet Union 
would protest the inability to influence the process. The intensifying Cold War rivalry only 
meant one thing—that the US could no longer act on the behalf of the Allied powers in the 
same way it did in the immediate postwar period which only led to provocations and 
extended debates mainly by the Soviet Union. With its refusal to sign the Peace Treaty with 
Japan in 1952, the USSR lost voice in the clemency and parole process of Class A war 
criminals, and yet, as will be shown in later chapters, it found a way to exert considerable 
influence over the process.   
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The Chinese mission in Japan was suspicious about the SCAP parole system as it 
contended that it amounted to the modification or alternation of the original sentence thus 
requiring consultation of the Allies. 82  They invoked MacArthur’s speech in which he 
announced his decision to retain sentences established by the Tribunal which was now 
altered by the SCAP parole system. The US did not heed as the parole system was 
administrative method, widely practiced in democratic societies, which only represented the 
change of the manner in which the sentence was executed.83 Along the similar lines, the 
USSR dissatisfaction revolved around the fact that the measure was unilateral, that the 
SCAP ought to consult and obtain agreement of other nations as the IMTFE was 
international tribunal and requested the revocation of Circular No. 5.84 The Article 17 of the 
IMTFE Charter did not allow for the premature release of the Class A war criminals. 
Already in the 1950s, it became evident that the issue of war criminals could potentially 
become fastidious, and that as such, it should be left to the past as soon as possible. Just 
before the outbreak of the Korean War, U. Alexis Johnson from State Department Far 
Eastern Bureau expressed this idea as follows: “I hope that one of these days we may be able 
to relegate questions concerning war criminals into the historical past where it so well 
belongs, particularly at this moment when we are looking toward the re-instatement of 
Japan into the family of nations.” 85  Mamoru Shigemitsu, who was included at the 
indictment at the Soviet request and received seven-year sentences was the first Class A war 
criminal to be paroled by the SCAP parole system and ready to go back to the public life.  
 
5. The Peace Treaty with War Criminals: Friends or Foes? 
 
                                                          
82 FEC, Minutes of Meeting, FEC, 193rd Meeting, May 18, 1950 in RG 43, Records Related to FEC, Minutes of 
Meetings, February 1946-1949, Box 3.  
83 Ibid.  
84 Message, Acheson, State Department to SCAP, August 30, 1950 in NARA, RG 84, Japanese War Crimes 
Cases, Box 26.  
85 Letter, U. Alexis Johnson, Department of State, Far Eastern Bureau to William J. Sebald, US Political 
Advisor to Japan, June 23, 1950 in in NARA, RG 84, Japanese War Criminals, Box 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
70 
In the first two years, the initial occupation policies towards Japan were almost exclusively 
delegated to General MacArthur, a highly authoritative persona, who wanted to play the 
central role in rebuilding Japan. As a part of aggressive demilitarization process the former 
Japanese leaders were prosecuted within the IMTFE and around 210,000 wartime officials 
were purged by the directive for the removal of undesirable personnel from public office of 
January 4, 1946,86 while the military structure was dissolved. In 1946, the GHQ Government 
Section, headed by Courtney Whitney pushed for more radical reforms that were imposed 
to the Japanese government, and often out of touch with Japan’s peculiar geopolitical 
environment. As a part of these reforms, Japan adopted amendment to Article 9 of the 
Constitution in 1946 that allowed Japan to exercise right to self-defense, as its initial 
interpretation was construed to eliminate the right to aggressive and defensive wars. 
Despite this change, only during second term of Prime Minister Yoshida will this 
interpretation take root. In addition, comprehensive economic reforms — agricultural land 
reform, removal of zaibatsu, the Anti-Monopoly act, growth of entrepreneurs and economic 
groups —gave impetus to much needed efficiency and growth.  
With Premier Yoshida in office the main focus of the occupation was economic 
development and integration within the global market and concluding peace treaty in view 
of restoring independence. The advance of Communists in Chinese civil war and the 
increasing rivalry with the USSR made the US slowly pivot towards Japan as reflected in 
NSC-13/2 which included Japan within George F. Keenan’s “containment” policy whereby 
the US committed to building a thriving economy in Japan. The 1949 brought many changes 
in the political outlook of East Asia as Chinese Communists took power while the USSR was 
on a par with the US nuclear capabilities which only increased the awareness of President 
Truman of Japan’s strategic value and importance of its place within the Western camp once 
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it regained its sovereignty. Furthermore, the outbreak of Korean War swayed Truman from 
Keenan’s economic containment strategy towards Paul H. Nitze’s costly “military 
containment” which entailed the increases in the US defense budged and military buildup. 
This placed US military bases in Japan at the heart of the US Cold War strategy and Yoshida 
decided to allow their presence once occupation ended as he saw value in Japan having its 
security guaranteed by the US while it could focus on rebuilding economy. Japan reaped the 
economic benefits from the Korean War by the way of special procurements contracts, but at 
the same time, due to the decline in the number of US forces, decided to establish National 
Police Reserve in 1950 for both domestic security purposes and future Japanese rearmament. 
Many politicians in Yoshida’s entourage advocated rearmament, but Yoshida decided to go 
another way around—prioritize stable political system, recover economy, regain 
independence and only then, rearm.  
In 1947, the US officials had already started pondering about the type of a peace treaty 
that should be concluded with Japan. One of the questions put before the drafters, other 
than burning questions related to security and reparations, was what would be the fate of 
Japanese war criminals once the occupation came to an end. During the occupation, Sugamo 
Prison was under the control of the US military which meant that once Japan regained its 
independence there would be institutional void related to the management of war criminals. 
The Americans knew that there was a widespread belief among the Japanese that once the 
Peace Treaty was concluded, the war criminals would be released as their sentences would 
have expired as the trials were part of occupation that thereby ended. 87  However, the 
automatic release after the occupation was not an option as the Allies wanted to validate the 
legal character of war crimes program that had been completed and justify the costly and 
fastidious prosecution process. Otherwise, the automatic release would damage the legal 
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basis of the trials, proceedings, sentences, and be embarrassing to the Allies. The war crimes 
program validation was of the utmost importance. In countries such as the Netherlands, 
Australia, and Philippines which bore the brunt of Japanese atrocities feared that their 
public opinion would be unsettling if their government allowed for the outright release of 
Japanese war criminals. The negotiations leading towards the conclusion of the Peace Treaty 
were of multilateral character which brought into perspective the Allies’ disparate and 
competing visions on what kind of peace should be concluded with Japan.  
The Allies were well aware that the lack of a clear clause regulating the conditions for 
the execution of the sentences imposed by the tribunals by the Japanese government after 
the occupation might end up in Italian war criminal scenario.88 The fate of Italian war 
criminals prosecuted by American and British military tribunals was not regulated by 
provisions of the peace treaty the two allies signed with Italy in 1947. Despite the oral 
assurances given by the Italian government that it would ensure that the war criminals 
would carry out the full term of their sentences or will not be released earlier without the 
Allies’ approval, Italy ended up releasing its war criminals in violation the informal 
agreement that existed.   
In 1947, Allies could somewhat agree that the provisions of the peace treaty with Japan 
should be harsh and restrictive. Hugh Borton, Japan hand from the State Department’s Far 
Eastern Affairs Bureau, drafted a peace treaty with provisions on war criminals that obliged 
Japan to fully carry out the sentences imposed by the tribunals and gave no power to it over 
clemency process. Interestingly, the Borton’s draft envisaged that the issue of clemency 
could be settled by an independently established diplomatic body which would comprise 
with the representatives from the FEC. This implied that the issue of clemency would be 
settled within a diplomatic framework rather than a legal one which would designate the 
                                                          
88 “The Effect of Blanket Clemency for Italian War Criminals on NA’s Position Regarding Post-Treaty 
Clemency for Japanese War Criminals,” April 5, 1950 in NARA, RG 59.  
 
 
 
 
 
73 
end of the war crimes program as a “political solution.” The British Commonwealth nations, 
the Philippines, and China all feared the resurgence of Japanese militarism and thus 
advocated hard line towards Japan and the peace settlement.89 As noted earlier, one of the 
main forces behind the change in the US foreign policy towards Japan in 1948 was George 
Kennan who argued that the only way to prevent Japan’s fall into the Communist orbit was 
to build strong economy and political stability. This meant that the initial harsh and 
disruptive occupation policies had to be terminated in favor of economic growth and aid to 
Japan to which President Truman acquiesced and which NSC 12/3 reflected as a part of 
economic containment policies. From 1949, the evidence of Soviet military dominance, the 
defeat of Chinese Nationalist government, the Chinese entry into the Korean War in 
addition to precarious social and economic situation in Japan swayed the key decision 
makers in Washington towards more liberal and tolerant policies towards Japan and the 
peace treaty.90 The draft treaties produced in 1950 evidenced this change by draft Article 14 
which allowed Japanese government the power to vary sentences subject to the prior 
approval of the interested governments.91 
The progress towards finding a common ground between the Allies came with the 
appointment of John Foster Dulles by President Truman, who was in charge of negotiations. 
The main obstructers to the liberal peace treaty terms and minimal limitations were 
Australia and New Zealand which were fearing Japan more than they feared the Soviet 
Union.92 The main issue for them was the absence of restrictions upon Japan’s rearmament. 
John Foster Dulles, participant at the Versailles Peace Conference, as noted earlier, was 
deeply marked by the lessons of punitive peace and insisted that peace ought to be generous 
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and with minimal restrictions.93 Dulles achieved breakthrough with the Commonwealth 
nations a week prior to the Peace Conference with the conclusion of Australia, New Zealand, 
and US Security Pact (ANZUS) which alleviated their fears of Japanese militarism. 94 
Following the same logic the US met the fierce resistance of Australia and New Zealand 
regarding the introduction of war guilt clause to the peace treaty. Dulles considered that 
public denouncement of Japan’s war guilt for waging aggressive war, especially in view of 
their cooperation under the occupation and the Korean War, would be contrary to the aim 
“to turn Japan into a viable and peace-loving nation”95 and met with general dissatisfaction 
in Japan. The final compromise was achieved by introducing the clause whereby the 
Japanese government accepts the judgements thus tacitly accepting the war guilt. 96  In 
relation to the Japanese government role in the clemency process, it was granted the faculty 
to recommend, but the final decision rested with the Allied Powers or interested country 
contrary to earlier drafts in which Japan and the Allied Powers had a “joint” decision in 
deciding the variation of sentences.  
The Japanese government also authored its versions of a peace treaty starting from 1950 
and later on, as the negotiations progressed they were asked to participate more actively in 
the drafting process by expressing their opinions or seeking amendments. The most extreme 
demand was to grant a general amnesty to the Japanese war criminals which was 
unacceptable to the Allies. The Japanese government, notably Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
adopted a cautious approach in dealing with war criminals, they sought to appear as a 
country that cherishes its international obligations and accordingly, did not object to the 
provisions under which it accepted the judgements or had a faculty to recommend the 
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release instead of decision-making power to be shared with the Allies.97 On the other hand, 
the Ministry of Justice believed that the process of clemency would be accelerated following 
the formalities around the signature and ratification of the peace treaty or that the Allies 
would simply accept the recommendations from the Japanese government for the release. 
Although aware of the tough stance taken by the Commonwealth countries mainly, many 
Japanese officials, especially the ones from the Foreign Ministry Treaty Bureau mistakenly 
believed that the US would exert influence upon all other countries regarding their decisions 
as well as be expeditious in their efforts to clear the prison. As the system of parole 
mentioned earlier already existed during the occupation, it was only expected that the end 
of occupation would considerably speed the matter up.  
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CHAPTER 3:  Clemency and Parole System for Japanese War Criminals: The Allied 
Powers’ Quest to Save the Face of Justice 
          
1. Decentralizing Justice: The Three-Men Board, NOPAR, and the Pursuit of Divergent 
Goals 
  
The clemency and parole are legal categories that are borrowed from domestic legal systems. 
The Allied powers were already familiar with mimicking domestic law in their legal 
undertakings as it has been earlier demonstrated with the introduction of the crime of 
conspiracy into the IMTFE Charter. The goal of early release in domestic law prioritizes 
reducing costs and preventing recidivism, while the international criminal tribunals are 
rather concerned with retribution of the most serious crimes and reconciliation between 
enemy parties after or during the conflict. 1  The transposition of these domestic legal 
practices into the practice of international criminal tribunals can have perverse effects—
mitigation of guilt and dissatisfaction of victims—for their lack of transparency and dilution 
of the original illegal act.2 Parole is an encouragement for the prisoners to show good 
behavior and participate in rehabilitative programs, its main goal being rehabilitation. In the 
practice of modern international criminal tribunals, the war criminals found themselves 
automatically released to unconditional, unsupervised parole after they have completed 
two-thirds of their sentence, contrary to domestic parole where they are under conditional 
release and supervision. In contrast, clemency is rarely used in domestic law, it exercises 
“error-correcting” 3  role, allowing for sentence adjustment in the light of the changed 
circumstances, and is often politically motivated.4 The main criteria for early release in 
international criminal tribunals is not primarily based on the newfound evidence that 
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mitigates the guilt or cooperation after sentencing, but rather repentance, the gravity of 
crimes committed, or probability of recidivism.5  
The importance of discussing the aim of clemency and parole, extensively used in the 
stage of execution of the IMTFE sentences, lies in pointing out at the meaning that this 
process had for its key stakeholders – the Allied governments, post-war Japan, and victims. 
The clemency and parole does not emanate from the realm of interpersonal forgiveness, it is 
public institutionalized form by which officials accord “forgiveness” to the wrongdoer.6 The 
prerogative to grant clemency and parole pertains to the executive, veiled in monarchical 
privilege7, exercised in discretionary manner almost “disregarding the declared law,” and it 
becomes “a form of legally sanctioned alegality.”8 Thus, the subject of these revisionary 
practices is different– “in forgiveness, it is the victim; in clemency it is the official; in 
repentance it is the wrongdoer.”9 The clemency and parole system as such represent an 
institutional forgiveness, forgiveness by law, where the main actors were high-level officials, 
and hence without any repercussions regarding forgiveness originating from the victims of 
war—which became one of the valuable political assets for elites in Beijing and Seoul to 
exploit when it comes to Japan’s war responsibility.  
After the Peace Treaty came to effect, the SCAP parole system was abolished and 
contrary to the high expectations of the Japanese elite, populace, and prisoners themselves, 
releases based on clemency and parole process of Sugamo inmates started to stagnate. Given 
that the fate of Class A war criminals was in hands of the majority governments represented 
                                                          
5 Ibid. The author discusses early release in international criminal law that has started with the IMT at 
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dilemmas could be traced in the parole system applied in the respective cases.  
6 Kathleen Dean Moore, Pardons: Justice, Mercy, and the Public Interest, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989 
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7 Austin Sarat and Nasser Husain, eds., Forgiveness, Mercy, and Clemency, 6.  
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at the IMTFE, the release of Class BC war criminals who were subjected to decisions of 
respective government which prosecuted them in national court, was promising to be a less 
burdensome path.  
Months into Japan gaining its independence, no specific procedure or framework was 
set forth to harbor the decision-making process of the majority governments represented on 
the IMTFE regarding the Class A war criminals. The SCAP Legal Section strongly advised 
the State Department officials to establish a venue for informal coordination between the 
representatives of interested governments, requiring them to assure the preservation of the 
judicial and legal character of the process.10 More precisely, the British proposal that the 
Committee should be exclusively composed of ambassadors was to be rejected as it threated 
to stain legal character of deliberations with rather political and diplomatic outlook. The 
stubborn obsession of the United States with extending the legal character to all ensuing 
stages of sentence execution and at every level of decision-making was already palpable. 
The legality and legitimacy of the war crimes programs in both Germany and Japan had to 
live up to legal standards until its very end. At the outset, it was decided that individual 
decisions of the Allied powers regarding the recommendations related to the Class A war 
criminals received from the Japanese government should not be directly communicated to 
Japan11 in order to maintain unity and avoid displaying any potential disagreements.  
In May 1952, the State Department assistant legal advisor for the Far Eastern Affairs, 
General Conrad E. Snow discussed the modus operandi to be devised for reaching US 
decisions regarding the Japanese recommendations for clemency and parole for war 
criminals. It was of the utmost importance to make decisions that go in line with the words 
of the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945 related to Japanese war criminals that “stern 
justice should be meted out to all war criminals.” Any disregard of this principle threatened 
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to enflame the public opinion, especially those who were personally or indirectly aggrieved 
by Japanese cruelties inflicted upon the prisoners of war. More generally, the lofty ideal that 
animated the American architects who led the Allied powers’ war crimes program back in 
1945—that was to ensure that the quality of American justice in the war criminal tribunals 
would be preserved—was as relevant in the closing phase of the program.12 General Snow 
had a distinguishing career as a military and lawyer. He was a member of Justice Owen J. 
Roberts Advisory Board for Clemency established after the war to mitigate the sentences of 
court-martialed soldiers which had been considered too harsh in the light of the new 
geopolitical developments.13  His experience in clemency and parole matter was further 
boosted by his appointment as one of the prominent figures of the Loyalty-Security Board 
which dealt with Senator Joseph R. McCarthy’s accusations of the Communists’ infiltration 
into, among other pores of American political establishment, State Department. Later on, he 
sat on the Advisory Board on War Criminals in Germany in 1950, appointed by John J. 
McCloy, High Commissioner for Germany14 granting the reduction of sentences that were 
considered “excessive” and thus required some dose of leniency, on a strictly legal basis, for 
German minor war criminals convicted by subsequent American Nuremberg trials.15 This 
extensive legal expertise made him rank high among the candidates for the position of the 
chair of Clemency Parole Board that had been envisioned. Furthermore, his professional link 
to East Asia was established as he had served as a legal counsel to the American 
representative on the Far Eastern Commission (FEC) which was formulating policy 
decisions to General MacArthur until its dismantlement in 1951. According to his legal 
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advice, clemency as a judicial solution would address the cases in which sentences are 
inappropriate to the crimes committed (unfairness of the sentence, mitigating circumstances, 
health, family conditions of the prisoner, or his conduct) while the parole would serve to 
end confinement that no longer served its purpose (conduct of the prisoner or nature of his 
crime).16  
A few months before the establishment of the Clemency and Parole Board (hereafter 
CPB), the US Embassy in Tokyo proposed to the Secretary of State via telegram 17  its 
initiative to undertake the clemency and parole process. The Embassy level process would 
allow for the clemency and parole process that had started under the now disbanded SCAP 
Legal Section be overturn smoothly to an unofficial board of senior embassy officers that 
would put recommendations before the ambassador. The American Ambassador Robert 
Murphy considered that the proposed setting would spare the release process of 
unnecessary public attention and avoid this issue becoming of great magnitude, which 
appeared likely to ensue should the President be involved in the process. Although the State 
Department gave a consideration to this idea, Dean Acheson rejected it out of concern that it 
might be received with criticism among the Japanese for being reminiscent of the “pattern of 
occupation”18 as well as the complication it would introduce to a necessary coordination of 
procedures related to the treatment of war criminals in Japan and Germany.  
On September 4, 1952, President Truman established the CPB for war criminals by the 
Executive Order 10393.19 The Board was meant to operate independently from the State 
Department. It consisted of three-members designated from the Department of State, the 
Department of Defense, and the Department of Justice–Conrad Snow, Roger Kent, and 
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James V. Bennett–respectively each appointed by the president. The composition was meant 
to reflect a delicate balance between different aspects that the CPB activity touched upon – 
related to foreign policy, international law, and treaty commitments (State Department), 
authority over the military courts which tried the war criminals (Ministry of Defense), and 
legal expertise in criminal law and matters related to clemency and parole (Ministry of 
Justice).20 The CPB would become one of the main bodies in the decentralized decision-
making process for the release of the war criminals that was to investigate cases for which 
the Japanese government requested clemency or parole via the US Embassy in Tokyo. The 
IMTFE war criminals were also to be included into deliberations of the CPB.    
In October 1952, Ambassador Murphy, reputed as “a skillful troubleshooter,”21 indicated 
that the CPB should proceed swiftly with processing the eligible cases in other to somewhat 
appease the war criminals issue fraught with danger of turning the public opinion against 
the United States.22 He warned that the emotional heights and Japan’s diplomatic animosity 
against the Soviet Union, for illegally retaining Japanese POWs, should serve as an indicator 
of how sour can US-Japan relations possibly turn. Although situations were of a different 
nature, humanitarian concerns were their common point. Indeed, the US was stubborn 
enough to gamble on the successful solution of what it considered a judicial problem, which 
the Japanese, in turn, considered to be an emotional one.   
Similar dangers were voiced in other venues, including the CPB. Few months into its 
mandate, on January 8, 1953, Roger Kent, general counsel of the Department of Defense, 
wrote in his resignation letter to the President that “present program is in fact a political one 
involving clemency and release rather than parole, because we have delegated vital 
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elements of the parole system to the Japanese.” 23  In his opinion, the program was 
detrimental to the US interests, but also impractical and ill designed to fulfill “political 
considerations [that] dictate that Japanese war criminals should be released within a short 
time– possibly a year.”24 He lamented that the US had already abandoned its commitment to 
justice when it decided to commute death sentences of the war criminals who committed the 
most heinous crimes and abandoned the further prosecutions after June 25, 1950, thus 
showing “the Japanese that we [the US] respect the realities of international relations.”25 In 
an almost prophetic tone, Kent warned that the protracted detention of Japanese war 
criminals carried risks to seriously turn the Japanese against the US and to the advantage of 
the Russians, given that the Japanese Communists heavily capitalized on the existence of the 
war criminals issue. As long as this matter remained unresolved, the US would not be able 
to benefit from the situation and its relations with Japan would suffer, as he put it, “while 
the issue of prisoners held by Russia somewhere in Siberia may get cooler, it is certain that 
the issue of war criminals held by Japanese jailers in Japanese prisons will get hotter.”26 
Kent’s final advice offered the unpopular solution in the form of general amnesty, a strategic 
move that would “liquidate Japanese war criminal program before opposing positions are 
publicly crystallized as they are now in Germany.”27  
 
2. The Yoshida Cabinet: A Timid Approach towards the Class A War Criminals  
 
The SCAP Legal Section sought to assure than in serving their sentence Sugamo inmates 
would receive “no better or no worse” treatment than the ordinary domestic felons and in 
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accordance with the minimally accepted international standards.28 In addition, they wanted 
to secure that the power to grant clemency, parole, or reduction of sentence would stay with 
the Governments concerned.29 And yet, the Japanese, well before the independence date, 
used the SCAP’s Circular No. 5 to draft several versions of law that would allow for a 
domestic legal basis for managing various aspects of the clemency and parole process for all 
categories of war criminals—authority accorded to the Japanese government by Article 11 of 
the Treaty of Peace. In crafting the text of the law, the Japanese interpretation of the Article 
11 opted for the most general terms possible which meant that there was no obligation upon 
Japan regarding the manner in which the sentences were to be executed, thereby giving 
them free hands to implement their own general prison laws in instances that were not 
prescribed in the provisions of the special law on war criminals. Bothered by the fact that the 
Peace Treaty left “war criminals,” as maintained by the terminology of the victors’ verdicts, 
in independent Japan, the drafters tried to remove the war stigma by favoring terms such as 
“inmates” over “prisoners”30 or “detention house” over “prison.”31 The goal was to get over 
with the issue as soon as possible while maintaining large room for maneuver. The final 
version of the Japanese Law No. 103 of 1952 that was deemed acceptable by the US 
government served as the main guideline for National Offenders’ Prevention and 
Rehabilitation Commission (hereafter NOPAR), established within the Ministry of Justice 
(hereafter MOJ), in presenting its recommendations for the release of war criminals to the 
interested governments via the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This made the whole process of 
execution of sentences institutionally fragmented and burdensome. Regarding the Class A 
war criminals, although the process was displaced from the IMTFE, which represented a 
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multilateral and international institutional experience, the further process would not loose 
of its international character. Once presented to the CPB, recommendations for the Class A 
war criminals were to be discussed among the legal representatives of interested 
governments in Washington. Prior to that, the Japanese officials, especially the ones from the 
Ministry of Justice (MOJ) repeatedly made sure that the US fully understood the Japanese 
position. It is important to stress that the Ministry of Justice (hereafter MOJ) was one of the 
main proponents of the “quick release” view regarding the war criminals.  
On October 6, 1952 Mr. Saito, Chief of Japanese Protection Bureau for Judicial Affairs, 
visited the CPB in Washington to convey the seriousness of the state of affairs regarding the 
war criminals in Japan by raising several points. First, that the public opinion had been 
gaining strength as the main driving force behind the requests for general clemency for all 
war criminals which formed into a solid movement. In the light of the overall “spirit of trust 
and reconciliation” that the Peace Treaty exuded, it was expected that the recommendation 
by the Japanese government would lead to an automatic acceptance of general clemency by 
the interested governments having in mind that the sentences imposed immediately upon 
surrender were harsh. The financial and moral hardship of war criminals’ families added up 
further drama and exacerbated the emotional aspects of the issue. Second, stagnation of the 
process further discouraged and frustrated the prisoners who thought that they endured 
harsh sentences only for obeying superiors’ orders and committing acts whose criminal 
nature they were not aware of. Mr. Saito’s inadvertently discredited the war crimes program 
by pointing out that as the purpose of punishment–that is maintenance of peace and 
deterrence of wars–was accomplished, the detention of war criminals who had already 
served seven years was no longer justifiable, and contrary to humanitarian considerations.32 
Mr. Hagen, former Chair of SCAP’s Parole Board, considered the popular movement for 
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release of war criminals to be contrary to the Peace Treaty, while his general impression, not 
incorrect one, was that the Japanese passed well beyond war and war guilt. Later 
throughout October 1952, the NOPAR recommended clemency and parole for Class A war 
criminals urging for their release by invoking the key points of the Prime Minister 
Churchill’s “Two Freedoms” speech, delivered in Dover in 1951 to legitimize their cause— 
“[…]t is in our interest and duty […] to bolt out and sweep away the hatred and vengeance[s] 
[sic] of the past.” From the NOPAR perspective, the protracted detention of Class A war 
criminals, who personified the main actors behind the war, lost its meaning and no longer 
had contribution to make which was illustrative of how blatantly the Commission 
comported itself towards the post-trial legacy of the IMTFE. On the occasion of the entry 
into force of the Peace Treaty, the Ministry of Justice granted minor Japanese criminals a 
general and special amnesty, reduction of sentence, and restoration of rights33 to celebrate 
Japan’s newly gained independence and send a strong signal that the Allies could do the 
same with the war criminals as the war era was officially behind Japan. The Commission 
believed that there should be no discrimination against war criminals in the words of 
National Offenders’ Prevention and Rehabilitation Commission’s Chairman Matsusuke 
Shirane.34  In the Commission’s document, Shirane specified that the sympathies of the 
public opinion in Japan were not exclusively directed towards the BC war criminals, but 
were also shifting towards the Class A war criminals. The new story that the responsibility 
for war should not rest only upon their shoulders, but be shared “by the Japanese nation as 
a whole” was gaining acceptance and momentum.35 For different reasons, the US and other 
Allies were not quite ready to give a follow-up to the Japan’s government requests for a 
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special treatment, in form of amnesty, clemency or parole, for 12 Class A war criminals.36 
The CPB was aware of the difficulties that any action on behalf on the Class A war criminals 
at that moment would create diplomatic difficulties for the Allies in reaching a majority 
decision, agitate their constituencies, have negative repercussions for the counterpart war 
crimes program in Germany, and in general compromise the whole effort and wipe out the 
seriousness of crimes prosecuted. Hence, the Class A war criminal file was left to lie 
dormant.37  
The Japanese government displayed a rather disparate interest in the release of the war 
criminals. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was a defender of the “gradual release” view 
regarding the release of war criminals. Their interaction with foreign governments’ 
representatives resulted in a greater level of awareness about certain governments’ adamant 
opposition to the release of the war criminals.38 As there were many other sensitive issues to 
deal with in the immediate post-occupation period, Yoshida chose to exercise prudence in 
not provoking agitation both at home and abroad over the issue of war criminals that were 
not regarded as ordinary felons, but were accused of the most heinous crimes.39 In the 
atmosphere of political uncertainty brought by the political comeback of influential 
politicians, previously purged under the occupation, such as Hayato Ikeda, Primer Minister 
Yoshida dissolved the Diet on August 28, 1952 and organized the general elections in 
October 1952. This opportune political move was motivated by Yoshida’s awareness of his 
little coordinated opposition consisting of political figures who wanted to oust him from 
power. In that atmosphere and to appeal to the growing demands of the public opinion for 
the release of the war criminals, Chief Cabinet Secretary Hori Shigeru announced that 
recommendations for release would be sent to various governments. In addition, the 
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pressures from the Diet for the release of war criminals were intensifying. In August 1952, 
Foreign Minister Katsuo Okazaki tried to elicit the release of war criminals 40 by linking it to 
the anniversary of Japan’s acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration which defined the terms of 
Japan’s surrender and posed the legal basis for the establishment of the war crimes program. 
Given the occasion, he requested the grant of general clemency or amnesty release of all BC 
Class criminals, with the exclusion of Class A war criminals who were linked to the Tokyo 
Tribunal.41 U. Alexis Johnson from the State Department’s Far Eastern Bureau considered 
the demand unfortunate in that it could escalate into political issue and be negatively 
received by the American press and public opinion which believed that justice had been 
done in Tokyo.42 The decision-makers in the US refused to readjust their legalistic policies 
when it came to the war crimes program. In November 1952, on the occasion of the 
investiture of Crown Prince, the Japanese government sent telegrams to all concerned 
governments asking for the general release of Class A war criminals and expressing concern 
that the public pressure placed upon Yoshida which could also be targeting the US. Few 
lines in the telegram displayed the Japanese government assertiveness in stating that Class 
A war criminals “had been imprisoned for seven years and the purpose of punishment was 
accomplished43” hence openly questioning the sentences imposed by the IMTFE.  In the 
same way the Japanese seized every occasion to stress the domestic aspects of the issue,44 the 
US also decided to instrumentalize their public opinion which would “not tolerate 
indiscriminate mass releases,”45  and insist that Japanese demands perturbed the parole 
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system, which was based on examining cases on individual basis with low-level publicity.46 
Another line of defense used was that if the Class A war criminals were released, it would 
have repercussions for all BC Class war criminals.  
In December 1952, Justice Minister Takeru Inukai appeared before the plenary session of 
the Lower House—the day the resolution for the release of the war criminals was passed—
and presented the government’s efforts for parole or amnesty of the Class A war criminals, 
to which governments of China and India consented which was received with the applause 
from the Diet members.47 Farseeing Ambassador Murphy warned the State Department that 
the continuous incarceration of war criminals could lead to constant pressures from Japan 
for their release. To support this belief, he drew attention to Mamoru Shigemitsu, a member 
of the Lower House of Representatives who was expected to become one of the leading 
figures in Japanese politics and who openly opposed the clemency and parole system and 
argued for general amnesty as he considered trials were “defective and committed 
injustices.”48 Shigemitsu, and not erroneously, predicted that judicial solutions due to their 
“tediousness” would have negative repercussions for US-Japan relations and that the 
resentment because of the incarceration was widespread.49 
On December 24, 1952, the Japanese Diet approved the amendments to Law No. 103 
which allowed the prisoners to be released for “provisional parole” for unspecified special 
circumstances up to fifteen days, renewable for additional fifteen days (Article 24) and 
without reference to the interested Governments. In other words, as there were no limits set 
for the number of renewals prisoner could apply for under “provisional parole,” war 
criminals could stay outside indefinitely. The US saw these vague provisions as highly 
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problematic from the point of view of Article 11 of the Peace Treaty and questioned the 
Japanese good faith in carrying out its terms.50 Ambassador Murphy warned that “[t]his 
Japanese Amendment […] opens door to wide-spread release of war criminals under guise 
of emergency conditions in violation of Article 11 of the Peace Treaty.”51 In this sense, the 
measure was oblivious to negative consequences it could produce for the Allied powers’ 
countries, and most importantly the US which aimed to base the program on careful judicial 
review of each case and prevent its further politicization. In response, the US pressed the 
Japanese government to ensure that no extension of provisional parole beyond five days 
that had been already granted should be approved without referral to the interested 
government,52 while in case of emergency provisional paroles, the US Embassy would have 
authority to grant the final approval. 
Another reason for Yoshida’s prudence was the erroneous understanding that the Class 
A war criminals represented a benchmark for the whole war criminals release issue, as these 
were the most notorious cases that, if liquidated, would set in motion the final settlement on 
the war criminal question.  
 
3. Deep-rotted Divisions and Power Play Between the Allied Powers Continued in the 
Post-IMTFE Stage 
 
The clemency and parole process similarly to the IMTFE establishment process, which 
involved the coordination between the Allied powers, was not immune from their inter-
relational dynamics and geopolitical considerations. Although the IMTFE has often been 
portrayed as an American Court, in reality it was an international experience where other 
interested countries tried to challenge the US lead. The US outnumbered other interested 
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countries when it came to the war criminals tried under the US authority and held in 
Sugamo prison. Hence, it was the expectation of the Japanese government that the release 
pace set by the US would be followed by other countries.53 However, despite the occasional 
considerations for speeding up the process of release by granting clemency or amnesty, the 
US was attached to the preservation of the judicial character of the procedure, hoping that it 
would not become a political one, in a manner that did not really help the acceleration of 
processing cases of other countries involved. The dynamics of diplomatic relations between 
Japan and the countries represented on the Tribunal was in great measure influencing the 
progress on the war criminal matters, including the Class A war criminals. The meetings 
between the governments represented at IMTFE also served as a scene for venting and 
settling their diplomatic differences arising from the ongoing Cold War.  
The first point of contention was the participation of governments which did not sign 
and ratify the Peace Treaty with Japan. The participation of governments represented on the 
Tribunal in reaching the majority decision for the release of the war criminals was stipulated 
by the Article 11 of the Peace Treaty on a basis of their representation on the Tribunal. 
However, the Article 25 was formulated to preclude the application of the Peace Treaty 
terms onto non-signatories and hence implied their inability to vote in the decision-making 
process regarding the release of war criminals. In the initial deliberations, the British 
proposed that the fate of major was criminals, as the Class A war criminals were otherwise 
called, whose actions were predominately related to the USSR and China should not be 
settled by majority governments in Washington, but rather dealt with on a bilateral basis 
between Japan and the respective countries. The Britain pondered whether China might be 
included in the majority governments’ decision-making as Japan signed the Peace Treaty 
with the Nationalist Government of China or whether China, USSR, and India should be left 
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out as they were not signatories of the Peace Treaty with Japan.54 In November 1952, the 
Japanese government approached India to support the clemency for twelve Class A war 
criminals, which India accepted. In spring of 1953, the Japanese Foreign Ministry informed 
India that as it was a non-signatory to the Peace Treaty, its right to vote should be 
transferred to Pakistan which was successor state to the British India. India was not really 
interested in Japan’s major war criminals issue, but rather in using this occasion to give a 
vent to its frustration and dissatisfaction over the Britain excluding it from consultations to 
the advantage of Pakistan which was included in the majority deliberations.55 The State 
Department saw the inclusion of Pakistan, previously not represented at the Tribunal, as 
unwise whereas it saw a strategic value in including the three other governments, especially 
the USSR. The Soviet negative stance towards the release could not affect the majority 
decision, but would generate a more valuable result of increasing resentment towards the 
Russians in Japan.56  In the note sent to the Secretary of State, the Indian government 
explained that it reserved its right of participation in the clemency process based on its 
representation at the IMTFE even after its independence in 1947. The note stressed that both 
Britain and Pakistan agreed that after the partition India was solely entitled to assume 
memberships to international organizations and treaties.57 The US decided to comply with 
the UK request in its reply to Indian government in asserting that Article 25 of the Treaty 
precluded India from participating, while Pakistan, according to international law, was 
entitled to be granted rights and obligations that belonged to British India as participating 
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on the Allied side in war against Japan.58 The advanced legal explanations were ambiguous 
and not quite correct but truly reflected the Cold War and postcolonial mentalities.59 Prime 
Minister Nehru was infuriated at the ill treatment of India and the fact that Britain agreed 
with other countries that Pakistan could also pretend to be legal successor of British India 
which it qualified as outright violation of international law.60 The concern was that the 
language of the reply would have repercussions on other diplomatic questions where the 
argument that Pakistan was a successor state to India could be advanced to India’s  
disadvantage.61  
Differences in diplomatic outlooks on postwar Japan and domestic factors in respective 
countries were factors that introduced complications in terms of pace and method of 
releasing the war criminals. The Commonwealth countries and the Dutch held particularly 
conservative positions. The British considered the Japanese government tactic in demanding 
the general amnesty imprudent in view of the British sailors’ incident that stressed Anglo-
Japanese relations in the second half of 1952. The officials in London were livid at the harsh 
sentences that the Japanese authorities imposed upon the two drunk British sailors who 
were convicted for robbery and violence against the taxi driver, who had his money 
returned and who was not assaulted with weapons.62 Initially sentenced to two and a half 
years’ imprisonment, the British sailors were eventually released in November 1952. In the 
negotiations for Japan’s accession to GATT, the British decided not to offer their support 
despite the pressures coming from Washington. The British did recognize the status of Japan 
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as an important and significant partner, however it kept a suspicious eye on its rearmament 
and frustratingly searched for the way to engage with it, especially since its preponderance 
in Asia Pacific region had been challenged by the US.63 Such British attitudes ought to be 
placed within the larger context of its position being relegated to a secondary role in the 
postwar international order where it no longer belonged to the premier league in which the 
US and the USSR dominated. Hitherto, the British were bothered by the US-sponsored 
Japanese rearmament and US-Japan “unhealthily intimate bonds.” 64  Furthermore, the 
signing of ANZUS Treaty in 1951 resulting in Australia and New Zealand exclusive military 
alliance with the US was regarded as international indignation to the Britain.65 Lord Hankey, 
the UK cabinet secretary throughout the world wars, and author of Politics, Trials and Errors, 
published in 1950, emerged as a vocal critic of the post-World War II war crimes trials in 
both Japan and Germany. On July 31, 1952 he wrote to the Editor of The Times that “the war 
crimes trials now proposed by the Chinese” are just “poisoning peace with no benefit to 
anyone.” 66  In an unapologetic style, he insisted that “[t]he allies should admit that 
Nuremberg and Tokyo had not fulfilled the hopes of their originators, and should adopt a 
policy of liquidation.”67 He proposed that general amnesty be given to German and Japanese 
war criminals and that the exclusive authority over the release process should be transferred 
to their respective governments. He further pointed out to the fact that the Britain had never 
tried any of its military for crimes against peace and crimes against humanity which implied 
that it did consider them to be punishable crimes. Hankey challenged the principle of 
command responsibility and called the UK to take initiative in promoting the return to the 
“Edmonds-Oppenheim rule” which excluded individual criminal responsibility for soldiers 
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who in following order of their governments and commanders violated norms of 
international law.68  
Australia was one of the Commonwealth countries that was slow to readjust to the view 
of Japan as the Cold War ally of the West. The war memories and Japan’s colonial past 
continued to play a significant role in feeding feelings of suspicion in Canberra which lead 
to its unwillingness to allow any form of clemency or a major concession for the Japanese 
war criminals. The domestic hatred against Japan was running high which gave the 
Australian government a powerful pretext to initiate or agree to any breakthroughs on the 
war criminal question. Justice William F. Webb of Australia, the presiding judge at the 
Tribunal appointed by General MacArthur, notorious for its domineering posture and his 
previous involvement into war crimes investigations in Australia, made sure that Australian 
and British interests were imposed at the courtroom. Upon his return to Australia, he gave 
an interview which reflected his racial and suspicious stance towards Japan as follows: 
“Australians are not deceived by the veneer of democracy too facilely assumed by the 
Japanese under American tutelage,”69 and he resolutely added that White Australia can be 
safe and thrive keeping powerful states close and in fostering good relations with its 
neighbors. The Netherlands government’s position was mainly dominated by stagnation in 
Japan’s compensations towards the Dutch internees, the popular anti-Japanese sentiment, 
and the general dissatisfaction with the way in which the worst atrocities were prosecuted 
which were linked to the degree of Dutch responsiveness towards the evolution of the 
clemency and parole program. 70  Regarding the Class A war criminals, the Dutch 
government first considered that they should not receive better treatment than the BC  Class 
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war criminals,71 a position that was soon to change. The French government was ready to 
grant parole or clemency to all Class A war criminals who were over seventy years old or in 
consideration of the extent of their contribution to the aggressive policies in the desire to 
bring a quick solution to the problem which was objectionable to the CPB which was 
concerned with considering each case on its merits.72  
The method of notifying the Japanese government on the decisions regarding the Class 
A war criminals brought into focus among the Allies’ representatives in Washington the 
question to what degree should the Japanese government be informed about their 
governments’ positions or deliberations leading to the final decision. The United States 
wanted to preserve the right to include its government’s individual position in each case, 
after stating the majority decision, in order to be able to distinguish itself from other 
governments in case of negative majority decision. The UK, on the other hand, argued that 
the decisions reached by the majority of governments should be communicated to Japan en 
bloc, in reference to consultation among its participants, “thus relieving the governments in 
minority of the onus attached to their position.”73 It was of the utmost importance that the 
Allied powers’ deliberation process remain secret and out of reach of the Japanese 
government— that is, reasons behind the majority decision or the nature of the Allies’ 
deliberations regarding the Japanese government applications for clemency and parole.74 
The notes regarding the release of Class A war criminals were to be kept low-profile and not  
publicized in the Allied powers’ capitals as it risked to provoke public clamor, but was 
allowed to be the subject of press coverage in Tokyo. The UK, the Netherlands, and New 
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Zealand decided they would not use the faculty of individual decision,75 and the British 
decided to press the US to rectify its position as “the US going alone” would complicate 
other countries’ relations with Japan, and consequently make the respective governments 
less willing to support the US policies towards Japan, such as rearmament.76 The British 
wanted to further muddle up the decision-making process by adopting a code of standard to 
use in preliminary consultations in order to reach unanimous position, a proposal that the 
US and Commonwealth countries opposed outright. The US was of the view that such 
technicalities would be an unnecessary waste of time that would “leave a problem involving 
delicate political relations with the Japanese in a state of continued irresolution.”77 For the 
US it was obvious that as the whole process would be confidential “the Japanese would 
[not] be able to play politics”78 in manipulating Allied governments’ opposing views.   
At the same time the Allied powers were deciding on the basic framework for decision-
making and interacting with the Japanese government in 1953, the Japanese press carried 
headlines such as “12 Class A War Felons May Be Paroled” by Mainichi and “US Offers Plan 
to Secure Release of 12 War Criminals” by Nippon Times which offered the garbled account 
of the conversation General Snow had with Jun Tsuchiya from the Japanese Embassy in 
Washington on the matter even before the Japanese government’s press release. The Snow 
did promise that once received the Class A war criminals’ applications would be given 
priority, but that after the President’s approval, they would be discussed with other 
governments concerned.79 The Japanese press enthusiastically reported that the US would be 
glad to assure the release of the Class A war criminals and that it was representing the views 
of the other eight governments. In order to remedy the confusion that was created among 
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other representatives in Tokyo, the US Embassy sent assurances to other governments that 
the news were false.80  
In the same period, decisions of the Allies were carefully weighed against their possible 
repercussions for the war crimes program in Germany. Although, the IMFTE and IMT were 
not linked institutionally in a direct way, their connectedness was visible in the political 
goals they were aiming to fulfill– this bond will not fade away until the dismantlement of 
the both programs.  
 
4. Together in Law and Politics: The Post-trial Phase of War Crimes Program in Japan 
and its Repercussions for Germany   
 
In 1952, the West Germany was preparing to ratify the Bonn Agreements which were the 
equivalent of the Peace Treaty in Japan. On March 10, 1952, Joseph Stalin tried to prevent the 
rearmament of West Germany by proposing the reunification of Germany and organizing 
free elections.81 These attempts failed, but they benefited the West German government in 
increasing their confidence in negotiations leading to the ratification of the Bonn 
Agreements with the US. Contrary to the Article 11 of the Peace Treaty that clearly states 
that Japan accepts the judgement and sentences imposed by the IMTFE, Article 6 and Article 
7 of the contractuals restoring German sovereignty were formulated in a way that they 
devised a way for the West German government to contest legal validity of judgements 
delivered in the Allied war crimes program. Article 6 set the basis for the establishment of 
the clemency and parole board, comprised of not only the Allied powers’ representatives, 
but also Germans, which in its activities should refrain from “calling into question the 
validity of the convictions.”82 Article 7 imposed an obligation upon Germany and its legal 
and judicial institutions, in explicit terms, to endorse legal validity and authority of the 
                                                          
80 Telegram, Murphy, American Embassy, Tokyo to Secretary of State, March 26, 1953 in NARA, RG84, War 
Criminals – General, Box 28. 
81 Peter Maguire, Law and War: An American Story (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 238.  
82 Ibid., 239.  
 
 
 
 
 
98 
Allied powers’ criminal tribunals. Curiously, Article 6 contained a clause limiting the 
application of the provisions of Article 7 for the matters it dealt with—in other words, the 
board did not have to accept legal validity of court’s judgements.83 Some time before the 
ratification, Heidelberg Jurists Circle,84 a powerful lobby group promoting rejection of legal 
authority and verdicts delivered by all Allied powers’ tribunals, recommended that the war 
crimes tribunals should not be recognized, a policy line that was endorsed by both the 
Bundestag and German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer.85 From the outset, the US talks about 
German rearmament did not sit well with the idea of top ranking military being held as war 
criminals in German prisons. As early as 1952, by linking German defense contribution to 
the release of German war criminals as pre-condition,86 Germans gained a wild card they 
could use in their negotiations with the Allied powers. However, the Mixed Parole Board 
planned for Germany would be put on hold as the ratification of the contractuals by the 
French National Assembly dragged on which heavily frustrated both Americans and 
Germans.   
Meanwhile, waiting for the conditions to be fulfilled for the Mixed Parole Board to come 
to life and in face of fall 1953 Bundestag elections that threated to punish Adenauer and his 
coalition partners given that the war criminal questions did not budge, Secretary of State 
John Foster Dulles proposed appeasement in form of interim parole board87 while the US 
military authorities would shift their stance to adopt a more liberal policy towards the war 
criminals.  
However, in Germany the US organized War Crimes Modification Board in 1949 and the 
Advisory Clemency Board, the so called Peck Panel, that granted clemency in cases where 
                                                          
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid., 235. Otto Kranzbühler, defense counsel at Nuremberg, was one of the prominent figures behind this 
plan.  
85 Ibid., 238.  
86 Ibid.  
87 Telegram, Department of State to Tokyo, April 10, 1953 in NARA, RG84, War Criminals – General, Box 28.  
 
 
 
 
 
99 
such grounds existed and harmonized the differences in sentencing existent between the 
subsequent Nuremberg trials.88 In 1954, the Japanese government complained that German 
war criminals had been released much quicker than the Japanese without taking into 
consideration that such system had already existed prior to the establishment of the Mixed 
Clemency Board in late 1953. The official stance of the US government was that the 
clemency and parole systems in both countries would be treated equally and without any 
discrimination. 89  However, both Germany and Japan would keep an eye on the 
developments regarding the release of war criminals in their theaters and would try to play 
on the differences in the release pace against the US.  
The election of President Dwight Eisenhower in November 1952 placed rearmament on 
the top policy agenda, a policy shift that supported more liberal views towards the 
treatment of war criminals held by his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, belonging to 
the third generation of lawyer-statesmen.90 This shift was endorsed by the officers from 
Political Affairs of State Department who promoted expediency and greater leniency of the 
clemency and parole system as they observed “the problem as political one, and not as 
juridical or moral one.” 91  However, over time the President Eisenhower’s rather 
conservative stance regarding the issue will pose an additional hurdle which will obstruct 
the initiatives to release the war criminals.92  
As a result, the State Department officers, especially the ones from political and legal 
affairs, were divided by an internal struggle regarding which course of action would be the 
most appropriate for the final phase of war crimes program. In a similar manner, 
institutional rivalry was also dividing the US in 1945 when the deliberations on the war 
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crimes tribunals establishment took place—State Department and Department of Treasury 
were in fierce competition for advancing policies of war crimes trials and summary 
executions of war criminals respectively. The State Department memo summarized the 
general amnesty policies for Japanese BC Class war criminals that had been recommended 
by Ambassador Allison and was scheduled to be further discussed by the Department’s 
legal and political officers for Far East and Europe for the purpose of coordination between 
the two clemency programs. The note observed that the State Department’s German officers 
displayed opposition to any form of amnesty given that they tried to implement a proper 
judicial system for clemency and parole. Those arguing for amnesty thought that 
consultations would be detrimental to the desired fast solution to the “war criminal 
business”93 which they considered “an unnecessary exacerbation in US-Japan relations.”94 
Prior to the meeting convened to discuss the amnesty for Japanese war criminals, John 
Auchincloss, State Department legal adviser, discussed the detrimental repercussions of the 
Allison’s proposal in a secret memo he sent to the US Embassy in Bonn. He highlighted that 
political solution would “undermine, in retrospect, the entire war crimes program,”95 while 
it would boost the far right in Germany, arise questions before the US Congress, and agitate 
the public opinion. His note reflected a view in complete opposition to the lawyer-
statesmen’s view that “what could be justified legally, did not have to be justified 
morally.”96  He thought that the uneasy questions of principle should be raised and bluntly 
pondered his view: “The men now serving sentences for war crimes are doing so because 
we believed at one time that they deserved to be punished for what they did. Do we still 
believe this, or do we not? If we do not, then we should release the men as soon as possible 
[…] If we believe it, we should stick to it, for to act against it would be cynical, if our 
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purpose were to gain a political advantage, or weak, if our purpose were to avoid political 
pressure.”97 
Ambassador Allison met the State Department representatives on February 16, 1954 to 
discuss his proposal regarding the US policy towards the war criminals in view of granting 
amnesty or “take some action less than amnesty”98 in case of Japanese war criminals as he 
was conscious of the repercussions this policy shift might have in German theater. Mr. 
Herman Phleger, the legal advisor, Mr. John M. Raymond, German officer, and Mr. James 
Bonbright, deputy assistant secretary for European Affairs, refused the proposal for an 
amnesty as it “would be observed as a concession to strong German desires, and to that 
extent it would prove a gratification to the Germans and a source of political benefit to us.”99 
They also pointed out that the Department of the Army who held the German war criminals 
in custody had conservative views regarding the parole system and would not be willing to 
go as far as the Allison’s proposal. It was generally agreed that the liquidation of war 
criminals question would be beneficial, but that the decision should be weighed against the 
public opinion and overall policy needs towards Germany and Japan.100 It was concluded 
that speeding up the release within the CPB would not be acceptable to German officers in 
State Department. Interestingly, the German counterparts to Class A war criminals in 
Germany—seven prisoners convicted by the IMT at Nuremberg, detained in Spandau 
Prison at Berlin, under the four Allied powers’ authority were not included in the parole 
program in Germany and served their sentences until the very end, with two exceptions.  
 
5. Impossible to Ignore: Influences of Public Opinion, Public Figures and Organizations 
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The Peace Treaty gave impetus to Japanese public opinion, private, religious, and municipal 
organizations to ask for the release of Japanese war criminals. The associations of war 
criminals’ families and relatives were the first to mobilize and gain the support of the press 
and media in their cause. The media will become one of the main driving forces “in the war 
criminals’ rise to prominence as a political and social issue.”101 Contrary to the case of 
Germany where the government’s interest in war criminals fate came organically as the 
elites had never really accepted the authority and judgement of the IMT at Nuremberg 
which was the wide-spread belief among the population, in Japan it was the popular 
movement that propelled the government’s action for the release, especially in the first 
months after the occupation. The general view of the Japanese people was that the ongoing 
detention of war criminals was not consistent with the newly signed Peace Treaty; they were 
regarded as “relics of the defeat” that ought to be eliminated. It is important to note that 
even the Allied Powers were aware of the possibility of this outcome in 1945 when they 
urged for the expedite prosecution of the major war criminals who could start gaining 
reputation of martyrs as the passions of war cooled down. It could be said that the same 
concerns were shared from 1952 by the Allies, especially the US which needed rearmed 
Japan as its ally in the Cold War. What’s more, the perception of collective war guilt to be 
shared on a national level, rather than individual guilt established by the military tribunals 
started to emerge. The editorials referred to Japan paying its debt to the world community, 
not only the war criminals.  
With Japan regaining its independence, the press censure disappeared which gave space 
to new narratives and stories to be told about war criminals and war experience.102 At the 
beginning, this freedom was scarcely explored as the articles questioning the quality of 
justice, the legality of the military tribunals under the rubric of victors’ justice were rather 
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occasional and articles related to atomic bombings and related crimes against humanity 
were seldom.103 In the words of John M. Steeves, political counselor at the US Embassy in 
Tokyo, the press was extensively reporting on vociferous criticism towards the legal 
principles, sentences, and authority of the military tribunals coming from the Class BC war 
criminals in Sugamo prison.104 Unrepentantly, press accounts expressed their belief that they 
should have never been prosecuted, “that they were taking responsibility for Japan’s defeat 
on behalf of the Japanese people,” 105  and urged for their immediate release. Invoking 
“superior orders” to advocate for their innocence, and expressing strong disillusionment 
with the military organization they reportedly sent letters to young officers from the Public 
Security Force “asking them how they could be so stupid to enlist.”106 In the first years, the 
Class A prisoners were rather left out of the press as they refused to be interviewed, 
according to the Embassy dispatch. They remained peaceful and confident in that before the 
Class BC war criminals were released, their cases could not be considered. 107  A more 
credible reason can be found in a rather ambiguous popular position towards them. First 
and foremost, they were the main characters behind planning and wagging war of 
aggression, thus brining Japanese people to the brink of misery and poverty for which they 
deserved to be punished. This view rooted in the Tokyo Tribunal version of events, 
enshrined in the majority judgement, remained unchallenged by the harsh censure during 
the occupation. The fact that there were classes of war criminals and that these tried at 
Tokyo were Class A was self-explicatory – “they were the worst.”108  
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The differentiation between the war criminals was visible in the Diet debates. On July 30, 
1953 Naruse Banji, the representative of the Socialist Party, during his talk regarding the 
amendment to the Pension Law, said that he had sympathy for the BC Class war criminals 
while he stressed that it should be made clear that the Class A war criminals were the 
responsible ones for the Pacific War, although they were not prosecuted domestically.109 
Later in 1954, the same amendment was debated regarding the possibility that the families 
of executed war criminals and those who died in prison could benefit from the same 
financial support  that the families of war dead had received.110 Considerable portion of the 
Japanese society was concerned about the rise in prominence of the war criminals, their 
victimization, which cast a shade onto Japan’s war guilt, and was potentially dangerous for 
postwar Japan, a peaceful and democratic country.111 Social aspect of the war criminal 
problem, various forms of discrimination they suffered or difficulties in finding employment, 
the families of deceased or executed war criminals who remained without financial support, 
and the financial misery of families of Sugamo prisoners were underreported by the press 
and representative of these less empathetic parts of the society.112 The general empathy for 
war criminal’s suffering and families that was gaining powerful momentum throughout 
1953 had slowly started having a spillover effect upon the views of the Class A war 
criminals as well. Thousands of petitions that were sent to foreign representatives and 
governments by private associations, prefectural assemblies, and war criminal families 
mainly asking for the release of the BC Class War Criminals, also started including the 
thirteen Class A war criminals into their demands.  
One of the postwar pioneers of historical revisionism was Tanaka Masaaki, who was 
editor of the paper of the Great East Asian Association, the organization whose chairman 
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was General Matsui Iwane, the IMTFE defendant sentenced to death in 1948.113 In his book 
with had misleading title On Japan’s Innocence: The Truth on Trial, published right after the 
media censure was terminated, he accurately summarized the Justice Pal’s dissenting 
opinion.114 However, the title was highly problematic as it implied Japan’s innocence. Pal’s 
opinion was not applicable to all Japanese war criminals, but was applicable to the Class A 
war criminals. In his dissent, he did find that the Class BC war criminals bore criminal 
responsibility for atrocities they had committed. The term “innocence” related to the Class A 
war criminals was established from the point of view of the international law in force at that 
time which did not strip them of their moral responsibility.115  
In early 1953, there was a general feeling that the government did not do enough for the 
war criminals which encouraged various associations and influential public figures to 
appeal stronger for their release not only within Japan, but also extended their demands to 
foreign embassies, and governments, including Presidents Truman and Eisenhower. The 
end of the occupation removed restrictions that SCAP purge directives placed upon the 
public and military officials in Imperial Japan which brought them back into the political life. 
Many of these figures had a personal or institutional link to the Tokyo Tribunal and other 
military tribunals which was foundation of their commitment to the war criminals’ release 
cause. Some among them, felt guilt as they were not the ones prosecuted, purged, or 
incarcerated which made them feel as they ought to return a favor to their fellow, less 
fortunate colleagues.116 Furthermore, what made others bandwagon was that the political, 
social, and emotional aspect of the war criminals question made it a fertile ground for 
politicians for gathering political votes. Mamoru Shigemitsu, former Class A war criminal 
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convicted by the IMTFE and released in 1950 by the SCAP Parole System, became the 
chairman of the Progressive Party or Kaishintō in 1952. Among the released Class A war 
criminal suspects were Nobusuke Kishi, member of the Liberal Party elected to the Diet in 
1953, Genki Abe, a candidate for general elections for Lower House in 1952; Ryōichi 
Sasakawa, who was indirectly involved in Japan’s postwar politics by helping political 
parties and businesses as a highly influential and wealthy businessman. From persons 
institutionally related to the work of the IMTFE was Ichirō Kiyose, General Tōjō’s defense 
attorney, formerly purged by SCAP, returned to politics as a secretary-general of 
Kaishintō.117  
On December 16, 1952, the National Convention for the immediate release of the war 
criminals was held and attended by many of the above-mentioned public figures and others, 
such as Shūmei Ōkawa, the Class A defendant dismissed during the Trial as mentally unfit, 
and later released form the mental hospital in 1948. They provided their support for the 
Declaration that was adopted on this occasion and which openly challenged the Trial.118 The 
Declaration rejected the legal grounds of the Tribunal as contrary to international law and 
treaties, “unilateral judgements as revengeful”119 and based on flawed investigations which 
only brought indignation and sorrow to the Japanese. The detained war criminals 
represented an impediment to Japan’s reintegration to the postwar international relations 
read the concluding paragraph of the Declaration.120  
One of the most influential private groups that worked on behalf of the war criminals 
was the Association for Relief of War Criminals, whose director was Chūichi “King Kong” 
Hara, admiral in Japanese Imperial Navy, who was prosecuted for war crimes in an 
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American military tribunal in Guam and released from Sugamo on April 19, 1951.121 In 1953, 
he was appointed by the Ministry of Justice as an advisor to the Chief of the Rehabilitation 
Bureau, his functions mainly consisting of preparing parole applications of war criminals for 
the Allied powers’ governments and helping rehabilitation of the released war criminals. At 
the same time the Ministry of Justice decided to organize vocational guidance program for 
war criminals in Sugamo Prison which aimed to be a way for them to earn money, made 
available from the Ministry of Finance funds, which was promised to be given to them as a 
reward after their release.122  
The ultranationalist groups such as Young Men’s Association for Japanese 
Reconstruction or Nippon Kenseikai on whose agenda release of war criminals was ranking 
high pressed the government, foreign representatives, and organized gatherings.  
Other than many Americans of Japanese descent who used their influence to promote 
the resolution of the Japanese war criminal issue, among influential Americans who 
travelled to Japan was E. Stanley Jones, Methodist Christian Missionary. In his letter to 
General Snow, he rightly observed that “the whole affair has spilled over from judicial to the 
political and to the human […] This can no longer be looked as a merely judicial affair and 
confined to that area.”123 
By the end of 1953, while the sympathy for war criminals reached new peaks, the 
situation in Sugamo was becoming critical with loose discipline and threats of mass 
escape.124 In the words of one prison official, reported by The Mainichi “if the prisoners 
should try to escape, we would just have to stand aside and let them pass; if the government 
wants to stop them with guns, let armed troops do it.”125 In September 1953, the Sugamo 
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Prison Committee concluded that there was a lack of understanding among people 
regarding the distinction between the Class A and Class BC war criminals which had been 
hindering the release movement. The petitions were no longer enough in order for the 
movement to finally transition from social to political one in order to gain vigor. The 
Committee expressed frustration at the “stubborn” war criminal problem in relation to the 
US and Britain, which are linking the release of war criminals with the Korean War and 
Japanese rearmament. The hopeful part of the report was the encouragement to exploit the 
strengthened Japan’s international stance under the peaceful offensive by the USSR and 
Communist China in order to make the US and Britain speed up and settle the war criminal 
problem.126 Although the issue of war criminals had not yet reached its peak on the political 
agenda, both Japan and the US were pondering over the possibility of using the war 
criminals release as a trump card in dealing with each other.  
 
6. All Paths Leading to the Release: Behind the Curtain of “Legalism”  
 
The classification of war criminals into A and BC Classes created confusion during the post-
trial process as its main stakeholders created different expectations for each group. As it had 
already been previously mentioned, the Class A war criminals were considered to be “the 
worst ones” by the Japanese public opinion and by the Japanese government. Nevertheless, 
the classification only indicated the type of the crime and the rank of its perpetrator, not the 
seriousness of the crime. In addition, terms such as “major” war criminals (Class A) and 
“minor” (Class B) war criminals were self-evident for the public and created further 
confusion for ordinary people who had constantly compared them. Accordingly, Class A 
referred to the crime of aggression that was committed by the individuals occupying the 
top-ranking civilian or military positions. In 1945, it was of utmost importance for the Allied 
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powers to mete stern justice to individuals whose names were sound to the public—Hideki 
Tōjō was another Japanese equivalent, besides the aforementioned Emperor, who was 
compared to the German Kaiser who had escaped the responsibility for war in 1918. 
However, among the BC war criminals, facing justice for conventional war crimes and 
crimes against humanity, were those guilty of crimes such as vivisections and bacteriological 
testing which were considered to be among the most heinous crimes. In this regard, for the 
majority of the Allied powers’ governments the Class A war criminals were not necessarily 
the most problematic or worst criminals to deal with. In other words, the release of the Class 
A war criminals was not a sine qua non of the release of the Class BC criminals. These 
misunderstandings were source of frustration and confusion that stressed the unfolding of 
the clemency and parole program on both sides.  
1953 was the year when the CPB received the first recommendations for the release of 
Class A war criminals from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs —notably for Jirō 
Minami, Shunroku Hata, and Takasumi Oka. In March 1953, the former IMTFE Chief 
Prosecutor Joseph Keenan was in a private visit to Tokyo where he met with the Prime 
Minister Yoshida, other officials, and received an audience with the Emperor. 127  The 
encounter naturally led to the discussion on the war criminals, albeit not officially. The 
Japanese press reported that the US government requested ex-Prosecutor’s views on the war 
criminals’ parole which were to be decisive on the matter. In his grandiloquent like manner 
Keenan said that “almost all of the twelve [Class A war criminals] can be released without 
danger to world peace.”128 Ironically, Keenan was still framing the narrative around the 
golden age Class A war criminals in terms of world peace whereas the peace promised to be 
maintained and war crimes deterred, by the UN Charter and war criminal tribunals in 1945 
respectively, had been usurped in not so faraway battlefields of the Korean Peninsula. Few 
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months later, Keenan visited the CPB where he voiced his opinions on Class A war criminals 
with respect to their rank and potential threat they posed to the postwar Japan. Although 
the IMTFE obviously failed at reeducating the Japanese, General Snow’s notes129 of the 
meeting captured Keenan’s candid view of what goals the Trial was meant to fulfill—it was 
not so much about the deterring effect, but rather it was used to “inform Japanese people of 
how they got into war,” and “to reduce effect of exulted function of defendants on the 
people.”130 These words meet the above-presented challenges of the prosecution to convict 
the representatives of each phase of the war faced with meagre evidence; in that context the 
multiple criteria they used looked for their rank, reputation, and visibility during the war. In 
Keenan’s evaluation Minami and Araki were described as not “rabble-rousing” which 
recommended them for clemency, while he held some reservations for Hata due to the high 
rank he held in the Army. As the only Field Marshall Hata was one of the key figures in 
China phase of the Trial—convicted of negative criminal responsibility and war crimes 
committed on a large scale and over a long period of time by his troops in China—although 
his conviction was made upon prima facie evidence.131 Kenryō Satō, Lieutenant General, who 
had never held the highest-level cabinet or army posts and Okinori Kaya, Minister of 
Finance, both Tōjō’s protégés were recommended for clemency as not “fanatic and war 
promoters.” Among those approved for clemency by Keenan was Naoki Hoshino, one of the 
prominent entrepreneurs and political figures in Manchukuo and later chief of cabinet in the 
Tōjō Cabinet as he would be “of more use outside prison.” Interestingly, Keenan suggested 
a careful reexamination of one of the most important defendants at the Trial, the Lord 
Keeper of the Privy Seal and advisor to the Emperor, Kōichi Kido as he thought that “he 
might have been wrongfully prosecuted.” In 1947, Keenan cross-examined Kido in order to 
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elicit from him any information about the Emperor’s role in decision-making process 
preceding the Pearl Harbor attack which he thought would support the larger occupation 
policy of exonerating the Emperor from criminal responsibility. Initially, his cross-
examination was supposed to be conducted by Comyns-Carr, the British Prosecutor at the 
IPS, who was in charge of studying Kido’s dossier, but in the last moment Keenan bluntly 
took over without any prior preparation or consultation with other members of the IPS, thus 
ruining the opportunity for getting important information from “this intelligent and 
formidable witness.” 132  The rest of Class A “villains,” according to Keenan: Kingorō 
Hashimoto, who was branded as unrepentant “fanatic war monger,” Shigetarō Shimada, 
Navy Minister during the Pearl Harbor attack, Takazumi Oka, Navy Vice-Admiral, who was 
depicted as bitter fanatic, Hiroshi Ōshima, former Japanese Ambassador to Germany, who 
was described as “the most dangerous man in confinement,” and Teiichi Suzuki, Army 
General were all listed as more or less potentially dangerous. 
In 1953, as the anti-US climate was reaching a new climax, the rumors that the 
Communist China and the Soviet Union were willing to repatriate the Japanese war 
criminals in their possession further frustrated the Allied powers’ legalistic plan for the 
release of war criminals. To be more precise, the Japanese prisoners of war (POWs) were 
prosecuted in Communist China Trials in the 1950s where their main purpose was to 
reeducate the Japanese, contrary to the Allied powers’ criminal courts that dwelled on 
retribution; in the Soviet Union, they were held in concentration camps, while few of them 
were adjudicated in the Khabarovsk trial. As neither Communist China nor the USSR signed 
the Peace Treaty with Japan, they had a liberty to organize their own trials. All the Japanese 
captured by the both countries were referred to as “war criminals,” not prisoners of war. 
This strategic move potentially had serious ramifications at various levels. On the one hand, 
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it would add more fuel to the already enflamed Japanese public opinion against the US—
their ally which was slacking its pace of releasing the war criminals behind its legalistic 
policies—while the Communist countries showed benevolence in dealing with the Japanese. 
This situation contrary to the common sense and logic gave powerful political tool to the 
leftist and neutralist elements in Japan to gain more sympathies among the population.133 
The refusal to grant clemency to Class A war criminals Araki and Minami could be 
evaluated against the Communist magnanimity.134 The members of the Japanese House of 
Representatives met with Walter Robertson and Robert J. G. McClurkin in September 1953 
to communicate their fears and urge the US to further speed up the release since the 
Communist threat loomed large.135 On October 12, 1953 the Japanese Red Cross helped 
repatriate 1274 Japanese “war criminals“ from Moscow, among which were military and 
civilians.136 According to the data held by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, there 
were 68,000 Japanese prisoners of war and civilians in hands of the Soviets and Chinese who 
were serving their sentences as war criminals. The situation became more precarious with 
both Philippines and China pardoning and releasing war criminals137 which created the 
impressions that the Asians did their part, but not the Americans. Furthermore, the releases 
of North Korean and Chinese Communists who had been captured and their non-
prosecution for atrocities committed against the Americans and United Nations’ POWs was 
one of the first failed tests of the postwar international criminal law principles which had 
been adopted in 1945.  What’s more both the illegality of waging war, its criminality, along 
with war crimes and crimes against humanity were eroded by the more pressing matters 
                                                          
133 General Files, 1952-1958, Memorandum of Conversation, Department of State, September 25, 1953 in 
NARA, RG220, Box 5. 
134 Weekly notes, November 7, 1953 in NARA, RG 84, Japanese War Criminals, Box 1. 
135 General Files, 1952-1958, Memorandum of Conversation, Department of State, September 25, 1953 in 
NARA, RG220, Box 5. 
136 The Weekly Notes for Tokyo, Department of State, November 21, 1953 in NARA, RG 84, Japanese War 
Criminals, Box 1.  
137 Mainichi, Editorial, “War Criminal Issue,” January 11, 1954 in NARA, RG84, War Criminals – General 
Files, Box 28.  
 
 
 
 
 
113 
were awaiting and no country wanted to get embroiled in another round of fastidious 
criminal proceedings. The UN General Assembly Resolution condemning, in vague and 
unspecified terms, the atrocities against Americans and the UN POWs was released only to 
appease the Congress and public opinion at home.138 
The recommendations for clemency of Minami, Araki, and Hata were discussed 
between the Allied governments’ representatives in November, 1953. The US supported 
clemency on the grounds of old age and health for Minami and Araki, who were to be 
supervised by the attorney general of Japan, but the postponement of Hata’s case for a later 
date as he was convicted on counts of war crimes (BC Class) to which the Netherlands, 
Pakistan, and France all concurred.139 The Commonwealth countries formed a conservative 
block that opposed any form of clemency suggesting they would agree to a temporary 
release for a hospital treatment, upon which they should return back to prison.140 The UK 
and Australia were opposed to clemency, even on the grounds of old age which they 
considered to be insufficient according to their domestic law– the most they could offer is to 
eventually agree to release the three on parole in 1959. The Australian position was 
particularly conservative not only because of the suspicions harbored towards Japan and 
their popular opinion being hostile to the Japanese, but also because their criminal system 
only recognized medical parole and reduction of sentence, hence they were careful about 
establishing precedents. Australians did not heed much about the fear the US felt as a 
response to the peaceful offensive by the USSR and “opposed what seemed like US effort to 
force the issue.”141 In January 1954, a special medical parole was approved by the majority 
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governments only for Minami, 78 years old who left Sugamo prison, while Araki, 75, was 
left for later consideration.  
Months prior to the official Prime Minister Yoshida’s visit to the United States 
scheduled for November 10, 1954, the Japanese Embassy in Washington was laboring hard 
to persuade the US government to prepare some tangible policies that would speed up the 
release of the war criminals. The Embassy Officer Takeuchi pointed at the speedy clearing of 
German prisons which was frustrating to the Japanese government as well as the unrest 
among the war criminals confined in Sugamo that could potentially escalate in the absence 
of some ameliorations. 142  At this point, the war criminals were becoming assertive in 
demanding political solution to the issue as they had a clear awareness “that public opinion 
was an important force behind them, not Yoshida or the US.”143 Ambassador Allison urged 
Secretary of State Dulles to seize the opportunity and find US offered solution to the 
problem, before it was too late. In Allison’s words “failure to attack this problem effectively 
is bound to cause our broader interest here to suffer increasingly.”144 He rightly observed 
that “the Japanese attitude was hardening on number of fronts” 145  in light of utmost 
irritation around the static issue of war criminals and the Bikini Atoll incident. Finally, he 
warned that this might be the last opportunity to take the maximum benefit of the present 
situation “at no tangible cost to us [the US] something of value for Yoshida to show for his 
visit.”146 The US could objectively promise to speed up the release of considerable number of 
war criminals while the remaining ones, those who committed the most heinous crimes, 
could never be paroled or at least, not in the near future.  
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In 1954, an important change brought about the solution that would speed up the 
release process while preserving the veil of legality that was of the utmost importance to the 
US and some of its allies. The expedite judicial review solution was a victory for the legalists 
in the US government against the repeated calls for granting amnesty or pardon from the 
Embassy and various State Department officers that was rejected on the grounds that it 
would nullify the legality of the war crimes program. Anyhow, it was a step forward 
towards resolving the anti-US “psychological climate not conducive to Japanese 
cooperation.”147 The US reviewed the CPB parole procedure in responding to the pressures 
and repeated warnings coming from the Political Division of the US Embassy in Tokyo. It 
was suggested that “the US government should elaborate a policy or concept as to the time 
limit in which the war criminal problem can be liquidated.”148 On July 12, 1954 the President 
approved the CPB proposal for the change in the basic rules governing parole mechanism—
one third of sentence for those with sentences in duration of 30 years or over and 15-year 
rule for lifers—which resulted in an all-encompassing 10-year rule which allowed all 
prisoners to become eligible for parole after having served 10 years of their sentence.149 In 
addition, upon the recommendation of the State Department, the CPB agreed to review all 
the cases and recommend them to the President,150 with the exception of the Class BC hard 
core cases, by the end of 1955 which meant that the war crimes program would be almost 
liquidated.151 If the old rules were to remain, the lifers, all of the Class A war criminals, 
would only become eligible for parole in 1961.  
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Simultaneously, during 1954, all of the ten remaining Class A war criminals were 
recommended for clemency by the NOPAR, four of them based on old age, as they were 
over seventy years old, while the remaining seven were the ones the most involved in 
aggressive war policy line according to the Board. The Board recommended that in the 
absence of credible medical record justifying earlier release on medical parole, all the cases 
would become pending.152 Recommendations for special medical parole for Hata, whose 
medical situation was worsening, and Oka, who was not seriously ill, were thorn in the eye 
to the CPB as they were convicted of BC war crimes, which could have repercussions for BC 
war criminals and involved in Pearl Harbor attack respectively.153 For these cases, the CPB 
required the veracity of Japanese medical reports to be confirmed by an American doctor. 
Ambassador Allison strongly discouraged this course as it could be interpreted by the 
Japanese government as questioning of their good faith in applying Article 11 of the Peace 
Treaty and would create situation reminiscent of the occupation days.154 Especially so in the 
light of the death of Bikini Atoll victim Aikichi Kuboyama and the fact that other 
governments did not ask for such double confirmation which would additionally enrage the 
Japanese. In the end, the chairman of the board acquiesced, but still on his own initiative 
forwarded the Japanese medical report to an army doctor through the US Army Judge 
Advocate General (JAG) for a comment.155 The US did not reach the decision on the two, 
“but not to make impression of dragging their feet,” before the other allies, they attributed 
the non-decision to the resignation of their Department of Justice Board member.156 Contrary 
to Japanese expectations, the US was not always setting example for other countries in 
simply approving the recommendations, quite the opposite. The US Embassy in Tokyo 
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feared that if such information leaked to the Japanese, it would come at the high cost for the 
US. Both Hata and Oka were granted a special medical parole by the majority vote from 
which the US eventually decided to abstain.157  
In November 1954, the Allied governments were slowly starting to act in concert 
regarding the Class A war criminals—the ten-year rule was proposed by the New Zealand 
delegate and the US as a legal basis for their parole thus making them eligible in 1955 or 
beginning of 1956 the latest.158 The most conservative governments, Australia and Britain 
were opposed to this proposition while France, Pakistan, the Dutch which supported early 
clemency and release agreed to these more liberal policies regarding the Class A war 
criminals. Australia was willing to follow the US lead as long as it did not have to be the 
initiator, due to its domestic concerns.159 For the Dutch, the Class A war criminals could be 
processed quicker as the justification for its Parliament and public opinion could be 
provided “under considerations of international nature.”160 The remaining task was for the 
Allied powers’ respective government to formulate their positions with respect to individual 
cases keeping in mind the ultimate goal that was “to dispose of this problem as rapidly as 
possible.”161 
In words of J. Graham Parsons, Officer of the US Embassy in Tokyo, during his visit to 
Washington in November 1954, Yoshida missed his chance to achieve more tangible results 
regarding the war criminals issue which was not of primary importance for him. Instead, he 
considered this topic should be left for discussion to lower level officers who accorded much 
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more attention to it.162 Although Yoshida’s modest efforts regarding war criminals’ release 
did not score high among his diplomatic achievements, things were taking their natural 
course—intransigent Japanese public opinion, the crumbling of Yoshida’s political base, and 
an overall anti-US climate that took root—as the US was finally gaining sobriety regarding 
the war criminals issue. It became clear that the war crimes program would have to get the 
tint of political and finally take more seriously into consideration the diplomatic and 
geopolitical aspect of its relation with Japan. The war criminals question and the insistence 
on its judicial character were taking toll on the implementation of other important policies, 
especially related to defense.163 The Assistant Secretary for East Asia and Pacific Affairs 
Robertson acknowledged that together with the State Department Legal Advisor, Phleger, 
who previously vigorously protested a political solution, the issue will be brought to the 
attention of the Secretary of State.164 
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CHAPTER 4: Japan and Releasing of the Class A War Criminals: New Understanding of 
Japan’s War Responsibility  
 
1. Cleaning up the Class A War Criminals: Medical Parole and the Allied Powers’ 
“Benevolence”  
 
The medical parole was the only way in which the Allied powers could effectively justify the 
release of Class A war criminals on humanitarian grounds, but also show themselves as 
compassionate and merciful towards aged and sick men they did not want to see dying in 
prison. In its recommendations for clemency of the Class A cases who were over 70, the 
Japanese government advanced clause from its Code of Criminal Procedure of 1948 
according to which the execution of sentence for prisoners who are at least 70 years old 
could be stayed on the moral grounds. However, not all the Allies were willing to accept the 
Japanese Criminal Code clauses, but advanced their own as an impediment for casting their 
favorable vote. The US position was quite prudent when it came to medical parole, the 
Board was favorable to casting vote for reasonable requests, but it deplored that the 
Japanese government in many cases failed to demonstrate the detailed medical condition or 
ailment of the Class A war criminals as they were not all old and sick. The Board concluded 
that granting them all medical parole would be a farce.  
Sadao Araki is the case in point, whose application dragged on for two years due to the 
stark opposition from the Commonwealth governments. As the initial application for Araki 
did not comprise a medical report or any information indicating ailment, his dossier was 
placed together with the other Class A war criminals who were considered for clemency or 
regular parole. French government was the most flexible as it was prepared to grant special 
treatment to Class A war criminals over 70 – Minami, Araki, Hata, Shimada, and Kido.1 The 
US was concerned that the group releases would jeopardize the proper procedure of 
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reviewing each case on its merits. In November 1953, during the governmental consultations, 
the Commonwealth nations were all opposed to any form of clemency based on old age 
proposing 1959 as the year to consider parole for the Class A war criminals who were not 
applying for medical parole. According to Australian penal system, life sentences were 
considered as 21 years with remission of one-third for good behavior which would reduce 
the sentence to 14 years, hence the prisoner would become eligible in 1959.2  In October 1954, 
the Canadian government proposed that as Araki was not involved in the aggressive 
policies after 1939, whereas others were, he could be distinguished from other Class A war 
criminals.3 At that time, the US representative proposed that the system of parole, the ten-
year rule approved by the president, could also be extended to Class A war criminals who 
were all serving life sentences.4 In February 1955, the Secretary of State Dulles complained to 
Bassin in Tokyo that the NOPAR medical reports were out of date which posed difficulties 
in deciding the cases and fed the idea that an American doctor should examine the prisoners 
directly.5 The State Department entered into all sorts of legal technicalities to support these 
requests. In case of medical examination of applicants by an American doctor, the State 
Department explained that the Japanese Law No. 103 contained a provision under which the 
Japanese government should allow the interested government to send an official to inspect 
the conditions of the execution of sentence and interview the prisoner.6 In March 1955, the 
NOPAR provided a medical report for Araki, 78, that diagnosed him with kidney atrophy 
due to arteriosclerosis and prognosis was not bright—“recovery is slow and the prospect of 
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recovery extremely poor” concluded the report.7 On June 14, 1955 the Allies’ representatives 
agreed to grant a special medical parole to Araki.8 Furthermore, in Hata’s application the 
NOPAR deliberately understated the offenses committed, at his request, in order to make a 
strong case for clemency and parole.9 The US was calculating its position in anticipation of 
other allies’ votes, concretely the CPB agreed that in case of the casting vote, the chairman 
should oppose clemency, while in case the majority was pro-clemency, he should align.10 In 
that sense, the US was not necessarily setting an example for others, but was using the 
positions of other governments to secretly preserve its time-consuming legalistic policies, a 
time credit that the US had already started to lose.  
The medical parole requested for Shigetarō Shimada was pending as the defense 
member of the Board considered that it would be difficult to release him on a medical parole 
given the serious offenses he was involved with as Navy Minister.11 The member referred to 
Shimada’s support for policies of killing survivors of sunken ships, although this offense did 
not gain prominence at the IMTFE, for which his subordinates pleaded guilty in United 
States of America v. Hisashi Ichioka, et. al in Yokohama Trials. 12  Together with Kingorō 
Hashimoto, he was described as “bad eggs,” and as they did not suffer from any serious 
illness, the prospects they would be released were slim in 1954. In his letter to the Embassy 
in Tokyo, Director of Northeast Asian Affairs from State Department Noel Hemmendinger 
deplored the almost set in stone rigidity of the US war crimes program: “it was extremely 
unfortunate that our position is so inflexible [w]hile the other Governments are developing 
more liberal attitudes as a result of our pressures, our position is remaining static.”13 This 
rigidity was reflected when in March 1955 Shimada was granted a medical parole by the 
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majority vote of the interested governments, on the occasion of which the US did not vote 
and stayed aside as it could not reach position on the case. 14  Hashimoto, although 
recommended for medical parole by the NOPAR and despite the fact that he had already 
been hospitalized in 1952, diagnosed with gastric ulcer which might have later developed 
into cancer, was not granted medical parole. Released on parole in September 1955, he died 
soon after on June 29, 1957 of a lung cancer.15 It is possible that the same way as in case of 
Shimada, his military record— the top-ranking military officer responsible for his troops’ 
war crimes in USS Panay Incident and portrayed as a staunch promoter of a military control 
over government, and aggressive war policies through his membership in the Imperial Rule 
Assistance Association—weighted against the unclear or suspicious diagnosis on his 
medical record in the deliberations of the CPB.  
 
2. The Hatoyama Cabinet and the Shifting Policies: Jyūnen Hito Mukashi 
 
The major shift took place with the Hatoyama administration that finally  dealt with the war 
criminal issue on the top government level contrary to the previous years where it had been 
almost exclusively relegated to the lower level where the respective embassies and the CPB 
were in charge with slight interventions of the State Department and the President 
Eisenhower. In 1955, Allison warned against the pressure placed upon Japan to increase its 
defense spending which would backfire on the US and introduce a considerable resistance 
to the establishment of the solid foundations for a long-term cooperation.16  Japan was 
deeply frustrated for not being an equal that could “influence US policy to same degree as 
major NATO powers”17 and pursue policies that are in line with its national interest rather 
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than “result of external pressures.”18   This bred a feeling among the Japanese of their 
country being treated “as second-class nation.” 19  The shift in the US policies was to 
primarily focus on building a solid political and economic basis in Japan which would bring 
improved confidence and sense of responsibility and hence become its bouncing off place 
for a more robust military buildup.20  
On December 10, 1954 Ichirō Hatoyama was elected the Prime Minister thus ousting 
Yoshida from power. This change in power would not only have the major repercussions for 
Japanese foreign policy, but also for Japanese war criminals, including the Class A. In his 
address before the Diet on January 21, he talked at the very beginning about his intention to 
finally resolve the deploring issues of repatriation of the Japanese detainees from abroad 
and war criminals still detained in Sugamo by appealing to the countries concerned.21 Prime 
Minister Hatoyama was determined to urge the US government to speed up the release of 
the war criminals meant to be eligible for parole only in 1959 by considering reduction of 
sentence. He argued that the US public opinion, often advanced as an excuse by America to 
justify the reluctance in the release process, should understand that ten years after the war, 
the Japanese were eager to liberate themselves from the remnants of war and ensure the 
general release of prisoners and their full freedom which proved to be impossible under the 
present parole system. During the same month, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu voiced his 
stance on foreign policy priorities which were the return of Okinawa and resolution of war 
criminals issue. Shigetmitsu did not hide his deep frustration with the inequality reigning 
the US-Japan relation—“it is truly distressing to see the scars of the war before our eyes at a 
time when cooperation with the democratic, free nations is being stressed.”22 
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The general elections planned for February 27, 1955 brought before the US, 
specifically the Secretary of State Dulles, the question of the timing when the decision 
regarding the release of Japanese war criminals could be announced to provide maximum 
benefits to the US. Ambassador Allison suggested that as it was expected that the 
conservatives would win two-thirds of the seats, the announcement before the elections 
would not contribute to the strengthening of the conservative position and might also be 
plagued with accusations of American ulterior motives. This option lost appeal to the fact 
that all the parties across the political spectrum were also eager to see war criminals released 
as they considered it “as politically motivated and unwarranted influence in Japan’s internal 
affairs.”23 Allison favored the announcement to be given after the elections as a strategic 
move that would set the US off to a good start in its interaction with the new government 
and clear the current anti-US environment of tensions so that the negotiations on more 
important matters could finally take place.24 The anxiousness over the possibility that the 
Soviets could offset the US in releasing  Japanese “war criminals” before elections prompted 
Allison to ask the government to make a final decision as soon as possible. 25  To the 
disappointment of the State Department officers in charge of the Far East, Dulles refused the 
recommendation to announce the release of all Class BC war criminals as he thought it 
would provoke negative reactions on the German side considerations of which still actively 
managed to “prejudice” a more resolute steps on the Japanese side.26 Solution that was 
contemplated was to place the definite authority of granting parole and clemency upon the 
CPB which would remove the President from decision-making chain and speed up the 
process. However, McClurkin was rather pessimistic that all war criminals could be released 
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by the end of 1955 having in mind “the legal approach that dominated the thinking of the 
Board,”27 but decided to stay engaged in pressing further for the resolution of Japanese war 
criminal questions when such opportunity arose.28  
The amendment to the executive order which would delegate the presidential 
prerogative to make final decision regarding the grant of clemency and parole to the CPB 
stopped the stream of paroles for few months which further frustrated the Japanese.29 This 
decision was deemed necessary in light of relieving the President of such burdensome 
procedure and in view of other considerations in two countries’ relations30—one of them 
being that the clock was ticking for the Americans to show some tangible results on the war 
criminals agenda. Although the CPB acquired the authority to act independently, there was 
no major evidence that the release process was  moving forward which seriously started to 
press and worry the less and less understanding officials from the US Embassy in Tokyo and 
State Department, who represented the first line of defense against the Japanese pressures, 
and prompted them to urge for some concrete rules or measures that would be in line with 
intended improvement in relations with Japan.31 In May, the CPB set the target date, the end 
of 1956, by which the decisions regarding the BC Class war criminals should be made, 
except for the hard core category.32  For its part, the CPB almost commended itself for the 
principled and legalistic approach the American war crimes trial program in the Far East 
had taken.33 Regarding the Class A, the CPB announced that only one Class A war criminal, 
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Kenryō Satō, would be eventually paroled in 1956, thus implying that the remaining ones 
would be paroled throughout 1955. 
In February of the same year, the officer from the Japanese Ministry of Justice Yokomizo 
travelled to the US to discuss the issue of war criminals with State Department Officers in 
charge of the Far Eastern Affairs William Sebald and Richard Finn. At this point, the 
Japanese started expressing frustration over the pace of the US release of German war 
criminals while the Soviets were ready to release all of the war criminals in their custody. At 
this point, in a lack of any better answer, Sebald framed his argument legalistically that the 
Soviet prosecutions of the Japanese for war crimes were not undertaken on any valid 
international basis.34 Complaints were coming from the Foreign Ministry Office regarding 
the discrepancies between the Japan and Germany—throughout 1954 two thirds of German 
war criminals were released against only one fifth of the Japanese.35 Under Shigemitsu, the 
efforts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs took shape of a diplomatic offensive. On August 15, 
1955, on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the end of war, the Foreign Ministry sent a 
verbal note to the US requesting the release of war criminals from Sugamo. 36  The 
recommendation for the release was prepared by the NOPAR which expected the postwar 
decade to bring a halt to and remove all the vestiges of the war era and principally release 
the war criminals from confinement. This would be a stepping stone to the deeper and more 
mature relations between the two countries. Symbolically, this initiative was in line with the 
Japanese saying jyūnen hito mukashi or “ten years make an epoch” which implied that at this 
turning point past should be released so that the new basis could be laid for an improved 
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future.37 On June 3, Shigemitsu expressed what he saw as a major impediment to improved 
US-Japan relations by saying that “Japan wants to cooperate with the US, but with war 
criminals still kept in Sugamo, their families and relatives are hardly likely to feel 
cooperative,”38 as reported by Yomiuri. Eikichi Araki, Governor of the Bank of Japan and the 
first postwar Japanese Ambassador to the US, also believed that the bilateral relations could 
not be “cemented” without clearing the war criminals’ problem which would in return have 
dramatic impact upon the Japanese attitude towards the US.39  On July 19, 1955, the House 
of Representatives passed a resolution urging for the release of all “war prisoners” or senso 
jukeisha40 referring to those detained in Soviet Union and war criminals problem in reference 
to the Allied powers which should be finally concluded a decade after the end of the war. 
Tadanori Nagayama, in his speech giving the reasons behind the adoption of the resolution, 
made a reference to inmates who were seventy or over seventy whose detention was being 
inobservant to humanitarian considerations. He used the opportunity to refute the Tokyo 
Tribunal that he called “an arbitrary court” and “revengeful measure” which was contrary 
to international law and human rights, thus an offense to legalism cherished by civilized 
nations.41  
At the end of August 1955, Shigemitsu’s week-long visit to the US where he met with the 
Secretary Dulles and other officials was instrumental for discussing key matters burdening 
the bilateral relation. During these talks, in informal manner, Kishi expressed his view on 
what he considered the main impediments to the healthy US-Japan relations —that is, 
military bases in Japan, lack of independence in making its own defense budget and issue of 
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contributions to the US forces, and finally the detention of war criminals.42 Unashamedly, 
Kishi made a remark to the US officials that “he and the Foreign Minister had spent some 
time in Sugamo Prison and could not but be emotionally concerned in obtaining the release 
of those still in prison as soon as possible,”43 and expressed his hope that “the United States 
would take a “bold stand” and settle this problem once and for all.”44  
On the last day of Shigemitsu’s visit to the US, Asahi and Sangyo Keizai reported, in 
reference to Reuters dispatch, that the Australian Foreign Minister Richard G. Casey 
revealed that the US and other countries agreed to adopt a more “lenient”45 attitude towards 
the war criminals and gave the US “a considerable free hand”46 in resolving the issue during 
the ongoing negotiations with the Japanese. On September 8, 1955, the representatives of the 
Allied powers’ governments once again discussed the adoption of the ten-year rule for Class 
A war criminals that had been previously proposed by New Zealand and the US. France and 
Pakistan, in view of their interest for a prompt liquidation of the war criminals issue offered 
their support for the proposal. The Dutch representative expressed his disapproval of 
adopting any rules or “automatic system of parole” which would prejudice the judicial 
review of each parole application on individual basis, and said his government would agree 
to consider the Class A war criminals eligible for parole after they have served ten years of 
their sentence. The Dutch were the last line of resistance among the eight allies. They feared 
that the automatic release on parole for the major Japanese war criminals would make them 
adopt the same decision regarding the still confined Japanese minor war criminals and 
German war criminals they held. In the words of the officer from the US Embassy in Hague, 
the Dutch held “bitter personal memories” and it was politically difficult for them to justify 
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any such lenient position before its Parliament and public opinion.47 The New Zealand 
representative considered that the Dutch were just acting for the record and as the decision 
would be adopted by the majority governments, it would not be as harmful for them.48 In 
the end, the governments agreed that the rules by which the majority decision was achieved 
and the vote should remain secret when the decisions for the Class A war criminals’  parole 
were notified to the Japanese government,49 among others not to hurt the results of the 
negotiations related to the Dutch civilian internees compensation.50 On September 17, 1955 
the representatives unanimously granted parole to Kaya, Hashimoto, and  Suzuki after 
having completed ten years in confinement.51  Asahi Evening News dedicated its front page to 
the release of the three Class A war criminals, reporting that despite “Shigemitsu’s personal 
pleas,” 52  the allies refused the wholesale release pointing finger at the Dutch due to 
“bitterness at war crimes and inadequate reparations.”53 Hoshino was paroled on December 
13, 1955, while Kido and Ōshima were released three days later, after being granted parole 
by the allies, while the Netherlands abstained from taking vote.54  
The governments agreed that no special restrictions, other than those already existing 
under the Japanese law, would be imposed upon the parolees.55 The Japanese Embassy tried 
to press for Satō’s earlier release by manipulating the dates of his arrest, but to no avail, and 
as had been previously mentioned, he was paroled only on March 31, 1956 which meant that 
Sugamo was finally cleared of the Class A war criminals. However, Sugamo was still 
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inhabited by the “hard core” BC war criminals which committed such heinous crimes that 
the CPB could no longer find the appropriate basis for their parole.  
The secretary of state recommended that the CPB be abolished which the Board 
observed as an end to the judicial procedures regarding the Japanese war criminals: “if there 
exist political or diplomatic problems that render desirable a termination of the present 
judicial solution of the war criminal program and the substitution of a political solution, the 
Board has no objection.” 56  Harumi Takeuchi, section chief of American Bureau of the 
Japanese Foreign Ministry worried that the release of the Class A war criminals, considered 
to bear greater responsibility for war that those on the “working level, without the 
simultaneous release of the Class BC war criminals “hue and cry” was to take place in 
Japan.57  
 
3. Criminals to Men: The Diplomatic Success of the Kishi Cabinet  
 
Kishi’s election in February 1957 came as a gift to the American elite and diplomats for his 
proactive stance towards Japanese rearmament. In the words of Ambassador MacArthur II, 
he was the man “he could ‘do business’ with,”58 and hence urged Washington that it had to 
seize the opportunity to respond to the Japanese demands for change resulting from a deep 
sense of frustration and subordination emanating from the unequal security treaty, 
Okinawan issue, and trade restrictions with China. Already in 1954, he was “an American 
favorite”59 for the position of the prime minister, but conservatives chose Hatoyama instead. 
Ironically, Kishi was the middleman in connecting the military with the zaibatsu in order to 
secure investments for the industrial development of Manchuria, Tōjō’s Minister of 
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Commerce and Industry at the time of Pearl Harbor attack who signed the declaration of 
war against the US, and a golfing partner of Joseph Grew.60  
On March 31 1956, almost all of the allies’ countries, even the most conservative ones 
expedited the release process.  The Netherlands and Australia both cleared Sugamo from the 
war criminals they had prosecuted while the Communist China had repatriated a large 
number of Japanese war criminals. Only the US, technically Japan’s closest ally, was unable 
to release one hundred thirty-three remaining criminals, fifty of which were under 
consideration for parole. Under the ten-year rule, many of them were eligible for parole, but 
the CPB refused to consider their cases or to reduce their sentences to make them eligible 
still on the grounds of  the gravity of crimes committed.61 In the eyes of the Japanese the US 
was gaining the reputation of being “warden of Sugamo.”62 In the light of Okinawan land 
issue and discrimination of Japanese textiles, the prospects for amelioration of their bilateral 
relation only looked bleak.63   
Given that fact that the German Mixed Parole Board had German members, Shigemitsu 
urged the US to consider transferring the right to grant clemency and parole for the still 
imprisoned war criminals in Sugamo to the Japanese government.64 This was refused on the 
grounds that such action would have consequences for German war criminals who would 
likewise have to be released. It would further complicate the matter from point of view of 
the need to revise the provisions of Bonn-Paris conventions and thus place the revision 
before the Congress that had already been unsupportive of paroles for Dietrich and Peiper;65 
and in relations to Germany which placed the utmost importance to the resolution of the 
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criminals issue.66 The Germans and Japanese kept an eye on the pace and method of release 
of war criminals by the US in both nations and constantly drew comparisons in order to get 
concessions. For instance, in Japan, out of 800 war criminals sentenced by the US, 133 
remained in prison as of March 1956, while in Germany out of 665, only 31 remained.67 The 
CPB kept refusing Allison’s urges to release all of the BC Class criminals to whom it retorted 
that the Board “can’t just be moved about like a chess in handing of the cases,” and that if 
political solution was to be implemented it should be done under someone else’s guise.68  
The public activity of released Class A war criminals was attracting attention. Yomiuri 
Shimbun editorial reported about radio lectures given by Araki, Hashimoto, Suzuki, and 
Kaya which were “reminiscent of wartime atmosphere.” Hashimoto was planning to come 
back to political life, while Araki stated that “Japan was not defeated in a sense” thus 
appearing as if they left their responsibility for war the day they left Sugamo.69 The editorial 
took a rather critical approach in stating that they should exercise prudence in what they do 
and say as “their patriotism in the newly created postwar political circumstances were 
unnecessary”70 and that now when the Japanese people left the most of their war memories 
behind “the words of Class A war criminals may serve them like narcotics.”71 In November 
1955, Araki’s article “Recollections of my life in Sugamo prison,” appeared in the monthly 
magazine Bungeishunjū, exposed the lax treatment of prisoners in Sugamo which alarmed 
the representatives of the allies and once again cast doubt upon the good faith of the 
Japanese government in carrying out the Article 11 of the Peace Treaty. Prison life in 
Sugamo somewhat emulated life in Japanese society as the prisoners were entertained by 
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kabuki plays, concerts, and baseball games aimed to distract them from daily misery and 
resentment according to his account. Inmates were offered vocational guidance and allowed 
leave of absence for thirty days which many of them used to get employment. In the words 
of the article, Class A war criminals were given a better treatment that others, and Araki 
hoped than the remaining prisoners would be released soon. Representatives of the allies, 
especially Britain and Australia, were irritated by these stories as that meant that monthly 
reports they received from Sugamo were deceitful and that the attitude of the Japanese 
government now threatened “to harm the parole program.”72 While Araki was himself 
defensive in that his account was distorted, the Ministry of Justice, the Prison Officers all 
refuted the veracity of the stories as “exaggerated,” while the Foreign Ministry’s War 
Criminals Office was worried about repercussions this might have for the remaining Class 
BC war criminals detained in Sugamo. The US Embassy in Tokyo advised other 
representatives to take no action as the Japanese government was expected to put an end to 
this kind of statements which were bad for its reputation. Araki was also reported to have 
bitterly criticized his trial and blamed “the late President Roosevelt for ‘inveigling’ Japan 
into war.73 
Roy L. Morgan, the former IPS American chief interrogator, in 1955-1956 occupying the 
position of the advisor to the Japanese Prime Minister, was informed that Hayato Ikeda, 
Takeo Miki, Nobusuke Kishi and Ichirō Konō, were determined in helping Hatoyama 
remain in power after April 1956. One of the prewar senior politicians the group was 
promoting for the Diet membership and potentially as Hatoyama’s successor, was the 
paroled Okinori Kaya, Finance Minister in Tōjō Cabinet and member of technical 
committees at both London Naval Conference in 1930 and Geneva Disarmament 
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Conference.74 In an interview for Mainichi in 1957, Morgan who worked on Kaya’s dossier 
admitted that his choice was solely guided by his cabinet position at the time of the Pearl 
Harbor attack and that there were other candidates who could have been added instead.75 
He went on further to say that in later stages of the trial the evidence was adduced about his 
opposition to war, up until the receipt of the Hull Note which was read by the Japanese as 
an ultimatum. Morgan’s account as a former IMTFE American associate prosecutor eased 
the war responsibility stigma that had been placed upon  Kaya who was at that time active 
as a consultant in industrial circles, government, and planned on engaging into politics 
again by running in the electoral campaign for the Diet.  
In 1956, Japanese frustration over the non-repatriation from Communist China and the 
USSR, along with the US dragging its feet over the remaining war criminals peaked—it 
meant “Japan’s inferior international standing,”76 a feeling of being treated as a “second 
class” power, a feeling that Japan had suffered from at the end of World War I. The Japanese 
government’s progress on rearmament and defense issues and its anti-Communist cause 
were directly impeded by the war criminals issue that in the eyes of the Japanese mind 
“symbolize[d] national sacrifices for guilt incurred by the entire Japanese nation.”77 The 
release of the Class A war criminals provoked criticism of lesser war criminals still being 
imprisoned testifying to the persistence of the afore-mentioned confusion between the two 
classes. In Japan’s understanding the Japanese military and civilian leaders who plunged 
Japan into a war they lost and the atrocities their troops committed were considered to be 
“forgiven” and “cleared” the day the US and Japan signed the treaty of reconciliation which 
over the course of time, due to their protracted detention, made them appear as national 
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martyrs, and not the war criminals. Subsequently, for Japanese elites this issue represented 
an essential irritant and “psychological impediment”78 to military buildup that would allow 
Japan to contribute to the free world and cherish its commitments. Even the Japanese who 
supported the rearmament could no longer understand the US foreign policy incoherence in 
demanding Japan to rearm, but at the same time keeping the Japanese as war criminals in 
Japanese prisons.  
The Japan-Soviet negotiations scheduled in the end of 1956, further added drama among 
Washington’s officers, Robertson was particularly worried that the normalization of Japan-
Soviet relations would lead to unconditional amnesty for Japanese “war criminals” which 
would have detrimental impact upon the US diplomatic stance towards Japan.79 Despite 
their territorial issues, the USSR and Japan resumed their diplomatic and trade relations in 
December 1956. During the same month, the Soviets returned 1,025 former prisoners to 
Japan after commuting their sentences and claimed that all prisoners were released to which 
Japan did not agree. Allegedly, there were more 10,000 Japanese prisoners somewhere in 
USSR.80 Other than Stalin’s thirst for revenge towards Japan, the Soviet attitude towards the 
issue of Japanese war prisoners can be placed within the broader context of decline of 
Japanese Communist Party since 1949, need for labor to carry out Stalin’s modernization 
programs, and overall dissatisfaction with the US occupation of Japan.81 Nevertheless, by 
this time, as expected the US looked bad in the eyes of its ally.  
The newly elected Prime Minister Kishi required the US to grant pardon for all Class A 
war criminals as he had plans for some of them, principally for Kaya to engage politically as 
noted above. The pardon was ruled out as a solution as it would jeopardize the war criminal 
problem and cause public indignation. The options under consideration for the US were 
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termination of their parole supervision or reduction of sentences to time served. This request 
did not come out of concern that as parolees they would be constrained to assume public 
office, which was the case under Japanese criminal code, but having in mind that the 
Japanese considered the IMTFE judgements to be “foreign judgements,” these usual 
restrictions would not be applicable as they were not considered as war criminals under the 
Japanese domestic law. Eisaku Satō, the Diet member and Kishi’s younger brother, in his 
meeting with Ambassador MacArthur II emphasized the importance of clearing the paroled 
war criminals of “criminal stigma,” and wiping out their guilt so that the source of anti-
American feeling can be removed.82 Satō was primarily pleading for civilians, singling out 
Kaya as a close friend and advisor to Kishi, while he was ready for a sell-out the Class A 
military so that the civilians could reclaim their honor and banish their war guilt. 83 Kaya 
made a successful comeback to public life in both political and financial circles as a “senior,” 
colleague who was entitled to a support from his subordinates to “regain his ‘rightful 
place,’”84 the same way Kishi did when he was released from prison; this revealed deep 
rooted “pattern of thought” and political culture of loyalties among the Japanese elite.85 He 
was expected to run for a seat in Lower House with LDP support, and in the future, to 
replace Ikeda to the position of Minister of Finance. 86 
Until the CPB was abolished, on December 3, 1957, it held the position that the 
distinction could be made between the civilians and the military among the Class A war 
criminals from which it would be possible to reduce sentences to time served for the former, 
and terminate parole supervision for the former having in mind the serious nature of the 
crimes they had perpetrated. This would mean that Kaya, Kido, and Hoshino would have 
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their sentences reduced, while the remaining eight would have their parole supervision 
terminated only.87 The State Department particularly worried about the interpretation of the 
term “termination of parole supervision,” as they wanted to avoid the possibility of the 
Japanese interpreting it as if the parolees were discharged of their sentence.88 The US again 
took special care at this stage not to jeopardize in any way the judgement and sentences 
imposed by the IMTFE—it was ready to go with the alternative option, as the other 
governments were likely to go further.89  However, in that case the Japanese government 
would be placed in an unfavorable political position as it would have to amend Law No. 103 
that allowed for parole supervision only for the duration of sentence, which meant that their 
sentences would have  to be reduced. Another facet of the problem was that suspending 
parole supervision for the Class A war criminals, but continuing it for the Class BC would 
be troublesome.90 As the general elections in Japan scheduled for May 1958 approached, the 
US was hurrying to liquidate the war criminals problem “in time to give Kishi record of final 
accomplishment on at least this one troublesome problem”91 while the Japanese Embassy 
was under pressure to rebrand, Prime Minister’s friend Kaya for the upcoming elections.92 
When the CPB was abolished, the Japanese government formed a new board, independent 
from NOPAR, that assumed the CPB role of recommendation for clemency and parole for 
the remaining 45  Class BC war criminals to the Secretary of State.93 The Board wanted to 
settle the war criminals issue as soon as possible to which the US did not oppose, as after all, 
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Japan was supposed to rehabilitate these criminals into their society.94  Graham Parsons 
from the US Embassy in Tokyo made a remark that this persistent matter “created 
disproportionate political problems that we [the US] did not want to have.”95 Although not 
directly related, this rather favorable move by the US government in respect to the Japanese 
war criminals coincided with the lenient sentence pronounced by the Japanese court in the 
Girard case which was also adding strain to US-Japan relations throughout 1957.  
The Japanese government made request to other interested governments for the 
reduction of sentences to time served for all Class A war criminals. The Canadian 
representative questioned the reasons for such demand in view of lax restrictions that had 
been placed upon parolees and the French government was concerned about the 
repercussions that treating the major Japanese war criminals as a group, and not on an 
individual basis, would have for IMT major convicts in Spandau.96 On April 7, 1958, the 
Allied Powers agreed to comply with all Japanese requests thus putting an end to the IMTFE 
saga. In his reply note, Japanese Foreign Minister Aiichirō Fujiyama related to the Class A 
war criminals as A kyū kankeisha or Class A related persons instead of A kyū senpan Class A 
war criminals.97  This is how the Japanese Class A war criminals ceased being stigmatized as 
“lawless international wrongdoers”98 which allowed them to leave their wartime criminal 
record behind and subsequently the severe social stigma they were exposed to.  
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The fast transition from the Pacific War strategy to the Cold War strategy created confusion 
within the US administration which was also reflected in dilemma surrounding the release 
process of war criminals.99 The Class A war criminals were all released on parole and then 
had their sentences reduced, there was no pardon involved, thus their sentences were not 
invalidated from the point of view of the allies. However, the fact that they were released 
and thus cleared from war stigma does imply that domestically they were no longer 
responsible, they were forgiven. The IMTFE judgement had been observed as a foreign 
judgement, imposed as a part of the occupation, which, for the Japanese, lost meaning after 
the occupation ended. This duality between the war guilt perceived as being cleared in a 
domestic context, but still existent in international arena by the virtue of Japan’s acceptance 
of the IMTFE judgement caused ambivalent attitudes towards the subject of war 
responsibility. For Japanese, that pertained to an old era, that Japan was slowly surpassing 
as it regained its place in international relations as the Western ally. Especially so, in the 
1960s which was the era of economic prosperity for Japan in which the concepts of “prewar,” 
“militarist Japan,” no longer resonated with the society, and consequently, war criminals 
which were an inseparable part of that era had no longer any meaning in the newly created 
circumstances.100 During the same period, debates about the nature of the Pacific War were 
animating the press which was divided between aggressive and self-defensive nature of the 
war. 101  The prevalent view was still that of the aggressive war which called for the 
avoidance of war and pacifist stance to infuse the dominant historical narrative thus 
extending the rationale of the Tokyo Tribunal’s judgement.102 In 1970, Zhou Enlai and Kim 
Il-sung fiercely accused Japan of its militaristic revival and for becoming “a dangerous force 
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of aggression in Asia.”103 They went further on to accuse Prime Minister Satō of serving US 
imperialistic ambitions in Vietnam War, conspiring new war against North Korea, and 
having pretentions to seize Taiwan.104 In the same year, Richard Minear’s Victors’ Justice 
publication refuting the legal, historical, and procedural validity of the IMTFE further 
reinvigorated views of the far-right that Japan fought a self-defensive war and should no 
longer subscribe “to the Tokyo trial view of its history” which was met with strong criticism 
from the leftist who at that time still considered that the Tribunal is a symbol of peace and 
that war responsibility should not be negated. On October 17, 1978, the seven Class A war 
criminals were secretly consecrated to Yasukuni Shrine. Yasukuni Shrine commemorates the 
spirits of the IMTFE defendants, it is “ideologically loaded”105 as it revers the war dead as 
Shinto gods thus glorifying Japanese imperial past.106 In domestic arena, it constantly gives 
rise to debates about the meaning of war crimes trials and in international realm, it provokes 
suspicion about Japan’s stance towards its war responsibility and the Tribunal’s verdict it 
had accepted by the virtue of the Peace Treaty.   
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The first international criminal tribunals established on ad hoc basis by the UN Security 
Council after the IMT and IMTFE precedents were the International Criminal Tribunal for 
ex-Yugoslavia (ICTY) and International Military Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). The tribunals 
established in the 1990s completely misunderstood the role that IMTs played in the 
immediate postwar period and thus overestimated what international tribunals can and 
cannot do.107   
The Tokyo Tribunal is surrounded by Japan’s myth of victors’ justice and the Allied 
powers’ myth of harsh retribution under the rule of law. In certain aspects, those features 
are indeed rampant–prosecution of atrocities committed exclusively by Japan and death 
penalties imposed upon the seven defendants respectively–but there is considerably more 
complexity to the Trial than these over-simplifications uncover.  
The Tokyo Tribunal pivoted on crime against peace not on war crimes and crimes 
against humanity. National courts that prosecuted BC war criminals addressed these crimes 
and thereby complemented the work of the Tribunal. In that sense, the Allied powers made 
a deliberate choice to not include these atrocities into the historical record produced by the 
Tribunal whose judgement represent the dominant historical narrative. From that aspect, the 
IMTFE entrepreneurs bear the part of responsibility for the non-prosecution of crimes 
committed against the former Japanese colonies and their non-representation at the Tribunal. 
The Japanese revisionist and right-wing leaders have used that silence as an excuse for 
ignorance and insensitivity in dealing with its Southeast Asian neighbors. This insensitivity 
stems from the centrality given to the IMTFE which not only contained diverse narratives on 
the Japanese leaders’ war guilt, but also had “institutionally” forgiven the Class A war 
criminals for their misdeeds.  
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Regarding the overall criminal aspect of the crime of aggression that the Tribunal sought 
to deter, it can be assessed as a failure in light of interventions and proxy wars that took 
place in the 1950s and for which no leader was held responsible. The crime of aggression has 
been only introduced in the Charter of the International Criminal Court at Hague (the Rome 
Statute), but it is still out of applications while all its powerful member states opted out from 
its application. The present-day military actions by states, unilateral or collective, have 
stretched the norms governing the use of force under the UN Charter and its Article 51 
regulating its exception of self-defense to the point that there are highly contested pre-
emptive self-defense wars (war in Iraq) and humanitarian interventions (war in Kosovo) 
which at time of their commission took form of aggression in disguise. The change that the 
end of World War II brought is that states whenever they resort to use of force they hire the 
best international lawyers to find justifications in international law.  
The IMTFE project, understood as extending well into 1956, as an example of retribution 
for waging aggressive war, or at least, challenging the status quo stood against the 
background of great powers’ colonialism, engagement in proxy wars, and interventions 
which deeply eroded the Tribunal’s legality and legitimacy. Already in November 1954, the 
United Nations General Assembly where the project of codification of international criminal 
code, based on Nuremberg principles, was discussed, the US delegate Charles H. Mahoney 
explained that “the project for a code of crimes under international law in today’s world is 
impractical and inappropriate;”108 while it refused the possibility that its citizens could be 
subjected to international agency which would apply the said code.109    
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The Tribunal produced a “highly schematic and simplified histories”110 in which the 
antecedents of conflict […] are elided.111 Laws are unable to write history, yet the records of 
IMTFE are full of poorly patched historical narratives construed around weak and indirect 
evidence which was interpreted in the light of colossal amount of studies, documents, and 
treaties used by the prosecution.112  Illustratively, “great men” theory purported by the 
tribunal eliminates all other individuals or circumstances that led to the atrocity. In 1919, the 
Versailles Commission refused the prosecution on the basis of authorship pointing out at 
complex, multifaceted circumstances leading to war. The prosecution of a group of civilian 
and military leaders and the non-prosecution of other sectors of society at IMTFE, such as 
industrialists and secret societies, which supported the war effort meant that the 
responsibility was shared within few and nobody else which does not reflect the 
complexities leading to the Pacific War and the war effort more generally. Law cannot 
address war complexities in a way other disciplines, such as history, can, therefore “the 
history writing” role discharged by default by the Tribunal proved to be rather a failure, 
contrary to the expectations it was initially expected to fulfill. The dialogue within Japan 
regarding the meaning of the Empire and war did not happen which is the void that the 
IMTFE verdicts are fulfilling. Framing Japanese security through militarism and pacifism 
are also reflections of the IMTFE judgement’s legacy, that can be placed within the initial 
harsh occupation policies, which in hindsight proved to have been not so strategic and 
forward seeing. Even in the context of contemporary precarious security environment that 
Japan’s faces, many believe that the Article 9 of its Constitution should not be amended as it 
represents the institutionalized version of Japanese remorse for the past militarism which 
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can be assessed as naïve and out of touch with current necessities and geopolitical realities. 
There is a dichotomy between the level of Japanese military might and its acceptance and 
discussion within the Japanese society.  
The criminal tribunals are a part of larger policies and serve to advance goals of 
sponsoring states and those they choose to patronize and protect. In the first place, strong 
political, strategic reasons and will are needed in order to bring them to life which explains 
why not all the cases of international crimes are referred to international criminal 
institutions. The strategic legalism that was discussed earlier will be applied to the particular 
state or leaders, but there is no guarantee that it will be consistently applied to other states 
which engage against the “aggressor” and interpret the same norms as to legitimize their 
use of force or accompanying crimes.  
The international criminal tribunals cannot preserve peace and offer reconciliation. They 
can acknowledge interests of certain victims and punish leaders for their ideas, mistakes or 
actual crimes, but they cannot offer the protection of victims. They cannot make a complex 
historical record or establish the truth, they can make judgements of an event, offer a 
narrative of a story that is further to be rectified and challenged. They can advance norms 
and their application, but cannot guarantee their sustainable and universal application. They 
may educate political elites not to recur to the violence again, but they can also create 
resentment at the political and social level thus creating tensions and making peace 
precarious. Their reach is limited as well as the role they can play while their reputation has 
been damaged as they continue to appear as “circumstantial” and “occasional” instruments 
of peace in hands of the most powerful states. This shows the need to further study the 
military tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo which still bear considerable resemblance with 
present day criminal tribunals which are often surrounded by idealism and morality that 
once they put into practice become exercise of power against the status quo challengers.   
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